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THE CALCULUS OF ACCOMMODATION: 
CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE, AND OTHER CLASHES 
BETWEEN RELIGION AND THE STATE 
Robin Fretwell Wilson* 
Abstract: This Article considers a burning issue in society today—whether, 
and under what circumstances, religious groups and individuals should 
be exempted from the dictates of civil law. The “political maelstrom” over 
the Obama administration’s sterilization and contraceptive coverage 
mandate is just one of many clashes between religion and the state. Reli-
gious groups and individuals have also sought religious exemptions to the 
duty to assist with abortions or facilitate same-sex marriages. In all these 
contexts, religious objectors claim a special right of entitlement to follow 
their religious tenets, in the face of equally compelling claims that reli-
gious accommodations threaten access and may impose significant costs 
on others. Legislators and other policymakers have struggled with how to 
advance two compelling, and at times conflicting, values—access and reli-
gious liberty. This Article examines, and responds to, a number of “stick-
ing points” voiced by legislators about a qualified exemption for religious 
objectors that would permit them to step aside from facilitating same-sex 
marriages so long as no hardship will result. These concerns bear an un-
canny resemblance to reasons why some believe the Obama administra-
tion should not yield further on the coverage mandate. This Article main-
tains that religious accommodations qualified by hardship to others can 
transform what could be a zero-sum proposition into one in which access 
and religious freedom can both be affirmed. 
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Introduction 
 2012  has witnessed a “political maelstrom”1 over the Obama ad-
ministration’s regulations to implement the new health care reform law, 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).2 These 
regulations require nearly all employers and health insurers to cover 
sterilization procedures and contraceptives,3 including newer emer-
gency contraceptives like ella4 which sometimes act after fertilization to 
prevent pregnancy.5 Even before the regulations become final, a hue 
and cry arose from the faith community because mandated coverage 
places the bulk of religious employers “in the untenable position of hav-
ing to choose between violating the law and violating their con-
science[s]”6—specifically, their religious belief that life begins at con-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Analysis of the Obama Administration’s Updated Contraception 
Rule, Wash & Lee U., http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/facultydocuments/jost/contraception.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029. This Article refers to these laws collectively as the “ACA,” which is becoming the 
preferred term in contemporary literature. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the 
Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps and Border Crossing Techniques and How to Address Them, 5 St. 
Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 27, 27 (2011). 
On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius, upheld the ACA’s individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress’s taxing power, while striking down a portion of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as 
exceeding Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). 
3 Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 
2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54). 
4 Section 2713 of the Public Health Services Act, enacted through the ACA, requires 
insurers to cover women’s “preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in compre-
hensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.” Pub-
lic Health Services Act, § 2713(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
These measures include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive 
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women 
with reproductive capacity.” Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guide-
lines, Health Resources & Services Admin., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2012) [hereinafter HRSA Coverage Guidelines]; see News Release, Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Statement of Sec’y Kathleen Sebelius ( Jan. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html; see also Coverage of Preven-
tive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 8728 (discussing coverage of contraceptive 
services by insurers and health plans under the ACA); Jost, supra note 1, at 1 (analyzing 
the coverage mandate guidelines). 
5 See infra notes 137–156 (discussing the mechanisms of action for ella and Plan B). 
6 See Matthew Larotonda, Catholic Churches Distribute Letter Opposing Obama Healthcare Rule, 
ABC News ( Jan. 29, 2012, 8:19 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/catholic-
churches-distribute-letter-opposing-obama-healthcare-rule. 
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ception and should not be destroyed.7 Although the regulations exempt 
churches, their cramped definition of religious employer provides no 
refuge for religiously affiliated universities, hospitals, and social services 
agencies like Catholic Charities, the “arm of compassion” of the Catho-
lic Church.8 As one group that supported the ACA, the Catholic Health 
Association, explained: “The impact of being told we do not fit the new 
definition of a religious employer and therefore cannot operate our 
ministries following our consciences has jolted us. . . . From President 
Thomas Jefferson to President Barack Obama, we have been promised a 
respect for appropriate religious freedom.”9 
 These claims of a special right to be exempted from the dictates of 
civil law were met by equally vigorous claims that “all women, regardless 
of their employer, should be able to access the birth control coverage 
benefit.”10 In promulgating the regulations, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Labor 
(DOL) relied on an Institute of Medicine study showing that “women 
have unique health care needs and burdens,” including the need for 
                                                                                                                      
7 See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, Eternal Word Television Network v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-
00501-SLB (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2012) (stating that, as a Catholic programming television 
station, Eternal Word Television Network (EWTN) “does not believe that contraception, 
sterilization, or abortion are properly understood to constitute medicine,” and that “these 
procedures involve gravely immoral practices, including the intentional destruction of 
innocent human life”). EWTN argued that “[h]aving to pay a fine to the taxing authorities 
for the privilege of practicing one’s religion or controlling one’s own speech is un-
American, unprecedented, and flagrantly unconstitutional,” and asserted that “the Man-
date can be interpreted as nothing other than a deliberate attack by the Defendants on the 
religious beliefs of EWTN and millions of other Americans.” Id. at 2–3. 
8 See Greg Johnson, Obama’s ‘Fig-Leaf’ Compromise on Contraception Won’t Mollify Conserva-
tives, Knoxville News Sentinel, Feb. 12, 2012, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012 feb/ 
12/obamas-fig-leaf-compromise-on-contraception-wont. Under the regulations, an organiza-
tion is an exempt “religious employer” only when it primarily employs and serves those who 
share its faith, seeks to inculcate its religious values, and meets Internal Revenue Service tests 
for a faith-based body. See HRSA Coverage Guidelines, supra note 4. Religious groups have liti-
gated, and lost, claims that state-level contraceptive coverage mandates too narrowly define 
exempt religious organizations. See, e.g., Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 95 
(Cal. 2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 469 (N.Y. 
2006). 
9 Carol Keehan, Something Has to Be Fixed, Catholic Health World, Feb. 15, 2012, at 1. 
Other religious leaders asserted that the coverage mandate treats them as “second class citi-
zens.” See Letter from Thomas J. Olmsted, Catholic Bishop of Phx., to Brothers and Sisters in 
Christ ( Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://www.diocesephoenix.org/uploads/docs/RELIGOUS- 
LIBERTY-INSURANCE-LETTER-013012.pdf. 
10 See, e.g., Press Release, Planned Parenthood Fed’n, Planned Parenthood Applauds 
HHS for Ensuring Access to Affordable Birth Control ( Jan. 20, 2012), available at http:// 
www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/planned-parenthood-app- 
lauds- hhs-ensuring-access-affordable-birth-control-38582.htm. 
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contraceptive services.11 Women’s rights groups, such as the National 
Women’s Law Center, cheered the Obama administration for establish-
ing “a major milestone in protecting women’s health.”12 Others de-
cried the inclusion of even a limited exemption for religious organiza-
tions and encouraged HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius to hold the 
line against broader exemptions.13 
                                                                                                                     
 These competing claims about whether and when to accommo-
date religious objectors arise because religious objectors are not, as a 
matter of federal constitutional right,14 shielded against the burdens of 
 
 
11 Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8727–28 (Feb. 15, 
2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54) (citing Inst. of Med., Clinical Preventive Ser-
vices for Women: Closing the Gaps 16 (2011)). Based on the Institute of Medicine study, 
HHS and DOL concluded that “[t]he contraceptive coverage requirement is . . . designed to 
serve the compelling public health and gender equity goals described.” Id. at 8729. 
12 E.g., Press Release, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., HHS Decision on Contraceptive Coverage 
an Important Milestone ( Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.nwlc.org/press-release/hhs- 
decision-contraceptive-coverage-important-milestone. 
13 J. Lester Feder, Contraceptive Rule a Pill for Obama, Politico (Dec. 7, 2011, 4:47 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70036.html. 
14 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment does not require states to exempt sacramental drug use 
from the enforcement of neutral, generally applicable criminal laws). Whether Employment 
Division v. Smith was correctly decided or represents an improper limitation on free exer-
cise remains a deeply contested question. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemp-
tions Debate, 11 Rutgers J.L. & Religion 139, 150 n.44 (2009); Symposium, Twenty Years 
After Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twentieth Century’s Landmark Case on the 
Free Exercise of Religion and How It Changed History, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1655 (2011). Never-
theless, I take Smith as a starting point for the need to secure accommodations in the legis-
lative process. 
Of course, religious objectors may receive greater protection under the federal Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. Cf. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4 (1994)), (requiring strict scrutiny for all claims 
based on the Free Exercise Clause), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997). Although the Supreme Court in Flores held that the federal RFRA was uncon-
stitutional as applied to the states, religious objectors may receive protection from statutes 
in sixteen states mirroring the federal RFRA. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After 
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466, 477 (2010) (listing RFRAs in Alabama, 
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia); Eugene Vo-
lokh, RFRA State Map, UCLA Sch. L., http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/relmap.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2012) (reporting states with state constitutional amendments, statutory 
RFRAs, and state constitutional free exercise clauses interpreted to require strict scrutiny). 
The state RFRAs “facially require strict scrutiny of all substantial burdens on religious prac-
tices.” See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda with 
Test Suites, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 595, 598 (1999) (arguing that although “RFRAs have more 
specific, binding text than does the Free Exercise Clause,” they nonetheless leave a num-
ber of open questions regarding religious liberty); see also infra note 17 (discussing legal 
challenges to the coverage mandate premised on such statutory protections); infra note 
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generally applicable laws.15 Instead, as the U.S. Supreme Court specifi-
cally noted in the 1990 case, Employment Division v. Smith, religious 
groups and individuals must look to the political process for these ac-
commodations.16 
                                                                                                                      
 
231 (discussing a recent decision that New Mexico’s RFRA did not apply to actions by a 
commercial actor). 
In addition, many state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to confer greater 
religious rights than the Federal Constitution. Lund, supra, at 466–67. Professor Christopher 
Lund notes that thirty states go beyond what is required by Smith and provide greater reli-
gious protections than federal law. Id. at 467; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. See generally Angela C. 
Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 
1993 BYU L. Rev. 275 (discussing state constitutions and how they have been interpreted to 
confer heightened protection to religious groups and individuals). 
15 Importantly, laws that are not neutral may also be struck down in accordance with 
Smith. See 494 U.S. at 890. A recent case from Washington, Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, illustrates 
how contextual the analysis of neutrality is. See 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 
2007), vacated, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). In Stormans, a group of pharmacists filed suit 
to preliminarily enjoin state rules lacking a conscience exemption. Id. The rules required 
them to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, which violated their religious con-
victions. Id. The federal district court granted this injunction, finding the rules to be nei-
ther neutral nor generally applicable given evidence that “strongly suggests that the over-
riding objective of the [rule] was, to the degree possible, to eliminate moral and religious 
objections from the business of dispensing medication.” Id. at 1259. 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that, from the 
“thin” evidentiary record, the rules were neutral and generally applicable because the “object 
of the rules was to ensure safe and timely patient access to lawful and lawfully prescribed 
medications . . . [and to] eliminate all objections that do not ensure patient health, safety, 
and access to medication.” 586 F.3d at 1131–32, 1142. The court emphasized that the rules 
did not single out drugs to which pharmacists might have a religious objection. See id. Conse-
quently, the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded the case. Id. at 1126. 
On remand, the district court conducted a twelve-day bench trial, developing a fifty-
four page record of factual findings, and concluded that the rules were neither neutral 
nor generally applicable. 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1181 (W.D. Wash. 2012). With respect to 
neutrality, the court found that the rules “are riddled with exemptions” that undermine 
their secular purpose, “but contain no such exemptions for identical religiously-motivated 
conduct.” Id. at 1190. Further, the state failed to explain why the refuse-and-refer policy for 
secular exemptions would create prohibitive difficulties for religious exemptions. Id. Lastly, 
the court found that “[t]he rules are not generally applicable because the State does not 
enforce them against all pharmacies, or even to all pharmacies with religious objections to 
dispensing [emergency contraception].” Id. at 1199. The court, applying strict scrutiny per 
Smith, concluded that the rules were unconstitutional. Id. at 1201. 
16 See 494 U.S. at 890 (concluding that neutral and generally applicable laws do not vi-
olate the First Amendment no matter how much they burden an individual’s or organiza-
tion’s exercise of religious liberty). The Smith Court emphasized: 
[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, 
or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and 
that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government 
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 The controversy over the coverage mandate precipitated just such 
a political process,17 with the Obama administration making a series of 
                                                                                                                      
 
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or 
in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality 
of all religious beliefs. 
Id. 
In January 2012, the Supreme Court, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School v. EEOC, held that the ministerial exception, grounded in the First Amendment’s Re-
ligion Clauses, applies to an employee who works in a church-affiliated entity (for example, 
in a church school), based on an overall assessment of the role of the employee, which de-
rives partially from the church’s own understanding of that role. 132 S. Ct. 694, 706–07 
(2012). Shortly after the decision, a number of commentators grappled with the impact of 
Hosanna-Tabor on Smith’s broader holding that religious groups and individuals must look to 
the political process for protection. See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, What Comes After Hosanna-
Tabor, First Things ( Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2012/01/ 
what-comes-after-hosanna-tabor (comparing Smith’s reasoning that “a blanket rule that reli-
gious claims nearly always trigger exemptions to generally applicable laws would in effect 
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself,” with Hosanna-Tabor, which said “in effect, 
that when it comes to the right to govern themselves in the choice of their clergy, ministers, 
leaders, and others whose functions and duties are distinctly religious, churches and other 
religious organizations are indeed a law unto themselves”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: Ho-
sanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, Engage, 168, 168–70 (Mar. 2012), http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20120322_EsbeckEngage13.1.pdf (making a similar comparison). 
17 The White House has indicated that it does not believe there are “any constitutional 
rights issues” presented by the coverage mandate. See Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Jay Carney 
( Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/31/press-
briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-13112 [hereinafter January Press Briefing]. Amid this po-
litical process, thirty separate suits have been filed by religious employers to date, arguing 
that the contraceptive mandate, as applied to objecting religious employers, violates the First 
Amendment and RFRA. See, e.g., supra note 7 (discussing the suit brought by EWTN). These 
suits, which began with the EWTN suit, reached a crescendo on May 21, 2012, when “43 
Catholic educational, charitable and other entities filed a dozen lawsuits in federal court . . . 
charging that the [coverage mandate] violates their religious freedom.” Julie Roviner, Catholic 
Groups Sue Obama Administration over Birth Control Rule, NPR (May 21, 2012, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/05/21/153218446/catholic-groups-sue-obama-
administration-over-birth-control-rule; see HHS Mandate Information Central, Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Sept. 
18, 2012) (listing lawsuits); see also supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (noting the reli-
gious backlash against the mandate). The University of Notre Dame, as discussed later in this 
Article, was among the forty-three institutions. See infra notes 322, 326–327 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the lawsuits).  
Also among the forty-three institutions was Wheaton College, an evangelical institution. 
For some, Wheaton’s inclusion shows that “‘[t]his is not a fight over contraception. Evangeli-
cals, in fact, don’t agree with Catholics on their opposition to contraception and birth con-
trol.’” Instead, the “issue is about religious freedom.” Napp Nazworth, Wheaton College, Catholic 
University Jointly Sue over Birth Control Mandate, Christian Post ( July 18, 2012, 4:01 PM), 
http://www.christianpost.com/news/wheaton-college-catholic-university-jointly-sue-over-
birth-control-mandate-78491/#OQD2M1jldBlgCwqI.99 (quoting John Garvey, president of 
Catholic University of America). 
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attempts to quell the rancor over the coverage mandate. First, it prom-
ised to work with religious groups to address their concerns before the 
deadline for implementation in subsequent plan years.18 Speaking for 
the White House, Domestic Policy Director Cecilia Munoz reiterated 
the administration’s commitment “to both respecting religious beliefs 
and increasing access to important preventive services.”19 The admini-
stration extended the deadline for compliance by one year,20 a conces-
sion dismissed by critics as “kicking the can down the road.”21 
                                                                                                                      
 
These suits are now working their way through the courts with varying success. For ex-
ample, in Nebraska ex. rel. Bruning v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the government’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint without prejudice on standing and ripeness grounds. No. 4:12CV3035, 2012 WL 
2913402, at *20, 24 (D. Neb. July 17, 2012). The following day, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia dismissed a case without prejudice brought by Belmont Abbey 
College, a Catholic liberal arts college, on similar grounds. See Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Se-
belius, No. CIV.A. 11-1989 JEB, 2012 WL 2914417, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012) (“[T]he 
Court agrees that Belmont’s injury is too speculative to confer standing and that the case is 
also not ripe for decision.”). In August 2012, the same court dismissed Wheaton College’s 
suit, concluding that in light of “concrete steps” by the Obama administration “to address 
Wheaton’s concerns, including their commitment not to enforce the challenged regula-
tions against Wheaton while accommodations are being negotiated, Wheaton has not al-
leged a concrete and imminent injury [necessary for] judicial review.” Wheaton Coll. v. 
Sebelius, No. 12-1169, 2012 WL 3637162, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012). 
By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted a preliminary 
injunction in a suit brought by a private, for-profit company, Hercules Industries, Inc., 
whose formal policies are based on Catholic principles. Newland v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-
1123-JLK, 2012 WL 3069154, at *1–2 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012). The court compared the 
possible harms threatening the plaintiff, the government, and the public and concluded 
that “[o]n balance, the threatened harm to Plaintiffs, impingement of their right to freely 
exercise their religious beliefs, and the concomitant public interest in that right strongly 
favor the entry of injunctive relief.” Id. at *5. The court, however, specifically limited the 
scope of its order so as not to enjoin the enforcement of the coverage mandate against 
other parties. Id. at *9. 
18 See Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Jay Carney (Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/06/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-26201 
2 [hereinafter February Press Briefing]. Until the deadline, employers would be required to 
direct employees seeking contraceptives to clinics or health centers. See Jost, supra note 1, at 
1–2. 
19 Cecila Munoz, Health Reform, Preventive Services, and Religious Institutions, The White 
House Blog (Feb. 1, 2012, 6:35 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/01/health- 
reform-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions. 
20 See Memorandum from the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. on Guidance on the 
Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor 2 (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/ 
resources/files/Files2/02102012/20120210-Preventive-Services-Bulletin.pdf (delaying en-
forcement “until the first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013” for “non-
exempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established or maintained by non-profit 
organizations whose plans have not covered contraceptive services for religious reasons at 
any point from . . . February 10, 2012[] onward,” but requiring the plan to notify employ-
ees). HHS issued guidance on August 15, 2012, which clarifies that the safe harbor is avail-
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 The Obama administration then proffered its much-maligned “ac-
commodation” for religious employers.22 The President explained: 
[I]f a woman’s employer is a charity or a hospital that has a re-
ligious objection to providing contraceptive services as part of 
their health plan, the insurance company—not the hospital, 
not the charity—will be required to reach out and offer the 
woman contraceptive care free of charge without co-pays, 
without hassle.23 
 This suggestion, too, was met with derision from critics. In a state-
ment issued after the President’s announcement, more than five hun-
dred scholars, university presidents, religious leaders, and others— in-
cluding Catholic Cardinal Timothy Dolan, archbishop of New York and 
president of the U.S. Council of Bishops—labeled the accommodation 
“unacceptable,” hiding a “grave violation” of religious liberty behind a 
“cheap accounting trick.”24 
                                                                                                                      
 
able to plans that object to covering “some but not all contraceptive[s],” as well as to objec-
tors who unsuccessfully attempted before the February 10, 2012 safe harbor date to ex-
clude or limit contraceptive coverage in their plans. See Memorandum from the Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. on Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor 1 (Au-
gust 15, 2012), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/prev-services-guidance-
08152012.pdf. But see H.H.S. 1-Year Extension May Not Apply to Student Plans, Campus Notes: 
The Cardinal Newman Soc’y Blog (Feb. 2, 2012, 9:20 AM), http://blog.cardinalnewman 
society.org/2012/02/02/hhs-1-year-extension-may-not-apply-to-student-plans [hereinafter 
Campus Notes] (discussing the possible exemptions to the extension). 
21 Johnson, supra note 8 (quoting the Catholic Archbishop of Miami, Thomas Wenski). 
22 See Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 
16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54) (advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking); Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54). 
23 See Richard Wolf, Obama Tweaks Birth Control Rule, USA Today (Feb. 10, 2012, 3:57 
PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/02/source-obama-to-
change-birth-control-rule/1 (noting that “White House officials took pains to avoid the word 
‘compromise,’ [because] under the accommodation, no woman who wants access to contra-
ceptives should be denied”). 
24 John Garvey et al., Unacceptable, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 1 (Apr. 11, 
2012), http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Unacceptable-4-11.pdf 
(observing that “it is unrealistic to suggest that insurance companies will not pass the costs of 
these additional services on to the purchasers,” and thus “[i]t is no answer to respond that 
the religious employers are not ‘paying’ for this aspect of the insurance coverage”). Other 
critics have also labeled the accommodation a “shell game.” See Wolf, supra note 23 (quot-
ing law professor Robert Destro of Catholic University). 
Religious objections have come not only from Catholics, but also from representatives 
of numerous Muslim, mainline Christian, and evangelical Christian universities. See gener-
ally id. (including as signatories the leaders of Arizona Christian University, Biola Univer-
sity, Dordt College, East Texas Baptist University, Houston Baptist University, Oklahoma 
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 At each step, the Obama administration has responded that its po-
sition strikes “the appropriate balance between religious beliefs and the 
need to provide preventive services to American women.”25 White 
House Chief of Staff Jacob Lew maintained that this final accommoda-
tion “set[s] out [the administration’s] policy. . . . We are going to final-
ize it in the final rules [because] we think that’s the right approach.”26 
                                                                                                                      
Baptist University, Oklahoma Christian University, Southeastern Baptist Theological Semi-
nary, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Union University, and Zaytuna College, 
among other religious institutions of higher education). 
25 See February Press Briefing, supra note 17. The ACA has drawn criticism on other 
grounds as well, including the creation of perverse incentives for employers to drop lower-
income or sick employees on the insurance exchanges. See David Gamage, How the Afford-
able Care Act Will Create Perverse Incentives Harming Low and Moderate Income Workers, Tax L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at *2–3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2067138; Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarz, Will Employers Under-
mine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 Va. L. Rev. 125, 172–80 (2011) (dis-
cussing the post-ACA incentives for employers to discontinue health care coverage for sick 
employees); Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Why Obamacare Will End Health Insur-
ance as We Know It, Issues 2012 (Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 
2012, at 3, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ir_7.pdf (characterizing 
President Obama’s promise that under the ACA, “you can keep your own insurance,” as 
inconsistent with changes dictated by the ACA to “key contractual provisions in ways that 
make existing coverage unaffordable, or unavailable at any price”). 
Among the perverse incentives created by the ACA are that: 
The ACA . . . deter[s] low- and moderate-income taxpayers from accepting jobs 
with employers that offer “affordable” health insurance; . . . discourage[s] many 
low- and moderate-income taxpayers from attempting to increase their house-
hold incomes; . . . dissuade[s] employers from hiring low- and moderate-
income taxpayers and . . . encourage[s] employers to reduce the salaries paid to 
some low- and moderate-income employees; . . . prompt[s] employers to shift 
some low- and moderate-income employees from full-time to part-time posi-
tions; . . . [and] induce[s] employers to stop offering ‘affordable’ health insur-
ance to at least some low- and moderate-income employees . . . . 
See Gamage, supra, at *2–3. 
26 See Obama Chief of Staff: No More Compromise, Contraceptive Rule Is Done Deal, Fox-
News.com (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/02/12/obama-chief-
staff-no-more-compromise-contraceptive-rule-is-done-deal. The Obama administration final-
ized the regulations on February 15, 2012. See Coverage of Preventive Services Under the 
ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 8728. Since the Obama administration signaled its unwillingness to 
compromise further, the U.S. Department of Justice has asked the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania to dismiss a suit challenging the coverage mandate because 
“the administration is working on an amendment to address the religious objections.” Brian 
Bowling, Feds Ask Judge to Dismiss ‘Morning-After’ Lawsuit, Pittsburgh Trib.-Rev. (May 1, 2012, 
1:44 PM), http://triblive.com/home/1292708-74/college-lawsuit-drugs-says-amendment-
geneva-administration-coverage-department-federal (reporting the government’s additional 
argument that the plaintiff “cannot satisfy the imminence requirement for standing”); see 
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, 6, Geneva 
College v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2012). 
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At least one later poll suggests that a majority of the American people 
in fact believe that exemptions for religious employers are warranted.27 
 These claims for exemption from the coverage mandate are far 
from the only claims for accommodation being made by religious 
groups today.28 Since 2009, two major medical centers have “revers[ed] 
a long-standing policy exempting employees who refuse[d to assist with 
abortions] based on religious or moral objections.”29 In each case, 
nurses alleged that they were threatened with firing or professional dis-
cipline for resisting participation in or training for abortions. In both 
cases, the nurses sued, asserting both constitutional and statutory 
rights30 to not assist in abortion procedures in violation of their moral 
                                                                                                                      
 
27 In a March 2012 poll, 57% of Americans responded that religiously affiliated employ-
ers, such as hospitals or universities, should be allowed to opt out of mandated coverage for 
birth control. See Jim Rutenberg & Marjorie Connelly, Obama’s Rating Falls as Poll Reflects Vola-
tility, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2012, at A1. Of those responding, 61% of men supported an opt-
out, compared to 53% of women. See id. Among all respondents, 37% believed the debate to 
be over religious freedom, whereas 51% thought it centered on “women’s health and their 
rights.” N.Y. Times & CBS News, 2012 Poll 22 (Mar. 7–11, 2012), available at http://s3. 
documentcloud.org/documents/324884/new-york-times-cbs-poll.pdf. A poll commissioned 
by Planned Parenthood in 2012 found that “[o]nly 39% of voters support an exemption for 
Catholic hospitals and universities from providing the benefit, while 57% are opposed to 
one.” See Tom Jensen, Our Polling on the Birth Control Issue, Pub. Pol’y Polling (Feb. 10, 2012, 
10:24 AM), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2012/02/our-polling-on-the-birth-
control-issue.html. 
28 Questions of conscientious objections arise in other contexts, too. See generally 
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, 21 J. 
Clinical Ethics 163 (2010) (surveying conscientious refusal laws and reviewing recent 
related legislative developments and lawsuits). 
29 Rob Stein, N.J. Nurses Sue over Abortion Policy, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 2011, at A2 (discuss-
ing a lawsuit against the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ)). 
30 Federal conscience protections contemporaneous with the Supreme Court’s land-
mark 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade provide that: 
No entity which receives [certain grants, contracts, loans or loan guarantees], 
may— 
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employ-
ment of any physician or other health care personnel, or 
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to [such] per-
sonnel, 
because he performed or assisted . . . a lawful sterilization procedure or abor-
tion, [or] refused to perform or assist [one] . . . [due to] his religious beliefs 
or moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions 
respecting sterilization procedures or abortions. 
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (2006) (popularly known as the “Church Amendment”); see also 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1973) (holding that a woman’s decision to have an 
abortion is protected by her right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution). Twenty states similarly provide conscientious 
objectors with an absolute exemption from participating in sterilizations and abortions. See 
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or religious convictions.31 Those suits reached very different out-
comes.32 
                                                                                                                      
 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Health Care 
Context, in Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts 77, 299–
327 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Emerging Conflicts]. 
31 In 2011, in Danquah v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, a dozen nurses 
sued UMDNJ in federal court, alleging that they were forced, under threat of professional 
discipline or dismissal, to assist with abortions in violation of their moral or religious con-
victions. See Verified Complaint at 2, 14–15, Danquah v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 
No. 2:11-cv-06377-JLL-MAH (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://www.lifenews.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2011/11/newjerseynursesabortion.pdf (alleging violations of U.S. 
Const. amend XIV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(d), 1983 (2006), and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:65A-1 
(West 2000)); see also Transcript of Proceedings at 4–5, Danquah, No. 2:11-cv-06377-JLL-
MAH (Dec. 22, 2011), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/DanquahSettlementTrans- 
cripts.pdf [hereinafter Danquah Transcript of Proceedings] (noting the nurses’ strong 
religious beliefs). The nurses alleged that in 2011, UMDNJ changed its policy of assigning 
only willing same-day surgery unit nurses to participate in abortion procedures. Verified 
Complaint, supra, at 7. In a marked departure from this policy, hospital staff “repeatedly 
[told] them and their colleagues that they must assist abortions or they would be termi-
nated . . . [and] that any objecting nurses might theoretically be relocated to significantly 
less favorable job positions.” Id. at 7–8. Staff required some nurses, including Sharon L. 
Danquah, to train for abortions without providing them with advance notice. Id. at 9. When 
Danquah objected on religious grounds, a staff member responded that the hospital “has ‘no 
regard for religious beliefs’ of nurses who so object, that ‘everyone on this floor is required 
when assigned to do TOPs [terminations of pregnancy; abortions],’ that such nurses ‘are 
trained to care for patients’ elective procedures,’ and that ‘no patients can be refused by any 
nurse.’” Id. The objecting nurses requested and received a temporary restraining order on 
November 3, 2011. Temporary Restraining Order at *2, Danquah, No. 2:11-cv-06377-JLL-
MAH (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/DanquahTRO.pdf. 
Two years earlier, in Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital, an operating room nurse 
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against her 
employer, claiming that she was coerced into assisting with a late-term, twenty-two-week 
abortion, in violation of the Church Amendment. See Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction at 6, Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 2010 WL 169485 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-03120), aff’d, 626 F.3d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 2010), available at 
http://oldsite.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/Cenzon-DeCarloPIbrief.pdf [hereinafter 
Memorandum for Preliminary Injunction]. The plaintiff, Cathy Cenzon-DeCarlo, alleged 
that although the hospital had staffed around her religious objection to assisting with 
abortions for years, on May 24, 2009, her superior threatened not only to terminate her if 
she did not help with an abortion, but also to report her to the nursing board for “patient 
abandonment.” See id. 
32 Danquah was fully resolved by a settlement on the record memorializing the parties’ 
agreement that, except when the mother’s life is at risk and there are no other non-
objecting staff members available to assist, nurses with conscientious objections will not 
have to assist with abortions. See Danquah Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 31, at 5–6. 
In such rare cases, “the only involvement of the objecting plaintiffs would be to care for 
the patient until such time as a non-objecting person can get there to take over the care.” 
Id. at 6. Judge Jose Linares retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure compliance with 
the agreement. Id. at 5. By contrast, the federal district court hearing the Cenzon-DeCarlo 
case dismissed the suit, concluding that the Church Amendment did not confer a private 
right of action. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485 at *4. The decision was affirmed by the 
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 While the clashes over contraception and abortion play out on the 
national stage, parallel claims for religious accommodations have been 
advanced in several states that have considered, and in some cases en-
acted, same-sex marriage legislation.33 Religious objectors to same-sex 
marriage have asked for a way to both honor their religious convictions 
and comply with the law.34 Specifically, they have asked to step aside 
from celebrating, facilitating, or recognizing same-sex marriages when 
doing so would violate their religious beliefs. 
 In a May 2012 statement to ABC News, the first of its kind by a sit-
ting president, President Obama supported the rights of same-sex cou-
ples to get married.35 At the same time, President Obama said that the 
state should respect religious liberty: “[I]t’s important to recognize that 
folks who feel very strongly that marriage should be defined narrowly 
as between a man and a woman, many of them are not coming at it 
                                                                                                                      
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cenzon-DeCarlo, 626 F.3d at 697, 699; see also 
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Empowering Private Protection of Conscience, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 101, 
104 (2010) (dissecting the legislative history of the Church Amendment and concluding 
that it does not support a private right of action). Cenzon-DeCarlo filed separate state 
court claims that are currently on appeal. See Cenzon-Decarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Nos. 
2011-02282, 2011-07705 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 12, 2010). 
The New Jersey statute cited in Danquah’s complaint, which states that “[n]o person 
shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of an abortion or sterilization,” 
provides an unqualified exemption for objectors to those procedures. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
2A:65A-1. Concerns that unqualified exemptions impose hardships on those seeking pro-
cedures or services are not unfounded. As Part IV of this Article explains, exemptions 
qualified by hardship are necessary to equitably balance both access and religious liberty. 
See infra notes 208–246 and accompanying text; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of 
Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive Health Care Procedures, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 41, 41 
n.5 (2008) [hereinafter Wilson, Limits of Conscience] (arguing that exemptions for pharma-
cies from the duty to stock emergency contraceptives pose a much greater threat to patient 
access than exemptions for individual pharmacists, and offering instead that state legisla-
tures should prefer individual exemptions over institutional ones provided that the indi-
vidual exemptions are qualified by hardship to patients). 
33 See infra app. A (collecting state statutory provisions relating to same-sex marriage). 
34 To be clear, not all religious believers object to same-sex marriage. In fact, some de-
nominations allow ministers to choose whether to marry same-sex couples, resulting in 
internal divisions over whether to perform same-sex marriages. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, True 
to Episcopal Church’s Past, Bishops Split on Gay Weddings, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2011, at A1 (not-
ing that in New York City, two out of five Episcopalian dioceses allow same-sex couples to 
be married in church); Churches Debate: May Clergy Marry Gays?, USA Today, July 17, 2011, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011-07-17-gay-marry-clergy-churches_n.htm. 
35 See Melissa Rogers, Obama and the Two Types of Marriage, Huffington Post (May 17, 
2012, 11:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-rogers/civil-and-religious-marriage- 
and-obama_b_1521981.html; Sam Stein, Obama Backs Gay Marriage, Huffington Post (May 9, 
2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/obama-gay-marriage_n_1503 
245.html. 
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from a mean-spirited perspective. They’re coming at it because they 
care about families.”36 
 Like President Obama, many state legislators have struggled with 
reconciling two compelling, and at times conflicting, values in the same 
piece of legislation—marriage equality and religious liberty. They per-
ceive difficult tradeoffs, such as how to protect religious liberty without 
offending the dignity of same-sex couples or condoning anti-gay ani-
mus, among other concerns. The real-world points of resistance that 
state lawmakers articulate echo the concerns voiced about exemptions 
to the new coverage mandate. 
 This Article summarizes a number of sticking points voiced to me 
by legislators about a hardship exemption that I, and others, have tried 
to secure in state same-sex marriage laws, together with some responses 
that may be offered.37 Assuming that spoken concerns reflect real ones, 
as I believe they do, it is worthwhile to examine points of resistance to 
religious liberty protections in same-sex marriage laws as a way of test-
ing the strength of claims for exemptions on other questions over 
which the public remains deeply divided. 
 Part I explores the threshold question troubling many legislators: 
if the political will is there to recognize same-sex marriage, why should 
                                                                                                                      
36 Rogers, supra note 35 (quoting President Obama). 
37 This Article draws on a series of letters I coauthored arguing for the inclusion of ro-
bust exemptions in same-sex marriage bills, including letters to New Hampshire governor 
John Lynch, D.C. City Council chairman Vincent Gray, New York Senate majority leader 
Dean Skelos, Maryland state senator Brian Frosh, Connecticut state representative Chris-
topher G. Donovan, New Jersey state senator Paul Sarlo, Washington governor Christine 
Gregoire, New Jersey governor Chris Christie, and the Iowa State Legislature, as well as a 
letter about the proposed rescission of the Bush Conscience Regulation to the HHS’s Of-
fice of Public Health and Science. See Memos/Letters on Religious Liberty and Same-Sex Mar-
riage, Mirror of Just. (Aug. 2, 2009, 12:59 AM), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirror 
ofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html (providing 
the full text of some of these letters). The remaining letters are on file with the author. 
This Article also draws on a model religious liberty provision that two groups of legal 
scholars have crafted and advocated for in jurisdictions considering same-sex marriage 
legislation. See infra app. B. One group of scholars consists of myself, Thomas C. Berg of 
the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Carl H. Esbeck of the University of Missouri 
School of Law, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. of Valparaiso University School of Law, Rich-
ard W. Garnett of the University of Notre Dame Law School, and Marc D. Stern, member 
of the New York State Bar for Legal Advocacy. This group takes no position for or against 
same-sex marriage, but argues that robust religious liberty protections should be included 
in any legislation. The second group, led by Douglas Laycock of the University of Virginia 
School of Law, consists of Professor Laycock, Marc D. Stern, and Michael Perry of Emory 
University School of Law, all of whom explicitly endorse same-sex marriage. In May 2012, 
Bruce Ledewitz of Duquesne University School of Law joined the second group. 
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the legislature accommodate anyone?38 This Part offers a simple re-
sponse: exemptions serve the interests of same-sex marriage support-
ers—in addition to being the right thing to do and maximizing indi-
vidual liberty.39 This Part contends that without accommodations, 
public attitudes about same-sex marriage are likely to harden, delaying 
marriage equality. It charts how a winner-takes-all approach to same-sex 
marriage—offering exemptions only to the clergy, who do not need 
them because of the First Amendment—has failed to garner sufficient 
support to become law. By contrast, bills providing meaningful protec-
tions for religious objectors have succeeded, suggesting that religious 
exemptions take a powerful argument away from same-sex marriage 
opponents. Part I then explores how an inflexible approach to requests 
for religious accommodations to the coverage mandate may likewise 
backfire if not tempered. 
 The Article then turns to a host of practical considerations raised 
by religious liberty accommodations. Part II asks, as District of Colum-
bia councilmember Phil Mendelson did, “how . . . policy maker[s] can 
know . . . that [a religious objector] is really acting on fundamental re-
ligious belief [rather than] prejudice?”40 Section A argues that al-
though sincerity issues do arise, the significant personal cost of object-
ing gives objectors little incentive to make insincere claims. Further, 
courts have shown the institutional competence to separate sincere 
from insincere claims in a range of contexts, from military conscien-
tious objections to suits by prisoners. Section B then considers a related 
concern in the health care context—that exemptions legitimize scien-
tifically unfounded ideas. This Section recaps the argument made by 
family planning advocates that emergency contraceptives like Plan B 
act only to prevent fertilization—and never after. This Section reviews 
emerging evidence about ella’s mechanisms of action that shows that 
ella’s enhanced effectiveness in preventing pregnancy stems in part 
from post-fertilization effects. More fundamentally, Section B argues 
that if claims of faith receive protection only when the rest of society 
                                                                                                                      
38 See infra notes 46–109 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra note 46 (discussing the goods served by having the personal liberty to live 
out one’s sexual identity and one’s religious identity). 
40 See infra notes 110–163 and accompanying text; see also Religious Liberty Implications of 
D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill: Hearing on Bill 18-482 Before the D.C. Council, 19th Sess. 6:59:40 
(Nov. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill] (statement of council-
member Phil Mendelson), videorecording available at http://oct.dc.gov/services/on_demand_ 
video/channel13/november2009/11_02_09_JUDICI.asx. 
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agrees with the objector’s belief, then almost nothing would remain of 
religious freedom. 
 Part III then explores how broad any legislative accommodation 
should be.41 This Part examines whether religious objectors should be 
protected only when they are noncommercial actors or when directly 
performing a morally freighted service, like solemnizing a marriage or 
terminating a pregnancy. It argues that appropriately crafted exemp-
tions can avoid the real concern driving efforts to cabin an exemption’s 
scope—dislocation to the individuals seeking the contested service. 
 Part IV assesses a claim made by White House press secretary Jay 
Carney that the coverage mandate “does not direct an individual to do 
anything,” and so there can be no real threat to religious liberty.42 The 
Part first documents the steep penalties that religious objectors face in 
both the health care and same-sex marriage contexts without specific 
protections. It then takes the claim at face value, concluding that if the 
changing legal landscape really does not direct objectors to do any-
thing, then religious accommodations cost nothing to grant but can 
allay significant fears at a time of great social change. 
 Part V explores the notion that no one should have to bear the 
cost of another’s religious objection, a claim now made in fights over 
both the coverage mandate and same-sex marriage.43 This Part first 
explains that appropriately crafted exemptions can vindicate both val-
ues at stake: access and religious liberty. It then acknowledges that 
qualified exemptions—that is, accommodations that allow religious ob-
jectors to avoid civil dictates only when a hardship will not result for 
those seeking a service—impose some costs on both sides, but also turn 
down the temperature on heated social debates. 
                                                                                                                     
 Part VI then explores the question of hardship in the especially 
difficult context of insurance benefits, both for same-sex spouses and 
for deeply divisive services like contraception.44 This Part argues that 
failing to include religious accommodations in benefit mandates often 
leads to greater hardships—namely, the choice to discontinue objec-
tionable coverage rather than violate a religious belief. Religious objec-
tors have resorted to this “nuclear option” on multiple occasions when 
an exemption was not forthcoming, and they may continue to do so. 
Outside the health care context, religious objectors can take the nu-
clear option at no real cost. Even after the ACA, the nuclear option re-
 
41 See infra notes 164–207 and accompanying text. 
42 January Press Briefing, supra note 17; see infra notes 208–246 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text. 
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mains available to institutions that object to the coverage mandate—
notwithstanding the steep penalties the ACA imposes on larger em-
ployers that drop health care coverage for their employees. Indeed, 
many employers that drop coverage are likely to come out ahead finan-
cially. This Part then asks a question almost entirely overlooked in the 
controversy over the coverage mandate: what happens to the individual 
who morally objects to contraceptives and sterilization—what do they 
do after the ACA? For them, the penalties are likely to be draconian, 
imposing a significant encroachment on religious liberty. 
 Part VII tackles the idea that accommodations for religious objec-
tors should not be allowed because of harm to the dignity of others.45 It 
argues that legislators frequently must address two dignitary harms, not 
one—for example, the harm to lesbian and gay couples who are turned 
aside and the harm to religious believers who are told that their beliefs 
are not to be tolerated, at least not in the public sphere. Although the 
competing claims about dignitary losses cannot resolve the question of 
whether to give accommodations, they can and should guide the struc-
ture of accommodations to cabin the possibility of dignitary harm. 
 Finally, the Article concludes that in the end, no matter how 
thoughtful an exemption or a claim for exemptions may be, to realisti-
cally obtain religious liberty protection in the legislative or regulatory 
process requires proponents to understand how exemptions look to 
decisionmakers on the ground. 
I. First Sticking Point: Why Accommodate Anyone? 
 Like the Obama administration’s evolving efforts to vindicate two 
competing values—access and religious freedom—state legislators have 
had to confront the obvious question: if the political will is there to 
recognize same-sex marriage, why should the state accommodate any-
one? The short answer is this: self-interest. 
 Before describing why religious liberty guarantees are in the inter-
est of both sides, in both debates, I should note that this focus on prag-
matic considerations is not intended to detract from principled argu-
ments favoring exemptions. The same fundamental values of personal 
liberty that support an individual’s right to follow and fulfill his or her 
essential identity, including sexual identity and same-sex relationships, 
also support an individual’s right to live according to his or her religious 
                                                                                                                      
45 See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text. 
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convictions.46 Not all observers agree with such principled arguments, 
however.47 For such people, a practical argument may have an appeal, 
even when more normative claims do not. So let’s talk practicality. 
A. Religious Accommodations Are a Pathway to Same-Sex Marriage 
 In the absence of accommodations, public attitudes toward same-
sex relationships are likely to become more divided, not less, as Profes-
sor Douglas Laycock has noted: 
To impose legal penalties or civil liabilities on a wedding plan-
ner who refuses to do a same-sex wedding, or on a religious 
counseling agency that refuses to provide marriage counseling 
to same-sex couples, will simply ensure that conservative reli-
gious opinion on this issue can repeatedly be aroused to fever 
pitch. Every such case will be in the news repeatedly, and every 
such story will further inflame the opponents of same-sex mar-
                                                                                                                      
46 Professor Chai Feldblum argues that the “identity liberty” same-sex couples have in 
marriage and the “belief liberty” objectors have in their religion both constitute core val-
ues and deserve protection, but these values directly conflict when civil rights laws force 
one to accommodate the other. See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, 
in Emerging Conflicts, supra note 30, at 123, 157. Professor Feldblum concludes that the 
conduct demanded by civil rights laws “can burden an individual’s belief liberty interest,” 
but “[a]cknowledging [the burden’s impact] does not necessarily mean that [civil rights] 
laws will be invalidated or that exemptions . . . will always be granted to individuals holding 
such beliefs.” Id.; see also Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims 
Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 206, 219–20, 230–32 (2010) (critiquing Professor 
Feldblum’s argument). Many other scholars also offer principled arguments. See generally 
Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal Marriage Statutes 
Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public Marketplace, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 236 
(2010) (arguing that religious objections to same-sex marriage do not necessitate addi-
tional statutory protections because those objections predate the debate over same-sex 
marriage); Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 
5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 260 (2010) (discussing four reasons to maintain religious liberty 
accommodations for those opposed to same-sex marriage); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tut-
tle, Same-Sex Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 274 (2010) (distinguish-
ing between freedom of clergy and claims of “religiously motivated individuals,” and con-
cluding that although some religious freedoms are sufficiently protected under the U.S. 
Constitution, others receive less protection, and thus same-sex marriage opponents would 
be wise to find common ground to secure robust exemptions now rather than wait); Marc 
D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 307 (2010) (advocat-
ing qualified religious exemptions as a solution to preserving religious liberty without di-
minishing the equality of same-sex couples); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: 
The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. 
Pol’y 318 (2010) (arguing that government employees with religious objections should be 
granted exemptions). 
47 See, e.g., Shannon Gilreath, Book Review Essay, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage 
and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 205, 221. 
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riage. Refusing exemptions to such religious dissenters will po-
litically empower the most demagogic opponents of same-sex 
marriage. It will ensure that the issue remains alive, bitter, and 
deeply divisive.48 
By creating religious martyrs, the likely outcome is to delay social ac-
ceptance of gay marriage, not to hasten it. 
 In the United States, our over-decade-long experience with at-
tempts to secure legislation recognizing same-sex marriage suggests 
that religious accommodations likely have helped same-sex marriage 
advocates secure long-sought victories. To date, seven jurisdictions have 
enacted, and retained, laws recognizing same-sex marriage: Connecti-
cut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, 
Vermont, and Washington.49 
 In three of those states—New York, Maryland, and Washington— 
proposed legislation offering protection only to the clergy failed to 
garner enough support to become law only months before revised bills 
passed.50 The fact that same-sex marriage bills with more expansive 
                                                                                                                      
 
48 See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, in Shannon Gil-
reath, The End of Straight Supremacy: Realizing Gay Liberation 260, 260–61 
(2011) (predicting that “[t]he number of people who assert their right to conscientious 
objection will be small in the beginning, and it will gradually decline to insignificance if 
deprived of the chance to rally around a series of martyrs”). 
49 See infra app. A. Maine’s same-sex marriage law, which contained a clergy-only exemp-
tion, was repealed in a “people’s referendum,” and a similar measure passed the New Hamp-
shire legislature only to be vetoed by Governor John Lynch. See generally Robin Fretwell Wil-
son, Charting the Success of Same-Sex Marriage Legislation (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/132 (summarizing the 
history of same-sex marriage legislation in every state to consider it to date). The New Hamp-
shire legislature amended the bill to include more expansive exemptions and Governor 
Lynch subsequently signed it into law. See id. 
50 On May 12, 2009, the New York Assembly passed legislation containing a clergy-only 
exemption by a vote of 89–52—only to see it defeated in the New York Senate on December 
2, 2009, by a vote of 24–38. See Jeremy W. Peters, Making Gay Marriage Personal and Political, 
N.Y. Times, May 12, 2009, at A1; Dwyer Arce, New York Senate Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Legisla-
tion, Jurist (Dec. 2, 2009, 3:19 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2009/12/new-york-senate- 
rejects-same-sex.php. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (summarizing the development of the 
key issues in the same-sex marriage legislation of New York, Maryland, and Washington). Two 
years later, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo proposed the Marriage Equality Act, a revised bill 
that included more expansive religious liberty protections. See infra app. A. The New York 
Assembly approved that bill on June 15, 2011, by a vote of 80–63. Kenneth Lovett, New York 
Assembly Passes Bill to Legalize Gay Marriage 80-63; Legislation Now Heads to Senate, N.Y. Daily 
News, June 15, 2011, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-06-15/local/29681615_1_gay-
marriage-exemptions-from-anti-discrimination-laws-senate-republicans. The New York Senate 
then revised the bill to include yet more protections, facilitating the bill’s passage on June 24, 
2011 by a vote of 33–29. See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex 
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2011, at A1. Although robust 
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protections were enacted such a short time later suggests that exemp-
tions mattered to the ultimate success of those bills.51 A number of ob-
servers drew precisely this conclusion. 
                                                                                                                      
 
protections played an important role in New York, so too did money and political maneuver-
ing in convincing Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos to allow the bill to reach the Senate 
floor in the first place. Strenuous lobbying by Governor Cuomo and New York City mayor 
Michael Bloomberg persuaded Skelos not to block the vote, and must have also persuaded 
some Republican members of the Senate to support the final bill. See Michael Barbaro, Be-
hind Gay Marriage, an Unlikely Mix of Forces, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2011, at A1; Nicholas Confes-
sore & Michael Barbaro, Wealthy Donors to G.O.P. Are Providing Bulk of Money in Gay Marriage 
Push, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2011, at A15; Thomas Kaplan, After Pushing Gay Marriage, Cuomo Is 
Thanked with Money, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2011, at A29. 
Efforts to pass same-sex marriage legislation in Maryland followed a similar trajectory. 
In 2008, Maryland legislators introduced bills containing clergy-only exemptions, but nei-
ther House Bill 351 nor Senate Bill 290 was voted upon by either chamber. See generally 
Wilson, supra note 49 (summarizing same-sex marriage legislation in Maryland). In 2009, 
bills containing identical clergy-only exemptions died in their respective committees. Id. In 
2011, the Maryland House considered two bills that contained the same clergy-only ex-
emption. Id. The Senate, however, added more expansive protections for religious objec-
tors to the original House bill. Id. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 25–21 on Febru-
ary 24, 2011, but the bill languished in a House committee, never to be voted upon by the 
full House. See id. In the next legislative session, the House took up legislation proposed by 
Governor Martin O’Malley, which contained additional protections. See id. The Maryland 
House passed that bill on February 17, 2012, by a vote of 72–67, and the Senate approved 
it on February 23, 2012 by a vote of 25–22. See Sabrina Tavernise, In Maryland, House Passes 
Bill to Allow Gays to Wed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2012, at A13; see also John Wagner, Same-Sex 
Marriage Bill Nears Passage, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 2011, at B1 (reporting that the Maryland 
Senate preliminarily voted in favor of same-sex marriage by a vote of 25–22). Nevertheless, 
opponents of the bill collected enough signatures to prevent the Maryland law from taking 
immediate effect, and it will be considered in a referendum in November 2012. See Re-
becca Berg, In Maryland, Gay Marriage Seeks a “Yes” at the Polls, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2012, at 
A16. 
In Washington, a bill offering protection only to clergy failed to gain traction in 2011 
and was reintroduced in 2012. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (discussing the legislative 
history of Washington’s same-sex marriage bill). Legislators then introduced a competing bill 
containing more robust protections, which was substantially amended and ultimately passed 
the Senate on February 1, 2012 by seven votes, with a total vote of 28–21. See id. The Washing-
ton House passed the Senate’s engrossed bill by a vote of 55–43 on February 8, 2012. Id. The 
bill was signed into law by Governor Christine Gregoire on February 13, 2012. See Joel Con-
nelly, Gregoire Signs Same-Sex Marriage Bill, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Feb. 13, 2012, 1:00 
PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/connelly/article/Make-History-Gregoire-signs-same-
sex-marriage-3312315.php; Andrew Garber, Gay-Marriage Bill Passes House, Awaits Gregoire’s 
Signature, Seattle Times (Feb. 9, 2012, 2:18 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ 
localnews/2017459861_gaymarriage09m.html. Like Maryland’s law, the law legalizing same-
sex marriage in Washington was placed on hold in June 2012, when opponents gathered 
sufficient signatures to block the law from taking immediate effect pending a November 
2012 referendum on the legislation. See Laura L. Myers, Gay Marriage in Washington Blocked by 
Proposed Referendum, Reuters ( June 6, 2012, 7:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/06/06/us-usa-gaymarriage-washington-idUSBRE8551JE20120606. 
51 The two exceptions to this pattern are Connecticut and Maine. In 2007, Connecticut 
considered, and failed to pass, proposed same-sex marriage legislation containing protec-
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 After Governor Andrew Cuomo signed New York’s same-sex mar-
riage law in the summer of 2011, the New York Times observed that the 
religious exemptions “proved to be the most microscopically examined 
and debated—and the most pivotal—in the battle over same-sex mar-
riage. Language that Republican senators inserted into the bill legaliz-
ing same-sex marriage provided more expansive protections for reli-
gious organizations and helped pull the legislation over the finish line 
. . . .”52 Similarly, in Maryland, religious liberty exemptions shifted the 
question for some legislators from whether to embrace marriage equality 
to how to balance that good with religious liberty.53 
                                                                                                                      
 
tions only for the clergy. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (discussing same-sex marriage in 
Connecticut). On Oct. 28, 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in Kerrigan v. Commissioner 
of Public Health, held that “the state’s disparate treatment of same sex couples [in excluding 
them from the institution of marriage] is constitutionally deficient.” 957 A.2d 407, 412 
(Conn. 2008). With the judiciary’s thumb on the scales, legislators then introduced a same-
sex marriage bill with substantial protections that ultimately passed in 2009. See Chase Mat-
thews, Connecticut Gov. Signs Gay Marriage into Law, ChicagoPride.com (Apr. 23, 2009, 12:00 
AM), http://chicago.gopride.com/news/article.cfm/articleid/7272400. 
In Maine, legislation containing a clergy-only exemption attained overwhelming sup-
port before being repealed in a popular referendum. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 
(discussing same-sex marriage in Maine). That bill passed in 2009 by votes of 89–57 and 
21–13 in the lower and upper chambers, respectively. See id. 
Although it is impossible, after the fact, to say definitively that more expansive exemp-
tions proved decisive in the success of these same-sex marriage laws, the number of nar-
rowly defeated bills that later succeeded when revised to include more expansive exemp-
tions is suggestive. Also suggestive is Maine’s experience: even where a same-sex marriage 
bill passed both chambers of the legislature by substantial majorities, the new law contain-
ing protection only for the clergy was narrowly rejected by voters. See id. 
It remains to be seen whether new legislation in Maryland and Washington, contain-
ing more expansive exemptions, will satisfy voters in a referendum. In these states, oppo-
nents have collected sufficient signatures to force a November 2012 referendum on the 
legislation. See Berg, supra note 50; Myers, supra note 50. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 
(summarizing recent developments in same-sex marriage legislation in Maryland and 
Washington). 
52 See Danny Hakim, Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, June 26, 
2011, at A20. 
53 See Robin Wilson & Anthony Kreis, Same-Sex Marriage Symposium: The Overlooked Bene-
fit of Leaving Perry in Place, SCOTUSblog (Sept. 18, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://www.scotus 
blog.com/2012/09/same-sex-marriage-symposium-the-overlooked-benefit-of-leaving-perry 
in-place/ (quoting Maryland House of Delegates Speaker Michael Busch’s statement that 
“I know for a fact that for two or three delegates [including religious liberty protections] 
was an important component in their decision to vote for it”); see also John Wagner & Aa-
ron C. Davis, Governor Unveils Details of His Legislative Agenda, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 2012, at 
B5 (explaining that “[r]eligious-exemption language included in O’Malley’s same-sex 
marriage bill is intended to pick up additional support in the House of Delegates, where a 
bill fell unexpectedly short last year after clearing the Senate”); Annie Linskey, After Soul 
Searching, Swing Votes Make Difference for Same-Sex Marriage, Balt. Sun (Feb. 18, 2012), http:// 
articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-02-18/news/bs-md-same-sex-sunday-20120217_1_marriage- 
bill-opponents-of-gay-marriage-vote-count (discussing the passage of same-sex marriage 
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 These successful attempts to recognize same-sex marriage resulted 
from a delicate process in which legislators reached a set of compro-
mises about how best to balance marriage equality with other goods in 
society. This should surprise no one. Competing interests are often bal-
anced in a pluralistic, democratic society. In the civil rights era, exemp-
tions for religious objectors and others served as the pathway to social 
change, not an obstacle to it.54 
 What sparked those compromises? Religious organizations do 
much good in society but frequently need the space to do so in accor-
dance with their convictions.55 In the same-sex marriage context, with-
                                                                                                                      
legislation) (noting that the bill passed with one vote to spare, and that one of the votes in 
favor of the bill came from a delegate who is a “devoted Methodist [who] was worried 
about churches that did not want to preform [sic] same-sex marriages”). 
54 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, prohibiting discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, or national origin in public accommodations engaged in interstate com-
merce, contains a provision known as the “Mrs. Murphy exemption,” which exempts dwell-
ings with four or fewer families, if one of them is the owner’s. See 42 U.S.C. 3603(b)(2) 
(2006). The fictional Mrs. Murphy, an Irish widow engaged in renting rooms in her home, 
emerged during congressional debate over Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when 
lawmakers expressed concern about restricting an individual’s right of commercial associa-
tion without interfering with his or her deep personal convictions. See Marie A. Failinger, 
Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and 
Religious Landlords, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 383, 383–87 (2001). Many proponents of the exemp-
tion feared Title II would not pass without this accommodation, because public empathy 
for homeowners who are forced to let rooms to support their families would deter law-
makers from enacting an unqualified law. See Peter Evans Kane, The Senate Debate on the 
1964 Civil Rights Act 50 (Aug. 1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University), 
available at http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/dissertations/AAI6806320. Like Title II, Title VIII 
exempts owner-occupied dwellings with no more than four families, as well as religious 
organizations operating noncommercial dwellings—accommodations that Senator Walter 
Mondale at the time labeled as “politically necessary.” 114 Cong. Rec. 2495 (1968). 
55 See Byron R. Johnson, Ctr. for Research on Religion & Urban Civil Soc’y, Ob-
jective Hope: Assessing the Effectiveness of Faith-Based Organizations: A Review 
of the Literature 7 (2002), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/crrucs_ 
objective_hope.pdf (noting that “[b]y some estimates, [Faith-Based Organizations] provide 
$20 billion of privately contributed funds to social service delivery for over 70 million Ameri-
cans annually”); Avis C. Vidal, Urban Inst., Faith-Based Organizations in Community 
Development (2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/faithbased. 
pdf (noting, in a foreword by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development general 
deputy assistant secretary  Lawrence L. Thompson, that “recently, there has been greater 
recognition and value given to the contributions of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in pro-
viding social services,” and that “[h]istorically, FBOs have been particularly prominent in 
providing food, clothing, and shelter to people in need”); White House Office of Faith-
Based & Cmty. Initiatives, Guidance to Faith-Based and Community Organizations 
on Partnering with the Federal Government 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.ethics 
institute.com/pdf/Faith%20Based%20Federal%20Grants.pdf (“Faith-based and community 
groups are the unsung heroes in helping Americans in need. Their compassionate care 
and neighborly love turn lives around and provide hope where it has been missing. These 
groups do not provide care because they have to, but because they want to.”). 
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out such protections, groups and individuals that hew to their religious 
beliefs about marriage would be at risk of losing government contracts 
and benefits and would also be subject to lawsuits from private citizens. 
These risks are not speculative. The City of San Francisco withdrew $3.5 
million in social services contracts from the Salvation Army when it re-
fused, for religious reasons, to provide benefits to its employees’ same-
sex partners.56 In New Jersey, the state’s Division of Civil Rights of the 
Office of the Attorney General found that a Methodist nonprofit asso-
ciation violated New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination when it de-
nied the requests of two same-sex couples to use the group’s boardwalk 
pavilion for their commitment ceremonies.57 Separately, local tax au-
thorities stripped the group of its exemption from ad valorem property 
taxes on the boardwalk pavilion and billed the group close to $20,000 
in “rollback” taxes, although it ultimately paid less.58 More recently, a 
Vermont bed-and-breakfast settled a suit seeking “symbolic and punitive 
damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief” brought by a lesbian 
couple, joined by the Vermont Human Rights Commission.59 The cou-
                                                                                                                      
56 See Don Lattin, Charities Balk at Domestic Partner, Open Meeting Laws, S.F. Chron., July 
10, 1998, at A-1. 
57 See N.J. Att’y Gen., Div. on Civil Rights, Finding of Probable Cause, Bernstein v. Ocean 
Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008, at 12 (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http:// 
www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-OGCMA.pdf. The administrative 
law judge who heard the case determined that the association “was renting space at the Pavil-
ion for weddings, an activity largely detached from associational expression or speech,” had 
rented “wedding space to heterosexual couples irrespective of their [religious] tradition,” 
and had never “inquire[d] into religious beliefs or practice because it did not sponsor, or 
otherwise control, these weddings,” and thus that the association had violated New Jersey’s 
Law Against Discrimination when it refused to permit the couple’s civil union ceremony. See 
Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. CRT 6145-09, 2012 WL 169302, at *4–5 
(N.J. Office of Admin. Law, Jan. 12, 2012). The federal courts refused to intervene when the 
association filed suit. See Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church 
v. Vespa-Papaleo, No. 07-3802-JAP, 2007 WL 3349787, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007) (granting 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss on abstention grounds), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 339 
F. App’x 232 (3d Cir. 2009). 
58 See Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Gay Rights, Religious Liberties: A Three-Act Story, NPR ( June 
16, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91486340; see also Judy 
Peet, Gay Unions Dispute Could Cost Group: State Pulls Association’s Tax-Exempt Status, Star-
Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 18, 2007, at 19 (indicating that taxes on the pavilion would be 
roughly $11,000 as a result of the property’s loss of exemption under New Jersey’s Green 
Acres Program, which requires that the property “be available equally to all persons”). Under 
the Green Acres Program, the tax exemption requires that covered property “is open to all 
on an equal basis and that a tax exemption . . . would be in the public interest.” See Letter 
from Lisa Jackson, Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to Scott Hoffman, Adm’r, Ocean Grove 
Camp Meeting Ass’n (Sept. 15, 2007) (on file with author). 
59 See Third Amended Complaint at 1, Baker v. Wildflower Inn, No. 183-7-11 CACV (Vt. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/wildflower_third_am- 
ended_complaint.pdf (providing the plaintiffs’ allegations and claims for relief). 
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ple filed suit after an employee indicated in an e-mail that the inn does 
not “host gay receptions” due to the innkeepers’ “personal feelings,”60 
although it remains disputed whether the employee’s statement did, in 
fact, represent the inn’s policy.61 Nonetheless, the inn agreed to pay a 
$10,000 civil penalty, place another $20,000 in a charitable trust, and 
no longer host weddings or receptions for any member of the public.62 
 The jurisdictions that have recognized same-sex marriage legisla-
tively have all acknowledged the impact of same-sex marriage laws on a 
wide swath of the public that adheres to a traditional (i.e., heterosex-
ual) view of marriage.63 Each law provides religious liberty protections 
to the clergy64 in addition to guarantees extending beyond those 
                                                                                                                      
60 See Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at Ex-
hibit A, Wildflower Inn, No. 183-7-11 CACV (Vt. Super. Ct. May 10, 2012), available at http:// 
www.aclu.org/files/assets/wildflower_answer_and_affirmative_defenses_to_plfs_third_amen
ded_complaint.pdf [hereinafter Answer and Affirmative Defenses] (containing a printed 
copy of the e-mail from the inn’s employee). The couple alleged that the innkeepers had 
made public statements that they could not offer their services “because it goes against every-
thing that we as Catholics believe in.” Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at 6. 
61 Compare Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at 6 (alleging that the owners of 
the inn reaffirmed that hosting same-sex weddings contradicted their religious beliefs), 
with Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 60, at 4 (denying this assertion as inaccu-
rate, and claiming that the employee who denied services did not follow the inn’s policy). 
Significantly, the employee offered the services of her own private company in the same e-
mail, to which the mother of one of the plaintiffs responded that “[they] will have no 
shortage of good choices.” See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at Exhibit A. As 
explained in Part V, the possibility of a hardship to the couple should influence society’s 
willingness to provide an exemption. See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text. 
62 See Vermont Inn, 2 Women Settle Gay Marriage Lawsuit, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/AP59a61574cce14b349a527456541a0c7c.html (reporting the 
terms of the settlement). The inn did not qualify for the statutory exemption contained in 
Vermont’s same-sex marriage law for religious organizations and associated nonprofits that 
refuse, for religious reasons, to provide services “related to the solemnization of a marriage 
or celebration of a marriage.” See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(l) (Supp. 2011). 
63 See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing more detail on the laws enacted in Con-
necticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and 
Washington). 
64 Clergy protections appear in each of the laws offering more expansive protections. 
For instance, Vermont’s same-sex marriage law provides that it “does not require a mem-
ber of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage, and 
any refusal to do so shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 
18, § 5144(b) (Supp. 2011). See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing the text of en-
acted legislation and a breakdown of protections in proposed and enacted bills). The idea 
of “forced officiating” is “a distraction from real situations where religious conscience [may 
be] at risk.” See Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Iowa Governor Chet Culver 
( July 9, 2009) (on file with author). 
Some proposed exemptions that insulate only the clergy and churches from the duty 
to solemnize same-sex marriages have failed to garner enough support to become law. See 
infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
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granted by the First Amendment.65 A core of protections has emerged 
for religious organizations66 and individuals67 who cannot celebrate or 
facilitate any marriage—including a same-sex marriage, interfaith mar-
riage, or second marriage—when doing so would violate their religious 
convictions.68 
 Although each law describes the exempt activities in slightly differ-
ent terms, generally they encompass the provision of “services, accom-
modations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if 
. . . related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a mar-
riage.”69 Each jurisdiction insulates religious organizations from civil 
                                                                                                                      
 
65 See supra notes 14–15 (discussing Smith, 494 U.S. at 890, and reviewing the Court’s 
conclusion that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment 
regardless of their burden on the exercise of religious liberty). 
66 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35a (West Supp. 2011) (covering “a religious 
organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, 
supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or 
society”); D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (covering “a religious society, or a 
nonprofit organization that is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction 
with a religious society”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2011) (covering “a 
religious organization, association, or society, or any individual who is managed, directed, 
or supervised by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, or 
any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in con-
junction with a religious organization, association, or society”); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-
b(1) (McKinney 2011) (covering “a religious entity . . . or a corporation incorporated un-
der the benevolent orders law . . . or a not-for-profit corporation operated, supervised, or 
controlled by a religious corporation, or any employee thereof, being managed, directed, 
or supervised by or in conjunction with a religious corporation, benevolent order, or a not-
for-profit corporation”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(l) (covering “a religious organization, 
association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, 
or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society”). 
67 See supra note 14 (discussing state RFRAs). 
68 These religious exemptions encompass “all” marriages, including interfaith marriages, 
second marriages, and same-sex marriages. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (not-
ing that religious organizations “shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request for such services, 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization of 
a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage”) (emphasis added); 
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b (noting that religious organizations “shall not be required to provide 
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or 
celebration of a marriage”) (emphasis added); see also infra app. A (providing other statutory 
examples). Some faiths oppose interfaith marriage. See  Cent. Conference of Am. Rabbis, 
Reform Judaism and Mixed Marriage (Responsa No. 146), reprinted in American Reform Re-
sponsa: Collected Responsa of the Central Conference of American Rabbis 1889–
1983, at 445 (Walter Jacob ed., 1983) (“The Central Conference of American Rabbis, recall-
ing its stand adopted in 1909 ‘that mixed marriage is contrary to the Jewish tradition and 
should be discouraged,’ now declares its opposition to participation by its members in any 
ceremony which solemnizes a mixed marriage.”). 
69 See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(l). New Hampshire also requires that “such sol-
emnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of [the objector’s] reli-
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suits for refusing to celebrate marriages,70 and six of the seven explicitly 
protect such organizations from punishment at the hands of the gov-
ernment.71 All insulate religious nonprofit organizations, like Catholic 
Charities or the Salvation Army, from the duty to celebrate or solem-
nize marriages that violate their religious tenets.72 Four extend these 
protections to benevolent religious organizations, like the Knights of 
Columbus, or to religious groups that sponsor marriage retreats or pro-
vide housing for married individuals.73 In New York, New Hampshire, 
                                                                                                                      
gious beliefs and faith.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III). See generally Wilson, supra note 
49 (providing the text of each law). 
70 E.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(l) (“Any refusal to provide services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance with this subsection shall not create 
any civil claim or cause of action.”); see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35a (using similar lan-
guage); D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(1); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 
§ 10-b(2). See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing more detail on these statutes). 
71 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2); N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1). Vermont provides an exemption 
without specifying more. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(l). 
72 See supra note 66 (providing the text of relevant statutes). 
73 Three states expressly allow benevolent organizations to limit membership or insur-
ance benefits to spouses in traditional marriages. See  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(IV) 
(Supp. 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4501(b) (Supp. 2011); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 43d Sess. 
(Md. 2012). A fourth, New York, includes “a corporation incorporated under the benevo-
lent orders law” in its general exemption. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) (McKinney 
Supp. 2012). See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing more detail on these statutes). 
As to religious counseling programs, three jurisdictions—the District of Columbia, 
Maryland, and New Hampshire—expressly protect religious organizations from the pro-
motion of marriage through religious counseling programs and retreats. See D.C. Code 
§ 46-406(e)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (noting that religious societies “shall not be re-
quired to provide services, accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose related to 
the solemnization or celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage through 
religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats, that is in violation of the religious 
society's beliefs”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (exempting certain organizations 
from providing services if “the promotion of marriage through religious counseling, pro-
grams, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals, and such solemni-
zation, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs 
and faith”); H.B. 430, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (noting that religious organiza-
tions “may not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges to an individual if the request . . . is related to . . . the promotion of 
marriage through any social or religious programs or services, in violation of the entity’s 
religious beliefs”). New York’s exemption may provide protection as well: 
[N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the right . . . of any religious 
or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated 
for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or con-
trolled by or in connection with a religious organization . . . from taking such 
action as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious princi-
ples for which it is established or maintained. 
See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(2). 
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and Washington, individual employees of these groups receive protec-
tion, too.74 Although no state legislature has yet to protect religious ob-
jectors in the for-profit sector or in government employment,75 the re-
ligious liberty protections enacted to date sweep far beyond the church 
sanctuary, providing accommodations that exceed what most scholars 
believe would be constitutionally demanded.76 Importantly, however, 
the legislative accommodations in some states were cobbled together 
quickly during the legislative process, resulting in some drafting prob-
lems.77 
 Contrast these legislative victories with the resounding defeats that 
have occurred when advocates have adopted an inflexible approach to 
religious accommodations. Since 2004, legislators in nine states and the 
District of Columbia have introduced proposed same-sex marriage leg-
islation shorn of protections for anyone other than the clergy and 
churches.78 This legislation has failed in every jurisdiction in which it 
has been offered.79 
                                                                                                                      
74 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) (“[A]ny employee . . . being managed, directed, or 
supervised by . . . a religious corporation, benevolent order, or a not-for-profit corporation 
. . . shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage. Any such refusal 
. . . shall not create any civil claim . . . .”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (“[A]ny indi-
vidual . . . .”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(2)(4) (West 2005) (“[A]n individual 
. . . .”). These provisions immunize employees of religious organizations from civil suit 
directly and possibly also from being compelled by their employers to participate in mar-
riage celebrations. Other states do not provide explicit exemptions for individual employ-
ees of religious organizations. See infra app. A. 
75 The religious liberty accommodations that I and others have worked to secure, how-
ever, would not allow religious individuals in government employment or commerce to 
serve as roadblocks on the path to marriage; on the contrary, they would only allow these 
individuals to step aside from facilitating a marriage when doing so would violate their 
sincerely held religious beliefs, but only when substantial hardship for same-sex couples 
would not result. See infra app. B. 
76 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
77 See, e.g., infra notes 131–133 and accompanying text (discussing the suggestion to 
limit the application of the model provision in Appendix B to sincerely held religious be-
liefs). 
78 See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing a summary of key provisions in selected 
states’ same-sex marriage legislation). 
79 See generally id. (reviewing various protections and exemptions considered by state 
legislators in drafting same-sex marriage bills). This is not to say that all same-sex marriage 
bills that include more expansive exemptions succeed. For example, Maryland’s proposed 
legislation in 2011 included a clergy-only exemption. The legislation was amended by the 
Senate to include more expansive exemptions, only to die in the House because the Sen-
ate’s provisions were effectively frozen—no further changes could be made by the House 
in time to be heard by the Senate in that legislative cycle. See id. 
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 Such measures have failed at the ballot box, too. In 2009, Maine 
legislators repeatedly refused to include expansive religious liberty pro-
tections in the state’s same-sex marriage law.80 Instead, the legislature 
elected to provide only “faux” protections already guaranteed by the 
Constitution and turned down more expansive religious liberty protec-
tions like those advocated for by some scholars.81 Maine voters turned 
back the law in a “people’s veto” by a relatively narrow margin: 52.9% 
to 47.1%.82 The inflexible, winner-takes-all character83 of the Maine 
statute naturally elicited the question raised by Professor Dale Carpen-
ter the next morning: would “includ[ing] broader protection for reli-
gious liberty in the legislature’s [same-sex marriage] bill” have made a 
difference?84 Arguably it would have—after all, if a mere 2.9% of voters 
                                                                                                                      
 
80 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Winner-Takes-All Approach to State Same-Sex Marriage Laws Is 
Self-Defeating, SCOTUSBlog (Aug. 29, 2011, 4:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/ 
08/a-winner-takes-all-approach-to-state-same-sex-marriage-laws-is-self-defeating. 
81 Maine’s same-sex marriage law provided “protection” that was coterminous with con-
stitutional guarantees. It expressly did not “authorize any court or other state or local gov-
ernmental body . . . to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s 
religious doctrine, policy, teaching or solemnization of marriage within that particular reli-
gious faith’s tradition as guaranteed by the Maine [or] United States Constitution[s].” An Act 
to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Laws 150–
51 (abrogated by people’s veto). It provided no other protections. See id. Provisions like these 
offer “faux” protection because “[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even 
asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them.” See Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Mar-
riage and the Churches, in Emerging Conflicts, supra note 30, at 1. 
82 In response to Question 1: People’s Veto, An Act to End Discrimination in Civil 
Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 52.9% of Maine voters responded “Yes” when 
asked, “Do you want to reject the new law that lets same-sex couples marry and allows indi-
viduals and religious groups to refuse to perform these marriages?” compared to 47.1% 
who responded “No.” See Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, November 3, 2009 General Election Tabu-
lations, Maine.gov, http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
83 Professor Jana Singer argues for winner-takes-all legislation stripped of any religious 
accommodations. See Jana Singer, Balancing Away Marriage Equality, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 29, 
2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/balancing-away-marriage-equality. She 
suggests that “broad-based exemptions are both constitutionally problematic and politically 
unwise.” Id. If Professor Singer’s over-accommodation argument were correct, thousands of 
state and federal religious statutory accommodations would be invalidated—from military 
conscientious objection provisions to Native American peyote use, which received statutory 
exemption in response to Smith. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. See generally Michael W. McCon-
nell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (2010) (discussing the extent of 
existing religious liberty accommodations). 
84 Dale Carpenter, There’s Always Next Year, Volokh Conspiracy (Nov. 4, 2009, 1:21 
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/11/04/theres-always-next-year (“Some will say that we 
should have included broader protection for religious liberty in the [Maine] legislature’s 
[same-sex marriage] bill.”). Professor Carpenter did not attribute the law’s demise to this 
omission, however: “I don’t get the sense that the supposed erosion of religious liberty was 
the main Maine issue or that broader protection would have made an electoral differ-
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could have been swayed to change their votes by live-and-let-live reli-
gious liberty protections, Maine would have same-sex marriage today.85 
Together, these experiences suggest that exemptions take a powerful 
argument against same-sex marriage away from opponents.86 
 As with the legislative process, religious liberty accommodations 
can mute a powerful argument used in constitutional amendment 
fights. Sadly, this did not occur in California with Proposition 8. There, 
the Yes on 8 campaign . . . [argued that] religious institutions 
would be in danger of losing their tax exempt status or being 
sued if they refused to perform same sex marriages or to allow 
the use of their properties for that purpose. Religiously affili-
ated adoption agencies would be sanctioned if they refused to 
allow same sex couples to adopt and religious parents would 
be harmed when public schools taught that same sex mar-
riages were as legitimate as heterosexual marriages.87 
                                                                                                                      
 
ence. . . . Instead, the central concern seems to have been what will be taught in public 
schools to children being raised by heterosexual parents.” Id. Others chalk up the demise 
of Maine’s same-sex marriage law to the vitriol in the referendum. See Jeff Jacoby, Wedded to 
Vitriol, Backers of Gay Marriage Stumble, Bos. Globe, Nov. 11, 2009, at A11. 
85 The strength of preference matters, of course. A voter could tend to favor religious 
liberty over gay rights, but not know how to weigh or evaluate evidence of a religious lib-
erty impact. If a voter’s preference or weighting is not strong enough to change his or her 
vote or position, then it is irrelevant. Certainly the fact that same-sex marriage opponents 
in Maine and California invested money in messaging about religious impacts in order to 
influence the outcome of referenda suggests that they think it mattered. See Bruce E. Boy-
den, Constitutional Safety Valve: The Privileges or Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a Fed-
eralist System, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 111, 167 n.292 (2010) (“Opponents of same-sex marriage in 
Maine [invested in] advertisements claiming that if same-sex marriage became legal, ho-
mosexuality would be taught in schools.”); Patricia A. Cain, Contextualizing Varnum v. 
Brien: A “Moment” in History, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 27, 48 (2009) (“The first adver-
tisement that opponents of same-sex marriage launched was one that said same-sex mar-
riage threatened to take away the tax-exempt status of California churches.”). The real 
assay of whether religious liberty concerns move undecided citizens will come in the 2012 
referenda on the Maryland and Washington bills containing more expansive religious 
liberty protection. See supra note 50. 
86 Other factors may explain this legislative track record. For example, Rhode Island’s 
2011 same-sex marriage bill contained a clergy-only exemption. See generally Wilson, supra 
note 49 (summarizing the key provisions of Rhode Island’s proposed same-sex marriage 
legislation). However, given the fact that Rhode Island is the most Catholic state in the 
nation, the same-sex marriage bill may have failed to garner sufficient support, whatever 
exemptions were proffered. See Religious Identity: States Differ Widely, Gallup (Aug 7, 2009), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122075/religious-identity-states-differ-widely.aspx (reporting 
that 53% of Rhode Islanders identify as Roman Catholic). Nonetheless, the pattern strong-
ly correlates with the refusal to embrace more expansive exemptions. 
87 Helene Slessarev-Jamir, Religious Conservatives’ Success in Constructing Gay Marriage as 
a Threat to Religious Liberties 3 (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n 2012 Annual Meeting Paper), avail-
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These arguments received traction precisely because no legislation was 
enacted on the heels of the California Supreme Court’s 2008 decision 
in In re Marriage Cases.88 The California legislature missed a crucial op-
portunity to balance religious liberty concerns with marriage equality, 
as Connecticut’s legislature did after Connecticut’s supreme court held 
in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health that laws limiting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples violated same-sex couples’ equal protection rights 
under Connecticut’s Constitution.89 
 As each of these examples illustrates, religious accommodations 
need not work against the marriage-equality agenda. As one prominent 
gay rights leader, Jonathan Rauch, has pointed out, the smart move is 
to “bend toward accommodation,” not away from it.90 
B. Religious Accommodations Can Cement Greater Access to Needed Services 
 Just as an inflexible, winner-takes-all stance may backfire in the 
same-sex marriage context, it may also backfire with the coverage man-
date. This is so not because a legislative victory hangs in the balance—
                                                                                                                      
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107976; see California Mar-
riage Act. 
88 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that “to the ex-
tent the current California statutory provisions limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, 
these statutes are unconstitutional”), superseded by constitutional amendment, California Mar-
riage Protection Act, Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (2008). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit subsequently held that Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1095 
(9th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. 
July 30, 2012) (No. 12-144). 
89 See 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008); supra note 51 (discussing the genesis of Con-
necticut’s legislation). Religious liberty protections may also impact challenges to same-sex 
marriage bans. See Anthony Michael Kreis, Gay Gentrification: Whitewashed Fictions of 
LGBT Privilege and the New Interest-Convergence Dilemma, (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (“The current policy debates in states enacting marriage equality will 
help sustain sexual minority’s claims to a fundamental right to marry. The statutory 
schemes enacted are indispensable evidence for judges that the interests of the LGBT 
community do not undermine the rights of religious institutions, religious social service 
groups, or other fraternal organizations.”). 
90 Jonathan Rauch, Majority Report, Advocate, Dec. 2010–Jan. 2011, at 24–27. Rauch 
argues for gay marriage advocates to adopt a two-pronged shift in strategy: 
First, accept legal exceptions that let religious organizations discriminate 
against gays whenever their doing so imposes a cost we can live with. Second, 
dial back the accusations of ‘bigot’ and ‘hater’. . . . Not every religious ac-
commodation is valid, and it’s not always clear where to draw all the lines. But 
the smart approach is to bend toward accommodation, not away from it, 
whenever we can live with the costs. 
Id. 
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the ACA has already been enacted, although Congress is now consider-
ing a number of bills to limit the coverage mandate91— but because 
religious objectors, when left no choice on other matters, have often 
chosen to exit the market rather than violate their religious beliefs.92 
                                                                                                                     
 Such exoduses have occurred again and again over the past dec-
ade. In 2006, Catholic Charities of Massachusetts shuttered its adoption 
business after placing children with Boston families for 103 years.93 In 
the months preceding the closure, the state’s bishops learned that the 
organization had placed children for adoption with a handful of gay 
and lesbian parents—placements that accorded with Massachusetts law 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.94 Still, the 
state’s bishops abruptly discontinued the practice.95 The bishops then 
sought “relief from the regulatory requirements,” asking then-Governor 
 
91 Efforts have begun in Congress to broaden the exemption or eliminate the coverage 
mandate. Laurie Kellman, GOP Senators Fail to Reverse Birth Control Rule, Bos. Globe (Mar. 
1, 2012), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2012/03/01/gop_senators_fail_to_ 
reverse_birth_control_rule. 
92 See Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that religious organizations may 
choose to leave the health care market and arguing that “[w]hatever one thinks of the 
moral questions involved, this controversy . . . is also sure to impose additional pressures 
on the [ACA]”). 
93 Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, Bos. Globe, Mar. 11, 2006, 
at A1. 
94 See 102 Mass. Code Regs. 1.03(1) (1997) (requiring adoption agencies to obtain a 
state license and “not discriminate in providing services to children and their families on 
the basis of race, religion, cultural heritage, political beliefs, national origin, marital status, 
sexual orientation or disability”) (emphasis added). This requirement dates back to 1989, 
“when Massachusetts amended its antidiscrimination statute dealing with employment, 
housing, and government services to include sexual orientation as one of the forbidden 
grounds of discrimination.” Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil 
Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 781, 832 n.301 (2007). 
95 Catholic Charities originally placed thirteen children with gay or lesbian parents, al-
though it is unclear whether the adopting parents were at the time in same-sex relationships. 
Compare Wen, supra note 93 (noting that “approximately 13 children had been placed by 
Catholic Charities in gay households” (emphasis added)), with Jerry Filteau, Catholic Charities in 
Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services, Catholic News Serv. (Mar. 13, 2006), http:// 
www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm (indicating that Catholic Charities 
“had arranged the adoption of 13 children by same-sex couples over the past 20 years” (empha-
sis added)). After reports surfaced regarding the organization’s placements, the state’s bish-
ops directed Catholic agencies not to place children with gay or lesbian parents. Wen, supra 
note 93. Eight members of Catholic Charities’ forty-two member board, which had voted 
unanimously to continue placing children with lesbian and gay parents, then resigned. Patri-
cia Wen, In Break from Romney, Healey Raps Gay Adoption Exclusion, Bos. Globe, Mar. 3, 2006, at 
B4. 
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Mitt Romney for assistance.96 Governor Romney initially signaled 
“openness” to the request, but ultimately said that any exemption would 
have to come from the legislature or a court.97 When relief was not 
forthcoming, however, Catholic Charities discontinued its adoption ser-
vices altogether.98 
 In February 2010, the Catholic Archdiocese of Washington ended 
its eighty-year-old foster care placement program rather than approve 
same-sex couples for placement, which presumably would have been 
required under the District of Columbia’s nondiscrimination laws and 
its new same-sex marriage law.99 Recently, Illinois’s same-sex civil union 
law ushered in a new requirement that all social service agencies that 
receive state money, including religiously affiliated ones, “must con-
sider same-sex couples as potential foster-care and adoptive parents.”100 
The state’s Catholic bishops lobbied against the civil union law, but 
contended that they and other religious leaders were given the impres-
sion that it would not affect state contracts with Catholic Charities and 
other religious social services.101 Finding themselves without an exemp-
tion, many groups are shedding their adoption services, closing them, 
or transferring them outside the church qua church to nonprofit or-
ganizations.102 
                                                                                                                      
 
96 See Statement of the Mass. Catholic Conference on Behalf of Archbishop Sean P. 
O’Malley et al. (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.bostoncatholic.org/uploadedFiles/ 
News_releases_2006_statement060228.pdf. 
97 See Patricia Wen, Bishops Dealt Setback in Pursuit of Gay Adoption Exemption, Bos. 
Globe, Feb. 17, 2006, at B3; Patricia Wen & Frank Phillips, Romney Shifts on Adoption by 
Gays, Bos. Globe, Mar. 1, 2006, at B1. 
98 See Wen, supra note 93; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral 
Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 475, 479–83 (2008) (documenting the exit 
of religious social services providers and other vendors from the market in the absence of 
an exemption). 
99 See Michelle Boorstein, Catholic Archdiocese Ends D.C. Foster-Care Program, Wash. Post, 
Feb. 17, 2010, at B1; Emily Esfahani Smith, Washington, Gay Marriage and the Catholic Church, 
Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 2010, at A11. 
100 See Laurie Goodstein, Illinois Bishops Drop Program over Bias Rule, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 
2011, at A16. 
101 Explaining why the Catholic dioceses did not lobby for a specific exemption, Bish-
op Thomas J. Paprocki said, “It would have been seen as, ‘We’re going to compromise on 
the principle as long as we get our exception.’ We didn’t want it to be seen as buying our 
support.” See id. Notably, Connecticut and Maryland’s same-sex marriage laws exempt so-
cial services agencies so long as they receive no government funding. Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 46b-135b; H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
102 See Goodstein, supra note 100 (describing the process by which Illinois bishops “fol-
lowed colleagues in Washington, D.C., and Massachusetts who had jettisoned their adop-
tion services rather than comply with nondiscrimination laws”); William Wan, Catholic 
Charities to Limit Health Benefits to Spouses, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 2010, at A1 (reporting that 
“Catholic Charities last month transferred its foster-care program—43 children, 35 families 
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 The coverage mandate likewise may hasten such extreme meas-
ures. Chicago’s Cardinal Francis George asked in a recent op-ed: 
  What will happen if the HHS regulations are not re-
scinded? A Catholic institution, so far as I can see right now, 
will have one of four choices: 1) secularize itself, breaking its 
connection to the church, her moral and social teachings and 
the oversight of its ministry by the local bishop. This is a form 
of theft. It means the church will not be permitted to have an 
institutional voice in public life. 2) Pay exorbitant annual fines 
to avoid paying for insurance policies that cover abortifacient 
drugs, artificial contraception and sterilization. This is not 
economically sustainable. 3) Sell the institution to a non-
Catholic group or to a local government. 4) Close down.103 
Cardinal George then noted that the Archdiocese’s directory contained 
“a complete list of Catholic hospitals and health care institutions in 
Cook and Lake counties,” and ominously warned that “two Lents from 
now, unless something changes, that page will be blank.”104 
 Other religious leaders have issued similar warnings. The presi-
dent of Belmont Abbey College, a Catholic-affiliated institution in 
North Carolina that has filed suit against HHS, told the Gaston Gazette 
that “[w]e want to serve our community but we feel cornered. . . . I be-
lieve we would go there [and close the college]” rather than comply 
with the coverage mandate.105 
 Of course, dire predictions may turn out to be nothing more than 
empty threats. The amount of weight decisionmakers should give to the 
possibility of an exodus of religious providers will necessarily depend on 
                                                                                                                      
and seven staff members—to another provider, the National Center for Children and Fam-
ilies”). 
103 Francis Cardinal George, What Are You Going to Give Up This Lent?, Catholic New 
World (Feb. 26, 2012), available at http://www.catholicnewworld.com/cnwonline/2012/ 
0226/cardinal.aspx. Cardinal George went on to say that the Church: 
would love to have the separation between church and state we thought we 
enjoyed just a few months ago, when we were free to run Catholic institutions 
in conformity with the demands of the Catholic faith, when the government 
couldn’t tell us which of our ministries are Catholic and which not, when the 
law protected rather than crushed conscience. 
Id. 
104 See id. 
105 See Amanda Memrick, Belmont Abbey Officials Explain Health Care Lawsuit, Gaston 
Gazette (Gastonia, N.C.), Nov. 20, 2011, at 1B; see also Campus Notes, supra note 20 (dis-
cussing the difficulties faced by Catholic colleges if they are forced to provide contracep-
tive coverage to students). 
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the specific context. For example, with health care services, legislators 
and policymakers wisely would consider a range of factors, including 
market concentration, the scarcity of other providers, the market share 
of the possible exiting organizations, the likelihood that the exiting or-
ganizations would sell the organization rather than shutter it, the likeli-
hood of a private buyer or the government acquiring the facility in ad-
vance of any shutdown, the probable time frame for any transition, and 
how likely it might be that the objector will choose to accede to civil 
strictures rather than actually exiting the market.106 Catholic-affiliated 
hospitals account for seventeen percent of all hospital admissions na-
tionally,107 and with many markets served exclusively by a sole, Catholic-
affiliated hospital,108 policymakers may well be loathe to engage in a 
high-stakes game of chicken.109 
II. Second Sticking Point: Exemptions Condone Prejudice or 
Crazy Ideas 
 In the same-sex marriage context, legislators readily accept that 
“member[s] of the cloth . . . clearly ha[ve] deeply held fundamental 
religious beliefs,” but sometimes express deep skepticism about wheth-
                                                                                                                      
106 With adoption services, legislators considering a religious exemption might con-
sider a variety of factors, such as the impact an exemption (or denial of one) would have 
on children awaiting adoption and on same-sex couples seeking to adopt. Among other 
questions, legislators should also ask whether other providers of adoption services would 
readily serve gay couples seeking to adopt, whether information-forcing rules could direct 
prospective parents to willing providers, and, if the state rejects religious accommodations, 
whether objecting agencies would exit the market, and if so, how many children would 
they have placed and how many of these children would be picked up by other agencies 
after their exit. See Wilson, supra note 98, at 479–83. 
107 Rachel Benson Gold, Advocates Work to Preserve Reproductive Health Care Access When 
Hospitals Merge, Guttmacher Rep. on Pub. Pol’y, Apr. 2000, at 3, 3, available at http://www. 
guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/2/gr030203.pdf. 
108 See Reed Abelson, Catholic Gains in Health Care Includes Strings, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 
2012, at A1. See generally Liz Bucar, Catholics for a Free Choice, Caution: Catholic 
Health Restrictions May Be Hazardous to Your Health (1999), available at http:// 
www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/healthcare/documents/1998cautioncatholichealthrest
rictions.pdf (listing counties throughout the United States that, as of 1999, were served 
solely by Catholic hospitals). 
109 Of course, under the hardship accommodation described in Part V of this Article, 
the Catholic hospital that exclusively serves its market is likely to be in a blocking position 
in some instances, and thus would have to provide the needed service, notwithstanding its 
religious objection. Importantly, the model provision in Appendix B does not limit the 
ability of religious organizations to object only when no hardship results, a point over 
which the groups of scholars I have worked with remains deeply divided. See infra notes 
249–258 and accompanying text (describing instances in which a religiously affiliated hos-
pital would occupy a blocking position, warranting qualification of any exemption). 
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er other objectors are “really acting on fundamental religious belief 
and doctrine as opposed to just a prejudice. . . . How do I make that 
distinction with [a wedding] photographer?”110 A related concern aris-
es in the health care context, where some argue that religious liberty 
accommodations legitimize scientifically unfounded ideas, such as the 
notion that emergency contraceptives act as abortifacients.111 
 This Part first takes up the claim that insincere objections will re-
ceive protection as a result of religious liberty accommodations. It then 
examines whether such accommodations validate completely ground-
less notions. 
A. Concerns About Insincere Beliefs 
 Consider first concerns about sincerity. Whether a claimed belief is 
sincere or a convenient screen for ignoble acts is an issue common to 
many, but not all, religious freedom protections. Unlike freedom of 
speech, freedom of conscience does not protect the insincere. 
 Patently, some individuals may be motivated to make a religious 
freedom argument in order to receive better work hours, get away with 
using illegal drugs, or avoid criminal charges.112 Many claims for pro-
tection, however, seek the ability to perform an act that is not only per-
sonally burdensome, but meaningless apart from the religious faith that 
gives the act meaning. So, for example, claims to go without medical 
care113 or to adhere to kosher dietary laws114 burden the claimant sig-
                                                                                                                      
 
110 E.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:54:40 (statement of 
Councilmember Phil Mendelson). 
111 See infra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of ella and 
Plan B). 
112 E.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834–35 (1989) (allowing a reli-
gious objection to working on Sundays, even though other members of defendant’s relig-
ion did not share this belief); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 429, 445 (D.D.C. 1968) 
(attempting to avoid prosecution for drug use by arguing that marijuana was a sacrament 
in the defendant’s religion, the “Boo Hoos”); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional 
Law: Principles and Policies 1189–90 (3d ed. 2006); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Tolera-
tion and Claims of Conscience,  (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 25) (on file with author) 
(“[I]f the claim for an exemption is not to work on Saturday, or to refrain from having a 
child vaccinated, we can imagine that someone who wishes to spend the day with his fam-
ily, or to avoid vaccination risks for his child, might announce an insincere objection in 
conscience.”). 
113 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Miss. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265–69 (1990); Schloendorff 
v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 128–30 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Of course, some religious believers assert claims of faith not to avoid 
health care for themselves, but to avoid some forms of health care for their children. See 
generally Understanding Family Law § 7.05, at 212–15 ( John De Witt et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2005). These protections have been criticized on a number of grounds. See James Dwyer, 
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nificantly, but impose very little cost on others, making it very unlikely 
that someone would make an insincere claim.115 
 Other claims for protection encompass acts that may impose a cost 
on others, but that nonetheless open the claimant up to significant per-
sonal costs. Consider the nurse at Mt. Sinai Hospital who alleged that 
she was coerced into assisting with a late-term, twenty-two-week abor-
tion, despite federal and state statutes giving her an unqualified right to 
refuse.116 She was threatened not only with termination, but with losing 
her nursing license for “patient abandonment.”117 
 Individuals who object on religious grounds to facilitating same-sex 
marriages have also incurred significant wrath in the marketplace, sug-
gesting that an objector would not lightly feign an objection. When a 
New Jersey bridal salon refused to assist a woman with a bridal gown for 
her same-sex marriage, the story went “viral,” soon gracing not just the 
pages of a local newspaper, but national media outlets as well. ABC 
News, the Los Angeles Times, Time Magazine, and Reuters all covered the 
story.118 As others have noted, 
[i]f an exemption, say from participating in the sale of morn-
ing after pills, confers no ordinary advantage on the person 
who claims that participation would violate his conscience, 
and if the seeking of an exemption is likely to cause irritation 
                                                                                                                      
The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Law as Denials of 
Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1321, 1323–24 (1996) (as-
serting that children do not receive equal protection of the law when their parents claim 
religious exemptions based on beliefs in faith-healing); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Perils of 
Privatized Marriage, in Marriage and Divorce in a Multicultural Context: Reconsid-
ering the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion 258–61 ( Joel A. Nichols ed., 2011) 
(examining the serious costs to children when states give parents complete authority to 
make treatment decisions). 
114 See, e.g., Doswell v. Smith, 139 F.3d 888, 1998 WL 110161, at *1–2, 5–6 (4th Cir. 
1998) (unpublished table decision). 
115 See Greenawalt, supra note 112, at 25–26 (“One way of minimizing the success of in-
sincere claims is, as I have suggested, to limit an exemption to religious claims, which 
many people may be more hesitant to make up, given the typical tie of religious convic-
tions to institutional affiliations.”). 
116 See supra note 31 (discussing Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital). 
117 See supra note 31 (same). 
118 See Stephanie Rabiner, NJ Bridal Store Refuses to Sell Lesbian a Dress, Reuters, Aug. 18, 
2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/tagblogsfindlawcom2011-free 
enterprise-id US2751876420110819; Megan Gibson, New Jersey Bridal Shop Refuses to Sell Wed-
ding Gown to Lesbian Bride, Time (Aug. 21, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/08/21/ 
new-jersey-bridal-shop-refuses-to-sell-wedding-gown-to-lesbian-bride/#ixzz1jjPMLGhe; Tina 
Susman, N.J. Bridal Salon Slammed for Refusing to Sell Gown to Lesbian, L.A. Times (Aug 22, 2011, 
9:46 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/08/bridal-salon-slammed-for-
refusing-gown-to-lesbian.html. 
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of superiors or colleagues that could down the road hurt 
[one’s] chances for a promotion or informal benefits, a per-
son has no incentive to make an insincere claim.119 
 Even though many individuals will not be motivated to feign a 
religious objection, sincerity questions can and do arise in some cas-
es—from prisoners requesting religious accommodations to military 
conscientious objectors. In each context, courts have generally proven 
competent to separate the sincere plaintiff from the insincere. In the 
prison context, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA) directs prison officials not to “impose a substantial 
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined 
to an institution.”120 Some prisoners bring lawsuits based on religious 
claims to harass prison administrators or to gain perks they cannot 
otherwise secure. For instance, in 2010, an inmate in an Orange 
County, California jail claimed to celebrate the Seinfeld holiday, Festi-
vus, in order to get double portions of food.121 There, prison officials 
determined that the inmate’s religious claim was not sincere.122 Obvi-
ously, many other prisoners do bring claims with merit.123 
 Because both sincere and insincere claims can arise, in the 2005 
case Cutter v. Wilkinson, the U.S. Supreme Court gave prison officials 
considerable leeway to test the sincerity of a prisoner’s stated need for 
accommodation, without which a prisoner-plaintiff cannot take advan-
tage of federal statutory religious accommodations: 
[P]rison officials may appropriately question whether a pris-
oner’s religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accom-
modation, is authentic. Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into 
whether a particular belief or practice is central to a prisoner’s 
religion, the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity 
of a prisoner’s professed religiosity. The truth of a belief is not 
open to question; rather, the question is whether the objec-
tor’s beliefs are truly held.124 
                                                                                                                      
119 Greenawalt, supra note 112, at 25. 
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006). 
121 Tony Barboza, Inmate Claims Bogus Religion, L.A. Times, Dec. 15, 2010, at AA4. 
122 Id. 
123 See, e.g., Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 455 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing summary 
judgment against a pro se Rastafarian inmate suing under RLUIPA because prison officials 
cut the plaintiff's dreadlocks). 
124 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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Similarly, the military has long had a detailed system for evaluating the 
sincerity of conscientious objections to military service.125  
 Tests for sincerity parallel the examination of “pretext” that is 
common to most employment discrimination litigation in the federal 
courts. Under the framework developed by the Supreme Court in the 
1973 case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, courts must evaluate 
whether an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for an 
adverse employment action is a pretext for invidious discrimina-
tion.126 
 Although these contexts differ in important ways, together they 
underscore that courts have the institutional competence to judge 
whether a claimed religious objection to same-sex marriage is sincere 
or merely pretext for animus. This is not to say, however, that deciding 
the sincerity of a religious belief is an easy task. Sincerity must be de-
termined “without a view as to [the] truth or falsity” of the religious 
belief being claimed, a point the Supreme Court established in the 
1944 decision in United States v. Ballard.127 There, the government in-
dicted leaders of a religion called “I Am” for mail fraud after the lead-
ers solicited donations from individuals they promised to cure of dis-
eases. The Court held that a jury could properly decide whether the 
leaders sincerely believed that they possessed healing abilities, but 
could not evaluate the religious belief itself. 
 Moreover, as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky points out, “[t]here is 
no measure for sincerity.”128 A number of commentators have sug-
gested guides for evaluating sincerity. For example, Professor Kent 
Greenawalt notes that when someone “loses her job or is demoted be-
cause she actually refuses to perform an act,” this helps to “demonstrate 
a true claim of conscience.”129 But he observes that “those whose claim 
for an exemption is granted usually are not put to such a clear 
test, . . . opening an exemption . . . to those with lukewarm reserva-
tions.”130 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 973, 979–81 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the 
U.S. Army’s determination under Army Regulation 600-43 that a claimed conscientious 
objection was not “sincere and deeply held”). 
126 See 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 
127 Chemerinsky, supra note 112, at 1190; see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–
86 (1944). 
128 Chemerinsky, supra note 112, at 1190. 
129 Greenawalt, supra note 112, at 26 (discussing moral objections, as opposed to reli-
gious objections). 
130 Id. 
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 Although it is true that the legislative accommodations described 
in Appendix B are designed to insulate religious objectors from law-
suits, this does not mean that objecting is cost-free. As noted above, 
many refusals are met with social opprobrium or stigma from one’s 
employer, coworkers, or community, even when there are existing pro-
tections.131 Neither does it mean that religious objectors get a free pass. 
Lawsuits may follow even when a legislative accommodation is made. If 
an exemption is structured like that in Appendix B,132 an objector, if 
sued, may find that his or her beliefs are, in fact, subjected to a search-
ing examination for sincerity. In the end, the difficulty of assessing sin-
cerity remains “one reason for the law to avoid exemptions,” but that 
reason “must be measured against the positive reasons to grant such 
exemptions.”133 
B. Concerns About “Crazy” Beliefs 
 In the health care context, some worry that religious exemptions 
will legitimize scientifically unfounded ideas. Two different religious 
beliefs underpin objections to the coverage mandate: one contends 
that all sexual intercourse should have the potential for creating life—
thus, procedures that sterilize a person and drugs that prevent fertiliza-
tion are both objectionable.134 The second belief focuses on emergency 
                                                                                                                      
 
131 See supra note 30 (discussing the exemptions available to abortion objectors), supra 
notes 31–32 (describing attempts to penalize workers claiming exemptions under existing 
laws). 
132 See Appendix A for statutory accommodations that have been enacted, some of 
which were cobbled together in last-minute negotiations, as a consequence of which, they 
have drafting problems. Unlike the model provision in Appendix B, the enacted exemp-
tions are not limited by sincerity. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). 
133 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fair-
ness 110 (2006). 
134 Some religious objectors emphasize the concern over contraceptive coverage. See, e.g., 
Bishop Robert H. Brom, Contraception and Sterilization, Catholic Answers (Aug. 10, 2004), 
http://www.catholic.com/tracts/contraception-and-sterilization (“[O]ver the course of time 
the Church has called greater attention to the unitive aspect of marital intercourse, yet it 
remains true that the procreative aspect of each particular marital act must not be frus-
trated.”). Many find the objection to contraceptive coverage to be incomprehensible. See, e.g., 
Nicholas D. Kristof, Beyond Pelvic Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR11; Guttmacher Inst., 
Testimony Submitted to the Comm. on Preventive Servs. for Women, Inst. of Med. 16 (2011), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/CPSW-testimony.pdf; Press Release, Majority of 
Catholics Think Employers Should Be Required to Provide Health Care Plans That Cover Birth Control 
at No Cost, Pub. Religion Res. Inst. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://publicreligion.org/newsroom/ 
2012/02/january-tracking-poll-2012. In his column in the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof 
wrote: 
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contraceptives as covered drugs, with objectors maintaining that emer-
gency contraceptives act after fertilization to destroy a life-in-being.135 It 
is this second belief that gets tagged as unfounded. 
 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), 
for example, opposed pharmacy and pharmacist exemptions from the 
duty to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, saying “provider 
refusals to dispense emergency contraception based on unsupported 
beliefs about its primary mechanism of action should not be justi-
fied.”136 ACOG argued that drugs like Plan B do not act as abortifa-
cients, thus objectors have no medically sound basis for claiming an ex-
emption from filling prescriptions.137 
 Factually, however, this contention is simply more complicated 
than ACOG’s blanket assertion suggests. Plan B was approved in 
1999,138 and its label states that “[i]t works mainly by stopping the re-
lease of an egg from the ovary. It is possible that Plan B One-Step may 
also work by . . . preventing attachment (implantation) to the uterus 
                                                                                                                      
I may not be as theologically sophisticated as American bishops, but I had 
thought that Jesus talked more about helping the poor than about banning 
contraceptives. . . . The cost of birth control is one reason poor women are 
more than three times as likely to end up pregnant unintentionally as middle-
class women. 
Id. Indeed, the majority of Americans believe that it is often socially responsible to have sex 
without procreation. In a survey of 591 adults nationwide, who were asked whether “the 
birth control pill has made American family life better,” 50% of those randomly tele-
phoned responded that it had, and 56% believed that “the birth control pill has made 
women’s lives better.” See CBS News, Poll: The Birth Control Pill: 50 Years Later 1–2 
(2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll_Birth_Control_Pill_050710. 
pdf. Religious believers did not share this view as widely. Id. (reporting that 38% of Catho-
lics and 41% of white Evangelicals believed the birth control pill had made American fam-
ily life better). 
135 Gene Veith, Church Organizations Must Provide Free Contraception and Abortifacients, Cra-
nach ( Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.geneveith.com/2012/01/24/church-organizations-must-
provide-free-contraception-abortifacient (“Christian organizations that oppose abortion as a 
matter of religious conviction will be required by law to pay for abortifacients and thus violate 
their religious convictions.”). 
136 Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 385: The 
Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on%20Ethics/co 
385.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20120728T1211090439. 
137 See id. 
138 FDA’s Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions and Answers, FDA.gov (Apr. 30, 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandpro- 
viders/ucm109795.htm. 
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(womb).”139 As late as 2004, Charles Lockwood, a member of the sci-
entific advisory committee to the U.S. Food & Drug Administration 
(FDA) that held hearings about whether to make Plan B available 
over the counter and now dean of Yale University’s medical school, 
explained that: 
[m]any on the FDA panel perceived that a contragestive effect 
[e.g., an effect after fertilization occurs] was possible and we 
recommended that the package labeling should describe the 
drug’s potential mechanism of action so that women could 
make an informed choice about its use and avoid inadver-
tently violating their own moral or religious beliefs.140 
 Despite these early concerns about a post-fertilization effect, since 
Plan B’s initial approval by the FDA, the only way that Plan B has been 
                                                                                                                      
139 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Plan B One-Step Prescribing Information 7 (2009) 
[hereinafter Plan B Prescribing Information], available at http://www.accessdata.fda. 
gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2009/021998lbl.pdf. 
140 Charles J. Lockwood, OTC Emergency Contraception: The Right Choice, Contemp. OB/ 
GYN, Jan. 2004, at 15 (discussing the available evidence and positing “that even if 10% of 
women experience the contragestive effect of Plan B, its [over-the-counter] availability will 
prevent far more abortions, performed further along in gestation”). Lockwood cited work 
showing a contragestive effect, and noted that by 2002: 
There [was] also evidence that the endometrial epithelium in both the pe-
riovulatory and luteal phases is disrupted by [Plan B], leading one group of 
investigators to conclude that its emergency contraceptive effect was medi-
ated by alteration of the endometrial surface and, therefore, receptivity [of 
the implanting embryo]. Because many of the key regulators of blastocyst at-
tachment and early implantation (such as integrins, cytokines, and glycopep-
tides) are regulated by steroid hormones, there is also the potential for more 
subtle biochemical derangements. 
Id.; see also G. Ugocsai et al., Scanning Electron Microscopic (SEM) Changes of the Endometrium 
in Women Taking High Doses of Levonorgestrel as Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 66 Contra-
ception 433, 433 (2002) (“[E]mergency methods of contraception. . . . exert their nega-
tive effect on fertility by . . . creating unfavorable conditions for the implantation or for the 
establishment of a pregnancy.” (emphasis added)). 
Despite this evidence, in an editorial the New York Times lamented: 
Belief that [Plan B] might be an abortifacient stems from speculative lan-
guage that the [FDA] approved for its original label, which listed a number of 
physiological processes by which the pill might prevent pregnancy, including 
preventing fertilized eggs from implanting in the womb. There was no evi-
dence to support that view at the time, and there is none to support it now. 
Editorial, How Morning-After Pills Really Work, N.Y. Times, June 9, 2012, at A20, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/how-morning-after-pills-really-work.html; see 
also Pam Belluck, Abortion Qualms on Morning-After Pill May Be Unfounded, N.Y. Times June 6, 
2012, at A1 (reviewing evidence that Plan B acts to prevent fertilization). 
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demonstrated to operate is as a contraceptive—meaning that it works 
to prevent fertilization entirely.141 Studies report, for example, that 
Plan B works to prevent fertilization by: (1) impeding the sperm’s abil-
ity to reach the egg and (2) delaying ovulation so there is no egg re-
leased to meet the sperm.142 Still, while Plan B appears to have no ef-
fect after fertilization, the authors of the studies supporting this 
conclusion acknowledge that post-fertilization effects cannot be defini-
tively ruled out.143 
                                                                                                                     
 The evidence about newer emergency contraceptives like ella, ap-
proved in 2010, is shaping up very differently.144 Whereas Plan B is ef-
 
141 See infra note 142.  
142 Gabriela Noé et al., Contraceptive Efficacy of Emergency with Levonrgestrel Given Before or 
After Ovulation, 81 Contraception 414, 414, 419, 420 (2010) (stating that “[i]t is estab-
lished that preovulatory administration of LNG [Plan B] interferes with the ovulatory pro-
cess” and finding from a comparison of the number of expected and actual pregnancies 
after “unprotected intercourse during fertile cycle days” among women who took LNG-EC 
[Plan B] on the day of ovulation or immediately thereafter” that the “difference was not 
statistically significant,” showing that Plan B “is very effective in preventing pregnancy 
when it is administered before ovulation, but it is ineffective in preventing pregnancy once 
fertilization has occurred”); James Trussell & Beth Jordan, Editorial, Mechanism of Action of 
Emergency Contraceptive Pills, 74 Contraception 87, 87 (2006) (“Levonorgestrel [Plan B] 
also interferes with sperm migration and function at all levels of the genital tract.”). 
143 Although studies of Plan B’s contraceptive mechanism of action are now seen as 
dispositive, the authors of those studies acknowledge that “[i]t is unlikely that this question 
can ever be unequivocally answered, and we therefore cannot conclude that [emergency 
contraceptives] never prevent pregnancy after fertilization.” Trussell & Jordan, supra note 
142, at 87; see also Noé et al., supra note 142, at 414 (conceding that studies of the impact 
of Plan B on “endometrial receptivity,” a post-fertilization effect, “are not consistent, and 
current knowledge on cellular and molecular markers of endometrial receptivity in the 
human is insufficient to resolve this controversy”). 
We cannot be one hundred percent sure about how Plan B or other emergency con-
traceptives work in humans because, as noted by Jeffrey Keenan, a professor of obstetrics 
and gynecology and director of the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility 
at the University of Tennessee Medical Center, the “Phase 2 and 3 clinical studies were not 
designed to assess this possibility.” Jeffrey Keenan, Ulipristal Acetate: Contraceptive or Con-
tragestive?, 45 Annals of Pharmacotherapy 813, 814 (2011). To be sure of the mecha-
nism of action would require “each study participant to undergo laboratory evaluation and 
possibly sonographic examination to determine whether ovulation had already occurred.” 
Id. Presumably, the makers of emergency contraceptives would not want to do such studies. 
144 Some commentators lump Plan B and ella together in their discussions, failing to dis-
tinguish between the mechanisms by which the two drugs appear to work. See, e.g., Keith 
Fournier, Plan B and Ella: Morning After Contraceptives Can Induce Abortion, Catholic Online 
(Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.catholic.org/national/national_story.php?id=44730 (discussing 
Plan B and ella and concluding that they both “may result in the eviction of an embryonic 
human person”). For those who, like the Catholic Church, maintain that life begins at con-
ception, parsing the exact mechanisms of Plan B and ella is irrelevant to the moral calculus 
of dispensing them. 
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fective for up to 72 hours after unprotected sex,145 ella works up to 120 
hours after unprotected sex146 and is much more effective in prevent-
ing pregnancy than Plan B. In one study, ella prevented 85% of ex-
pected pregnancies, compared to Plan B’s 69%.147 
 A number of authorities believe that ella’s enhanced effectiveness 
stems in part from post-fertilization mechanisms of action, although 
ella clearly also works to prevent the release of an egg from the ovary, 
and therefore prevents fertilization itself, as Plan B does.148 A 2011 arti-
cle in the Annals of Pharmacotherapy concluded that if a woman happens 
to take ella within five days after unprotected sex—and after the egg has 
already been fertilized—ella’s “mechanism of action is much more ac-
curately described as contragestive, since only gestation (implantation 
and growth) of the embryo [fertilized egg] is prevented” during that 
time frame.149 Indeed, this contragestive effect likely accounts for ella’s 
“enhanced effectiveness . . . compared with [Plan B].”150 
 One author posits that with ella, “there is a unique circumstance 
and time period in which [ella] would have a direct abortifacient effect”
—defined in the article to mean “loss of the embryo occurring either at 
the preimplantation stage or at the post-implantation stage”151— “rather 
than a contraceptive effect.”152 This would occur when “unprotected 
intercourse occurs within the fertility window (i.e., less than 120 hours 
(5 days) before ovulation or not more than 24 hours after ovulation) 
and [ella] is taken after fertilization.”153 Professor Ralph Miech, an asso-
                                                                                                                      
145 Plan B Prescribing Information, supra note 139, at 7. 
146 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ella Prescribing Information *7 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Ella Prescribing Information], available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsat 
fda_docs/label/2010/022474s000lbl.pdf. 
147 Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Chun-Xia Meng, Emergency Contraception: Potential 
Role of Ulipristal Acetate, 2 Int’l J. Women's Health 53, 57 (2010). 
148 Id. at 59 (“UPA [ella] has been demonstrated to have a direct inhibitory effect on 
follicular rupture. This allows UPA [ella] to be effective even when administered shortly 
before ovulation when the LH surge has already started to rise, a time period when use of 
LNG [Plan B] is no longer effective.”). 
149 Keenan, supra note 143, at 814; see Ella Prescribing Information, supra note 146, 
at *9. 
150 Keenan, supra note 143, at 814. 
151 Ralph P. Miech, Immunopharmacology of Ulipristal as an Emergency Contraceptive 3 Int’l 
J. Women’s Health 391, 392 (2011) (noting that “[t]his report [uses] the classical defini-
tions of abortion and contraceptive. Abortion is defined as the loss of the embryo occur-
ring either at the preimplantation stage or at the post-implantation stage and contracep-
tion is defined as the prevention of fertilization.”). 
152 Id. (noting elsewhere that “[a]n abortifacient effect of [ella] can occur when [ella] 
is taken post-fertilization but prior to implantation, when the progesterone levels are rela-
tively low”). 
153 Id. 
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ciate professor emeritus of molecular pharmacology, physiology, and 
biotechnology at Brown University, believes that ella “blocks the immu-
notolerance effects of progesterone on the maternal innate immune 
system . . ., resulting in the immunorejection of an embryo attempting 
to implant.”154 
 In line with this evidence, ella’s FDA label states under the heading 
“How does ella work?” that “ella is thought to work . . . primarily by 
stopping or delaying the release of an egg from the ovary. It is possible 
that ella may also work by preventing attachment (implantation) to the 
uterus.”155 As with Plan B, evidence of ella’s precise mechanisms of ac-
tion may evolve as new studies accumulate.156 
 The evidence of a contragestive effect, as opposed to a contracep-
tive one, begs the question of whether a drug that acts after fertilization 
or implantation should count as an abortifacient—itself a deeply con-
tested matter.157 But whatever one considers to be an abortifacient, 
more than half of women in one study—fifty-three percent—said they 
would not use a birth control method that acts after fertilization.158 In 
                                                                                                                      
154 Id. at 391. As Professor Miech explains, "Inadequate progesterone synthesis results 
in spontaneous abortions" as a matter of course. Id.; see also Pamela Stratton et al., Endo-
metrial Effects of a Single Early Luteal Dose of the Selective Progesterone Receptor Modulator CDB-
2914, 93 Fertility & Sterility 2035, 2039–40 (2010) (“[ella caused] a significant dose-
dependent decrease in endometrial thickness [and] an increase in glandular [progester-
one] receptors. . . . Either effect . . . may hamper implantation.”). See generally Robin Fret-
well Wilson, The Erupting Clash Between Religion and the State over Contraception, Sterilization 
and Abortion (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (providing a more com-
plete discussion of this and other studies demonstrating that ella works not only as a con-
traceptive but also as a contragestive). 
155 Ella Prescribing Information, supra note 146, at *9; see Veith, supra note 135. 
156 Popular reporting on ella emphasizes both the findings about ella’s possible mech-
anisms of action and the uncertainty remaining about those mechanisms. See, e.g., Belluck, 
supra note 140 (“Research on Ella . . . is less extensive, but the F.D.A., Dr. Blithe, and oth-
ers say evidence increasingly suggests it does not derail implantation, citing, among other 
things, several studies in which women became pregnant when taking Ella after ovulating. 
The studies, focused on Ella’s effectiveness, were not designed to determine if it blocked 
implantation, but experts still consider them significant.”); Rob Stein, 5-Day-After Contracep-
tive Wins FDA Approval, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 2010, at A1 (“Ella . . . works as a contracep-
tive by blocking progesterone’s activity, delaying the ovaries from producing an egg. But 
progesterone is also needed to prepare the womb to accept a fertilized egg and to nurture 
a developing embryo . . . Ella’s chemical similarity to RU-486 [a controversial abortifa-
cient] raises the possibility that it might do the same thing, perhaps if taken at elevated 
doses. But no one knows for sure whether the drug would induce an abortion, because the 
drug has never been tested that way.”). 
157 See Wilson, supra note 154. 
158 Huong M. Dye et al., Women and Post-Fertilization Effects of Birth Control: Consistency of Be-
liefs, Intentions and Reported Use, 5 BMC Women’s Health, no. 11, Nov. 28, 2005, at 3, available 
at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6874-5-11.pdf (surveying 748 women, 
aged 18–50, seen in Utah and Oklahoma family practices and OB/GYN clinics). 
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the same study, forty-four percent of women said they would “stop us-
ing” their birth control method if told that “there was even [a] remote 
possibility” that it acted after fertilization.159 
 Like ordinary women across multiple cultures,160 objectors could 
seek exemptions not because they positively knew that by filling a pre-
scription they were cutting short a potential life, but because they could 
not positively know they were not. Ultimately, then, this is a question 
about who gets to decide in instances of uncertainty.161 
 Of course, when claims of faith are involved, the requirement that 
the rest of society agree with the objector’s belief in order for the objec-
tor to receive protection would leave almost nothing of religious free-
dom. As Justice William Douglas noted, writing for the Supreme Court 
in Ballard, “Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may be-
lieve what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their 
religious doctrines or beliefs.”162 The Court reiterated this principle in 
its 1981 decision in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security 
Division, explaining that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logi-
cal, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection.”163 
III. Third Sticking Point: Objectors Are Protected from Doing 
the Deed—Solemnizing a Marriage or Performing an 
Abortion—and That Is Sufficient 
 Accommodations invariably raise the question about who precisely 
will receive protection. In both the same-sex marriage context and the 
health care context, many readily concede that religious objectors 
should be protected when actually performing a morally freighted ser-
vice, like presiding over nuptials or ending a pregnancy, but resist pro-
tections for others acting in less direct capacities. Put another way, some 
contend that, on these questions, society should protect only priests and 
doctors. 
                                                                                                                      
159 See id. at 4. 
160 See Wilson, supra note 154 (collecting studies across multiple countries of women’s at-
titudes toward using birth control methods that may act after fertilization or implantation). 
161 To be sure that emergency contraception was acting only to prevent fertilization, 
and not at a later stage (either before or after implantation), would require “historical 
knowledge of the woman’s menstrual cycles, ultrasound examination, and [certain] hor-
mone surge testing.” Keenan, supra note 143, at 814. Surely, nobody really wants to resolve 
this uncertainty at the expense of women. 
162 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86–87. 
163 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
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 Consider this claim first as to same-sex marriage. Every draft 
same-sex marriage bill has unambiguously protected the refusal to 
solemnize a marriage,164 notwithstanding the shared intuition that 
churches and clergy cannot be forced to solemnize marriages in viola-
tion of their religious tenets.165 But legislators responsible for the text 
of the draft bills have been much more skeptical when it comes to 
crafting a “compromise that permits continued discrimination outside 
of solemnizing a marriage in a church sanctuary.”166 In a clever column, 
Professor John Corvino captures the tension over protecting more than 
solemnization: 
[T]he gay-rights debate concerning religious accommodation 
is not about worship. No serious person argues that the gov-
ernment should force religions to perform gay weddings (or 
ordinations or baptisms or other religious functions) against 
their will. That would violate the First Amendment, and be-
yond that, it would be foolish and wrong. Rather, the debate is 
about the not-strictly-religious things that religious organizations 
often do: renting out banquet space, for example, or hiring 
employees for secular tasks. And it’s about religious individu-
als who for reasons of conscience wish to discriminate in secu-
lar settings.167 
 Professor Corvino’s comments encompass three related claims, 
although they are unstated: (1) that facilitating a ceremony is not a re-
ligious act in the way that performing the ceremony itself is; (2) that an 
objector’s claim weakens when it extends to services routinely provided 
by commercial entities, such as renting a banquet hall; and (3) that a 
religious objector may legally or morally object when asked directly to 
“do the deed” —to solemnize a relationship—but that an objector’s 
moral or legal claim weakens when less direct actions are at stake.168 
                                                                                                                      
 
164 See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (discussing the legislative history of same-sex 
marriage legislation in selected states). 
165 See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I; Letter from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. to Deborah 
Kelly regarding D.C. Bill No. 18-0482, “Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality 
Amendment Act of 2009,” at 4 (Nov. 9, 2009) (on file with author) (remarking on “how 
[the District of Columbia’s] bill so thoroughly addresses the non-threat of compelled offi-
ciating at religious ceremonies”); John Corvino, Religious Exemptions and the Slippery Slope, 
Meefers.com (Dec. 7, 2009), http://dev.meefers.com/features.asp?id=629. 
166 See, e.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 7:00:32 (statement 
of Councilmember Phil Mendelson). 
167 Corvino, supra note 165 (emphasis added). 
168 See id. Also implicit is the assumption that social services provided by religious or-
ganizations are not as inherently “religious” as other activities. Yet religious organizations 
1462 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1417 
 The first claim to assess is whether facilitating a same-sex marriage 
should be entitled to protection. Religious objectors, from wedding 
planners to landlords, all may seek to step aside from providing certain 
services because they “feel that they are being asked to promote or fa-
cilitate sin in a way that makes them personally responsible for the sin 
that ensues.”169 Professor Douglas Laycock believes there is a tendency 
“to dismiss these feelings of moral responsibility” because “the person 
providing services to a same-sex couple is not participating in 
the . . . conduct she considers immoral and cannot reasonably think of 
herself as responsible for it.”170 Yet, he contends, “that is a mistake” be-
cause “[m]any religious traditions have a long history of theological 
teaching attempting to identify the point at which one who cooperates 
with another’s wrongdoing, or even one who fails to sufficiently resist, 
becomes personally responsible for that wrongdoing.”171 Certainly, with 
other actions, ideas of complicity and vicarious moral responsibility 
have not seemed so far-fetched. They underpinned, for example, boy-
cotts of companies doing business in South Africa during apartheid.172 
 The religious liberty exemptions contained in recently enacted 
same-sex marriage laws clearly see claims of facilitation as worthy of re-
spect: all of them exempt religious institutions from facilitating or cele-
brating a marriage through such actions as providing the space for a 
reception.173 In three instances, the laws exempt individual employees 
of religious organizations more generally from the duty to “celebrate[] 
or promote[]” same-sex marriage if doing so would violate their “reli-
gious beliefs and faith.”174 
                                                                                                                      
 
may view these services as part of a larger ministry to which the group is called. See Thomas 
C. Berg, Taking Exception: Gay Marriage Legislation, 26 Christian Century 12, 12 (2009) 
(“People from many perspectives—religious progressives as well as traditionalists—should 
affirm the principle that the exercise of religion does not stop at the church door, but 
carries over into organizational works of charity and justice motivated by faith.”); Thomas 
C. Berg, Other People’s Freedom, Christian Century (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.christian 
century.org/blogs/archive/2011-12/other-peoples-freedom (“[F]or progressive Christians, 
acts of mercy and justice, serving all people, are at the heart of the gospel, even if these 
acts witness implicitly rather than explicitly. Catholic social services and health-care institu-
tions reflect that model, as do many evangelical agencies.”). 
169 Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in Emerging Conflicts, supra note 30, at 195. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 195–96. 
172 See id. at 196. 
173 See infra app. B; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing one case 
addressing this issue, Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n). 
174 Compare N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2011) (exempting individuals 
associated with religious organizations from providing “services, accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request . . . is related to the 
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 But those same laws offer no protection to businesses or individu-
als in the marketplace who provide catering, flowers, reception halls, or 
gowns.175 This brings us to the question of whether the law should dis-
tinguish between religious organizations and for-profit commercial 
vendors, even when providing identical services. 
 In other contexts, the law has not drawn the line for an exemption 
along a non-profit versus for-profit divide. For example, with respect to 
abortion, many conscience clauses exempt non-profit and for-profit 
providers alike. Thus, for example, the Church Amendment provides 
that the receipt of certain federal funds cannot be used by courts or 
public officials to force any entity to “make its facilities available for the 
performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if [it] is prohib-
ited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions,” 
or “provide any personnel for [such services].”176 This protection is not 
limited to nonprofit organizations or denominational hospitals. Clearly, 
the services at issue are provided in the commercial marketplace by 
non-objecting institutions.177 Therefore, at least in the abortion con-
text, it is not who the objector is, but what the objector is being asked to 
do that merits protection. 
 Moreover, the law has not always required direct participation in 
order to receive protection. Again, the abortion conscience clauses are 
illustrative. Many insulate not just the physician who performs the abor-
tion, but any person asked to assist in its performance. This is true of 
                                                                                                                      
solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage 
. . . and such solemnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or 
her religious beliefs”), with N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b (McKinney Supp. 2012) (providing 
that “any employee” of “a religious entity . . . or a corporation incorporated under the 
benevolent orders law . . . or a not-for-profit corporation operated, supervised, or con-
trolled by a religious corporation . . . shall not be required to provide services, accommo-
dations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a 
marriage”) and H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (exempting religious officials 
from any requirement “to solemnize or officiate any [ ] marriage” if doing so would im-
pede the official’s free exercise rights). 
175 To date, states have provided protection to religious institutions and nonprofit or-
ganizations when they provide space for a reception or otherwise facilitate or celebrate a 
marriage. See supra notes 63–77 and accompanying text. Thus, they would exempt a 
church-affiliated nonprofit from hosting a wedding reception for same-sex couples, but 
would not exempt a commercial bed-and-breakfast. See supra notes 57–62 and accompany-
ing text (discussing suits against the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association and the 
Wildflower Inn). 
176 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2) (2006). 
177 See Wilson, Limits of Conscience, supra note 32, at 53 (discussing the network of 
Planned Parenthood clinics across the country). 
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both state-level exemptions178 and federal conscience protection.179 
Some federal protections reach services outside those that most would 
view as “core” —the abortion procedure itself—to encompass more pe-
ripheral activities, like training and referrals for abortion.180 Some 
health care conscience clauses are so broad that they exempt objectors 
from performing any service they find objectionable if the facility re-
ceives certain program funding from the federal government.181 
 The accommodation of an employee’s religious beliefs in the em-
ployment context follows this pattern as well. Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) requires employers to provide reason-
able accommodations for an employee’s religious practice or belief un-
less the employer will experience an undue hardship.182 As thinned-out 
as Title VII’s protections are now,183 Title VII imposes this duty even 
                                                                                                                      
 
178 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 36-2154(A) (Supp. 2011) (“any other person”); Ark. 
Code Ann. § 20-16-601(a) (2005) (“No person shall be required”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
6-104 (2011) (“A person who is a member of or associated with the staff”); Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 24, § 1791(a) (2011) (“No person”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.0111(8) (West 2008 & Supp. 
2012) (“No person”); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-142(a) (2011) (“any person who states in 
writing an objection”); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 453-16(e) (2011) (“any person”); Idaho Code 
Ann. § 18-612 (2004) (“Any such person”); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 510 / 13 (West 
2010) (“employee thereof”); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-1-4 (LexisNexis 2011) (“[e]mployee 
or member of the staff of a hospital or other facility”); Iowa Code Ann. § 146.1 (West 
2005) (“An individual”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-443 (2002) (“No person”); Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 22, §§ 1591–92 (2004) (“other person”); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.20181 
(West 2008) (“associate of the staff, or other person connected therewith”); Minn. Stat. 
§ 145.414(a) (2010) (“No person”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-2 (2004) (“A person who is a 
member of, or associated with, the staff of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital”); N.Y. 
Civ. Rights Law § 79-i (McKinney 2009) (“any person . . . by filing a prior written re-
fusal”); N.D. Cent. Code § 23-16-14 (2012) (“No . . . physician, nurse, hospital employee, 
nor any other person”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4731.91(D) (West 2004) (“No person”); 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3213(d) (West 2000) (“no medical personnel or medical facility, 
nor any employee, agent or student thereof”); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-17-11 (2008) (“A physi-
cian or any other person who is a member of or associated with the medical staff of a 
health care facility or any employee of a health care facility . . . and who shall state in writ-
ing an objection.”); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-12 (2011) (“No physician, nurse, or oth-
er person.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-204 (2010) (“no person”); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-75 
(2009) (“any person”); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 19-13-D54(f) (2006) (“No person”). 
179 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (“No individual”). 
180 See, e.g., id. § 238n. 
181 See, e.g., id. § 300a-7(d) (“No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the 
performance of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole 
or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
if his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program or activ-
ity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”). 
182 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
183 In the 1977 case Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court inter-
preted Title VII’s religious accommodation requirement narrowly to hold that an em-
ployer need not provide reasonable accommodations to an employee if it would impose 
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when the objector does not directly facilitate the activity to which she 
objects. Thus, Title VII’s protections have extended to nurses who do 
not want to assist with abortions,184 clerks who process draft registration 
forms at the post office,185 and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents 
who process applications for tax exemption for abortion providers.186 
Although employers may consider hardships to themselves and other 
employees in granting or refusing an accommodation, nothing suggests 
that only those directly involved in a challenged activity can or should be 
exempted. The expansive protections in the employment and health 
care contexts reflect the reality that many people believe they are per-
sonally accountable for facilitating another person’s actions. 
 It is possible that a claim for exemption may be so remote that it is 
beyond cognizance and society’s willingness to protect it. For instance, 
in the health care context, an Iowa Attorney General Opinion con-
cluded that the state’s abortion conscience clause extended by its terms 
only to those who “recommend[], perform[], or assist[] in an abortion 
                                                                                                                      
more than a de minimis burden on the employer or an employee’s coworkers. See 432 U.S. 
63, 84 (1977). 
184 For example, in the 2000 case Shelton v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jer-
sey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered staff nurse Yvonne Shel-
ton’s Title VII religious discrimination claim that she was required to perform emergency 
abortions despite her request not to. 223 F.3d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2006). Although the court 
ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Shelton’s employer, a state hospital, it 
concluded that Shelton had established a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Id. 
at 225, 228. Shelton worked in the hospital’s Labor and Delivery (L&D) section. Id. at 222. 
Although elective abortions were not performed in the L&D section, emergency abortions 
occasionally were. Id. A devout Pentecostal, Shelton refused to participate in the emer-
gency abortions, delaying treatment on several occasions. Id. at 223. Budget cuts made it 
impossible for the hospital to hire staff around Shelton’s refusal. Id. The hospital informed 
Shelton that she could no longer work in L&D, but it offered to transfer her to another 
unit or to help her secure an open position elsewhere in the hospital. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 
223. When Shelton refused, she was fired; subsequently Shelton brought suit under Title 
VII, alleging religious discrimination. Id. The court concluded that Shelton had estab-
lished a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII, which shifted the burden “to 
the Hospital to show either that it offered Shelton a reasonable accommodation, or that it 
could not do so because of a resulting undue hardship.” Id. at 225. The court concluded 
that the hospital provided reasonable accommodations for Shelton because the proffered 
transfer would not have resulted in a loss of pay or benefits, and the service Shelton would 
perform in another unit would not have been “religiously untenable.” Id. at 226. Shelton’s 
steadfast refusal to “cooperate in attempting to find an acceptable religious accommoda-
tion” ultimately doomed her claim. See id. at 228. 
185 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 354–55 (discussing Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Lo-
cal v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1986) and McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 
F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1980)). 
186 See id. at 355–57 (discussing Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 
1979)). 
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procedure.”187 Consequently, nurses who provide comfort to a patient 
and pharmacists who prepare the saline solution used in abortions 
could not use the conscience clause to refrain from doing their jobs. 
The opinion emphasized the slippery slope that a contrary decision 
would create: “[O]ne could eventually get to the point where the man 
who mines the iron ore that goes to make the steel, which is used by a 
factory to make instruments used in abortions could refuse to work on 
conscientious grounds.”188 Clearly, the state can and must draw lines to 
avoid hardships to the public, as well as frivolous claims of conscience. 
 The exemptions proposed in Appendix B would exempt religious 
groups from “provid[ing] goods or services that assist or promote the 
solemnization or celebration of any marriage” when the group cannot, 
for religious reasons, celebrate or promote a given marriage, and they 
would insulate such groups from private suit or government penalty for 
such refusal,189 as numerous states now do.190 The proposed package of 
exemptions would also provide protection to individuals in commerce 
and government employees, but only in those situations in which no 
substantial hardship for same-sex couples would result.191 
 Professor Kent Greenawalt has asked about the outer boundaries 
of such exemptions: would they cover only the clerk who assists with 
and processes the marriage paperwork, or would they also extend to a 
clerk who hands blank forms to the couple or to the cashier who takes 
their license fee?192 All these services arguably facilitate the marriage 
because they all directly involve the marriage licensing process. It is dif-
ficult to pinpoint the precise degree of involvement warranting an ex-
emption. But clearly, an exemption should not cover the security offi-
cer who unlocks the clerk’s office in the morning because unlocking 
the building is not particular to facilitating same-sex marriages—the 
office must be unlocked to facilitate all of the office’s other business 
throughout the day. Put another way, because the office must be open 
                                                                                                                      
187 41 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 474, 478 (1976). 
188 See id. 
189 See infra app. B, § (b)(1)(A). Separate provisions address employee benefits and 
housing. 
190 See infra app. A. 
191 See infra app. B. In the case of government employees, the couple must be able to 
receive the requested service immediately, but for commercial vendors, the couple must be 
able to secure the desired service without substantial hardship. See infra app. B. Thus, these 
exemptions would not allow religious individuals in commerce or government employment 
to act as a roadblock on the path to marriage. 
192 See Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They Be 
Accommodated?, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 47, 60 (2010). 
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to the public for a number of services, there is no meaningful sense in 
which the guard’s service “celebrates” or “assists” the “solemnization” of 
any particular couple’s marriage. Neither is there any reason for the 
security guard to know the occasion for any particular couple’s visit to 
the clerk’s office; this suggests that any refusal has nothing to do with 
sincere religious objections to the marriage. 
 More fundamentally, there is no reason to take a crabbed view of 
assistance in the same-sex marriage context. It is true that limiting ex-
emptions to direct involvement in a morally freighted activity is a device 
for minimizing hardships to same-sex couples, but an exemption quali-
fied by hardship to same-sex couples also serves this limiting function. 
Thus, at a time when the public remains deeply divided about same-sex 
marriage, legislators can soften the blow of legislative defeat for people 
who cannot, consistent with their faith, facilitate same-sex marriages by 
allowing them to step aside—without imposing great costs on same-sex 
couples. 
 In the health care context, others have observed that, although 
exemptions have been granted in life-and-death matters—like abortion 
and physician-assisted suicide,193 both of which involve being forced to 
end a life—more general protections for conscience objections have 
not been as forthcoming.194 One way to interpret this pattern is that a 
religious objector’s claim weakens significantly when less direct actions 
are required. 
 At least one commentator would count as providing “assistance” 
anyone with “significant personal contact with the patients,” but not, 
for example, the person who makes a patient’s bed.195 Advocates like 
the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), which represented the nurses in 
                                                                                                                      
193 The federal government and forty-seven states have provided some exemptions to 
the duty to assist with abortion. See Wilson, supra note 30, at app.; see, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 127.885(4) (2011) (“No health care provider shall be under any duty, whether by con-
tract, by statute or by any other legal requirement to participate in the provision to a quali-
fied patient of medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.”). 
194 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 290 n.80. Conscience protections may be more 
capacious than Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle suggest. Some exemptions allow 
providers to step away from any service that violates their moral or religious beliefs—if the 
service is funded by specific federal programs. See supra note 181 (providing the text of the 
Church Amendment). Other federal conscience clauses reach services unconnected to the 
abortion procedure itself to encompass peripheral activities, such as training or referrals. 
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)(1) (2006). 
195 See Greenawalt, supra note 192, at 60 (“I do not think everyone remotely connected 
to patients . . . should have a right of conscience to refuse based on the procedure the 
patient undergoes. The tie to the objectionable practice is too remote.”). Professor 
Greenawalt’s argument concerns those who would not have qualified for protection in his 
view, but he may not intend “patient care” to be a requisite for protection for all objectors. 
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both Danquah v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey and Cen-
zon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital, described in the Introduction, con-
tend that a nurse “assist[s] with the abortion [and therefore is entitled 
to protection] even if [he or she is] taking down [a] name, holding a 
patient’s hand during the procedure, or walking them to the door.”196 
 Certainly, ADF’s test reaches too far. As with the religious objec-
tions to same-sex marriage discussed above, not every person who has 
contact with a patient seeking abortion services actually facilitates the 
objectionable procedure. For example, the attendant who wheels the 
patient to the hospital entrance for curbside pick-up does this for any 
patient who needs this assistance. There is nothing unique to the 
abortion procedure that the attendant makes possible through her 
work. Contrast this with removing the remains of a fetus after a dila-
tion and extraction or prepping the operating room for the abortion 
procedure itself—in both cases, the procedure could not happen 
without the specific services described.197 
 As these examples make clear, providers can facilitate an abortion 
without significant patient contact. Likewise, a provider can have sig-
nificant personal contact with a patient and still not facilitate an abor-
tion. Thus, the operating room technician who ordinarily uses an auto-
clave to sterilize instruments would be able to claim an exemption from 
sterilizing a particular batch of instruments used only in abortion pro-
cedures, but he would not be able to object to sterilizing instruments 
for other surgeries. Similarly, a technician who disposes of medical 
waste could claim an exemption for refusing to dispose of the remains 
from an abortion, but not for refusing to dispose of remains per se. 
 The Cenzon-DeCarlo case offers a useful illustration of what would 
count as assistance—and thus receive protection—and what would not. 
In Cenzon-DeCarlo, the clinical nurse manager who was responsible for 
“facilitating the flow” of the hospital’s daily surgeries, testified that Cen-
zon-DeCarlo’s supervisor offered to allow Cenzon-DeCarlo to leave the 
operating room during the abortion procedure.198 The hospital, how-
ever, would require Cenzon-DeCarlo “to perform her pre-operative job 
                                                                                                                      
196 Seth Augenstein, 12 Nurses Accuse UMDNJ of Forcing Them to Assist in Abortion Cases 
Despite Religious and Moral Objections, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.) (Nov. 14, 2011, 8:11 PM), 
http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates_impact/print.html?entry=/2011/11/12_nurses_accus
e_umdnj_of_forc.html; see Stein, supra note 29; see also supra notes 31–32 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Danquah and Cenzon-DeCarlo). 
197 See Gillian Flett & Allan Templeton, Induced Abortion, in Dewhurst’s Textbook of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 95 (Keith Edmonds ed., 8th ed. 2012). 
198 Affidavit of Maura Carpo 1–3, Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 10237-10 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 2011). 
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duties because [the hospital] had not been able to locate a replace-
ment for [her] and the physician made clear that the patient’s life was 
at risk.”199 The issue of whether anyone else could perform Cenzon-
DeCarlo’s services remains contested, and presumably will figure 
prominently in any trial.200 Under the test articulated above, Cenzon-
DeCarlo’s pre-operative procedures in preparation for a second-
trimester abortion would clearly constitute “assistance.” Nonetheless, as 
explained in Part V below, accommodations for religious objectors 
should be qualified by hardship to the patient.201 
 The pressure to limit the scope of “assistance” stems precisely from 
the desire to avoid hardships on patients, employers, coworkers, and 
others that might be created by an unbounded exemption. The quali-
fied hardship exemption illustrates, however, that there are more direct 
ways to satisfy this important, overriding objective.202 A number of 
states, in fact, have recognized the possibility of hardships for patients 
and raised the bar for objecting to assistance with abortion services— 
which states are free to do because the Church Amendment does not 
preempt this entire area of law. For example, Iowa law provides that 
“[a]n individual . . . shall not be required against that individual’s reli-
gious beliefs or moral convictions to perform, assist, or participate in 
such procedures” unless “necessary to save the life of a mother.”203 
Likewise, South Carolina law provides that “[n]o private or nongov-
ernmental hospital or clinic shall be required to . . . permit their facili-
ties to be utilized for the performance of abortions,” but may not “re-
fuse an emergency admittance.”204 
 A number of common sense devices can also reduce dislocations 
to patients and others. Making objectors disclose ex ante any objections 
in writing would both eliminate the possibility of unfair surprise to 
those seeking services and give employers an opportunity to staff 
                                                                                                                      
199 Id. at 3. 
200 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (discussing Danquah). 
201 See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text. 
202 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Legal Column: Conscientious Objection by Health Care 
Providers, Lahey Clinic J. Med. Ethics, Winter 2011, at 4, 4 (discussing the “evolving non-
uniform patchwork of [state] laws” protecting conscientious exemptions and identifying 
trends). 
203 Iowa Code Ann. § 146.1 (West 2005); see also Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen. § 20-
214 (LexisNexis 2009) (no person shall be required to perform an abortion, except when 
it may cause “death or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury to the patient” 
or when it would be “contrary to the standards of medical care”); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215 (West 2011) (providing that public employees need not per-
form abortions except when “necessary to save the life of the mother”). 
204 S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-40 (2002). 
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around the objector.205 Disclosure ex ante would serve an important 
screening function as well—separating individuals with deeply held ob-
jections from those with less sincere or more ambivalent feelings. 
 The likelihood of hardships could be reduced by limiting the abil-
ity to object, as Title VII does, to only those situations in which an em-
ployee’s objections would not render her “unable to perform a substan-
tial proportion of the duties of a particular position.”206 Kentucky and 
Pennsylvania make it unlawful to discriminate against an abortion ob-
jector when the health care facility is not operated exclusively for the 
purpose of performing abortions,207 but facilities that exist precisely to 
conduct abortions may elect not to hire and could legally discharge an 
abortion objector. Obviously, giving protections to abortion objectors 
inside an abortion clinic would cause real mayhem. In this way, states 
such as Kentucky and Pennsylvania have struck a workable balance be-
tween respecting the religious beliefs of objectors and ensuring the 
continued availability of abortion services. Policymakers in a range of 
contexts should strive to follow this example and minimize the likeli-
hood of significant hardships to all parties. 
                                                                                                                      
205 See infra note 362 and accompanying text. 
206 See Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1178–84 (holding that the IRS violated Title VII’s protec-
tions against religious discrimination when it refused to promote a Catholic IRS agent 
“solely” because he “refus[ed] to handle applications for exemptions from persons or 
groups which advocate abortion or other practices to which he objects,” he objected to 
working on cases comprising a tiny fraction of the overall volume of his work, and the IRS 
could have staffed around the agent without any undue hardship). 
207 The Kentucky statute states: 
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for . . . [a]ny public or private 
agency, institution or person . . . [to] discriminate against any applicant for 
admission thereto or any physician, nurse, staff member, student or employee 
thereof, on account of the willingness or refusal . . . to perform or participate 
in abortion or sterilization by reason of objection thereto on moral, religious 
or professional grounds, or because of any statement or other manifestation 
of attitude by such person with respect to abortion or sterilization if that health 
care facility is not operated exclusively for the purposes of performing abortions or ster-
ilizations. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.800(5)(c) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added). The Pennsyl-
vania statute uses similar language. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3213(d) (West 2000) 
(“Except for a facility devoted exclusively to the performance of abortions, no medical personnel or 
medical facility, nor any employee, agent or student thereof, shall be required against his 
or its conscience to aid, abet or facilitate performance or an abortion or dispensing of an 
abortifacient . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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IV. Fourth Sticking Point: No One Is Being Asked to Do 
Anything So No One Needs Protection 
 Some assert that laws recognizing new civil rights do not need reli-
gious liberty guarantees because they do not require religious objectors 
to do any particular thing. For example, White House press secretary 
Jay Carney has said that the coverage mandate “does not signal any 
change at all in the administration’s policy on conscience protections” 
because it “does not direct an individual to do anything.”208 
 Like Carney, legislators have expressed genuine confusion about 
how same-sex marriage can trigger a threat to religious liberty, asking 
for: 
[C]oncrete examples . . . that would justify anything along the 
lines of this exemption. . . . I’m finding this very amorphous, 
you know, just understanding what the concern is, you’ve got 
to concretize the concern to get my attention on this. Other-
wise I think we’re just, kind of, thinking in kind of an airy 
fairy way about possible problems and I want to know what 
the serious things are that you are, that you prompt us to con-
sider this.209 
 The fallacy of the notion that no one will be asked to do anything 
that would burden them is clearest in the same-sex marriage context. It 
overlooks a stream of advice to government officials and employees 
that they must serve all members of the public, even when another will-
ing provider can do so immediately. After Massachusetts recognized 
same-sex marriage, the chief counsel to then-Governor Mitt Romney 
told the state’s justices of the peace that they must “follow the law, 
whether you agree with it or not.”210 One linchpin of that law is Massa-
                                                                                                                      
 
208 See January Press Briefing, supra note 17. 
209 E.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 7:29:55 (statement of 
Councilmember Jim Graham). Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle make a similar claim 
as to government officials: “We have discovered no law on the question whether a Justice 
of the Peace or other official authorized to officiate is under a statutory duty to perform 
marriages when requested, and we expect no such specific duty exists.” See Lupu & Tuttle, 
supra note 46, at 294. 
210 Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2004, at 
A15. In Massachusetts, some justices of the peace had previously announced that they would 
resign if forced to perform same-sex marriages. Kathleen Burge, Justices of the Peace Confront 
Gay Marriage, Bos. Globe, Apr. 18, 2004, at B1; see also 158 Cong. Rec. E1370 (daily ed. Aug. 
1, 2012) (statement of Rep. Laura Richardson) (“Simply put, religious freedom requires 
religiously affiliated employers to obey the law rather than to become a law unto them-
selves.”). Although this is a common refrain in discussions of whether to enact religious lib-
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chusetts’ statute forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation, which subjects violators to as much as $50,000 in civil fines.211 
 Similarly, in the wake of the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 same-sex 
marriage decision, Varnum v. Brien,212 the Iowa attorney general told 
county recorders: 
We expect duly-elected county recorders to comply with the 
Iowa Constitution as interpreted unanimously by the Iowa 
Supreme Court. . . . Our country lives by and thrives by the 
rule of law, and the rule of law means we all follow the law as 
interpreted by our courts—not by ourselves. . . . Recorders do 
not have discretion or power to ignore the Iowa Supreme 
Court’s ruling. . . . All county recorders in the state of Iowa 
are required to comply with the Varnum decision following is-
suance of procedendo from the Supreme Court, and to issue 
marriage licenses to same sex couples in the same manner as 
licenses issued to opposite gender applicants.213 
As if this were not emphatic enough, the attorney general added: “if 
necessary, we will explore legal actions to enforce and implement the 
Court’s ruling, working with the Iowa Dept. of Public Health and coun-
ty attorneys.”214 
 Similarly, on the heels of New York’s same-sex marriage law, the 
Office of Vital Records of the New York State Department of Health, in 
an informational memorandum to town and city clerks, told clerks that 
“[u]nder New York State Law the town or city clerk must provide a li-
cense to an applicant who meets all marriage requirements for New 
York State. It is a misdemeanor violation if the clerk refuses to do so for 
any reason.”215 These unmistakable messages from the executive de-
                                                                                                                      
 
erty protections, it is not helpful to say that an objector must follow the law when the dia-
logue is about what the law should be. 
211 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5(c) (2010) (imposing such a fine on those who 
have “been adjudged to have committed 2 or more discriminatory practices during the 7-
year period ending on the date of the filing of the complaint”). 
212 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009)(holding that an Iowa statute defining marriage as 
between a man and a woman violated the equal protection rights of same-sex couples un-
der the Iowa Constitution). 
213 Statement of Tom Miller, Iowa Att’y Gen., County Recorders Must Comply with Su-
preme Court’s Varnum Decision (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.state.ia.us/govern- 
ment/ag/latest_news/releases/apr_2009/Marrige_Stmnt.html. 
214 Id. 
215 Informational Memorandum to New York State Town and City Clerks, Office of Vi-
tal Records, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health ( July 13, 2011), available at http://site.pfaw.org/ 
pdf/Jordan_Belforti_NY_Marriage.PDF; see also Dan Wiessner, New York Town Clerk Quits 
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partments of Iowa and New York left little doubt about local marriage 
clerks’ new obligations in those states. 
 Government employees and officials believe they are at risk. At 
least one Iowa magistrate, authorized by law to preside over wed-
dings,216 has stopped performing marriages.217 Although some judges 
believe the decision to preside over weddings is entirely a “discretionary 
function,” a spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney General’s office cau-
tioned that “judges and magistrate judges have discretion whether they 
choose to participate in wedding ceremonies . . . . [but i]f they do, they 
should certainly do so without bias or prejudice, as per the Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct.”218 In Massachusetts, several justices of the peace said 
they would resign because no exemption was available, and at least one 
did so.219 In New York, two clerks resigned in advance of the law’s effec-
tive date rather than violate their religious beliefs.220 
 In a case that has received national attention after it was first pro-
filed in the New York Times, the town clerk for Ledyard, New York, Rose 
Marie Belforti, assigned the task of issuing marriage licenses to a deputy 
clerk, who would issue the licenses by appointment, rather than as a 
walk-in service.221  Belforti, a “self-described Bible-believing Christian,” 
instituted the new process saying: 
                                                                                                                      
over Gay Marriage License, Reuters, July 12, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
07/12/us-gaymarriage-newyork-resignation-idUSTRE76B7BJ20110712 (quoting Governor 
Andrew Cuomo as saying, “When you enforce the laws of the state, you don't get to pick 
and choose the laws”). 
216 See Iowa Code Ann. § 595.10(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011). 
217 See Kilian Melloy, Iowa Magistrate to Stop Performing Marriages, Edge Boston (Apr. 23, 
2009), http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2=news&sc3=&id=903
10. 
218 See id. (quoting a spokesperson for Iowa’s Office of the Attorney General). 
219 See Emily Shartin, Clerks in Suburbs Ready for May 17, Bos. Globe, May 13, 2004, at 
A1 (reporting that a Bellingham, Massachusetts town clerk planned to resign her post as 
justice of the peace “because she fe[lt] ‘uncomfortable’ about the prospect of performing 
same-sex marriages”); Steve Inskeep, Mass. Justice of the Peace Resigns over Gay Marriage, NPR 
(May 14, 2004), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1896321 (indi-
cating that a Charlton, Massachusetts justice of the peace “chose to resign her post rather 
than perform gay marriages”). 
220 See Efrem Graham, Town Clerks Bullied over NY Gay Marriage Law, Christian Broad. 
Network (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2011/November/Town-
Clerks-Bullied-over-NY-Gay-Marriage-Law-/ (quoting one clerk as saying, “I’d like to see 
[clerks] protected. . . . I think they should have a right to their religious beliefs, their bibli-
cal beliefs. . . . [T]hey should be able to stay in the office and just appoint someone else to 
do the job. It’s a very small percentage of work in a rural community”). 
221 See Thomas Kaplan, Rights Collide as Town Clerk Sidesteps Role in Gay Marriages, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 28, 2011, at A1. 
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For me to participate in the same-sex marriage application 
process I don’t feel is right. . . . God doesn’t want me to do 
this, so I can’t do what God doesn’t want me to do, just like I 
can’t steal, or any of the other things that God doesn’t want 
me to do.222 
Not surprisingly, the same-sex couple who presented for a marriage li-
cense on August 30, 2011, Katie Carmichael and Deirdre DiBiaggio, 
chafed at being put off to a later date, saying that “[s]eparate but equal 
is not equal. . . . We do not want to have to go in there on another day 
and be treated like a second-class citizen.”223 Later news reports suggest 
that the office—which serves a population of 1900 people, is open nine 
hours a week,224 and “issues fewer than seven marriage licenses a year”
—now issues all marriage licenses by appointment.225 People for the 
American Way, together with attorneys at Proskauer Rose LLP, have 
threatened suit on behalf of Carmichael and DiBiaggio, arguing that 
“[p]ublic officials can’t pick and choose the laws they want to follow. . . . 
If a public official simply decides to shirk the obligations of her office, 
then she should resign and be replaced by someone who will do the job 
and carry out state law.”226 To date no suit appears to have been filed. 
As explained more fully below, the claim that government employees 
must perform all services offered by a government office conflates the 
public’s legitimate claim to receive the service from the state with a 
claimed entitlement to receive it from each employee of the office.227 
                                                                                                                      
 
222 See id. 
223 See Tyler Kingkade, New York Town Clerk Refuses to Let Same-Sex Couple Get Married, Huff-
ington Post (Sept. 15, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/15/new- 
york-town-refuses-to-marry-gay-couple_n_964595.html (quoting Carmichael). 
224 See Kaplan, supra note 221. 
225 See Graham, supra note 220. 
226 See Press Release, People for the American Way, PFAW Foundation Demands That 
NY Town Clerks End Marriage Discrimination (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www. 
pfaw.org/press-releases/2011/09/pfaw-foundation-demands-ny-town-clerks-end-marriage-dis 
crimination (quoting the president of People for the American Way Foundation); see also 
Letter from James E. Gregory, Esq., Proskauer Rose LLP, to Mark Jordan, Ledyard Town 
Supervisor and Rose Marie Belforti, Ledyard Town Clerk (Sept. 9, 2011), available at http:// 
site.pfaw.org/pdf/Jordan_Belforti_NY_Marriage.PDF. 
227 New York law appears to authorize town clerks to delegate services to a deputy in 
certain instances: 
[T]he clerk of any city with the approval of the governing body of such city is 
hereby authorized to designate, in writing filed in the city clerk’s office, a 
deputy clerk, if any, and/or other city employees in such office to receive ap-
plications for, examine applications, investigate and issue marriage licenses in 
the absence or inability of the clerk of said city to act, and said deputy and/or 
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 Countries with a longer experience with same-sex marriage have 
also witnessed resignations and firings over the question of what duty is 
owed to same-sex couples.228 Although the laws governing in each ju-
risdiction surely differ in material ways, such resignations and firings 
provide further evidence that the law cannot simply remain silent on 
the question of duties. 
 The claim that “no one has to do anything” also overlooks the ex-
isting nondiscrimination statutes in every state that has embraced same-
sex marriage, whether by legislation or judicial decision.229 Many of 
these state antidiscrimination laws contain some religious liberty pro-
tections.230 Yet, where statutes prohibiting sexual orientation discrimi-
nation do not contain religious liberty accommodations, they have 
been used to fine a photographer who refused to photograph wed-
dings231 and to sue a Methodist association that refused to open its fa-
                                                                                                                      
 
employees so designated are hereby vested with all the powers and duties of 
said city clerk relative thereto. 
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 15(3) (McKinney 2010). 
228 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 324–25 (chronicling resignations in Canada, dismissals 
in the Netherlands, and disciplinary actions against employees in the United Kingdom). 
229 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-81c (West Supp. 2011) (employment); D.C. 
Code § 2-1402.11 (LexisNexis 2012) (employment); D.C. Code § 2-1402.21 (housing); 
D.C. Code § 2-1402.31 (public accommodations); D.C. Code § 2-1402.41 (educational 
institutions); Iowa Code Ann. § 216.6 (West 2005) (employment); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
151B, § 4 (2010) (employment); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:6 (2009) (employment); 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495 (2009 & Supp. 2011) (employment). 
230 Of the twenty states with laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation, eighteen provide exemptions for religious institutions. See Joan Frawley Desmond, 
Same-Sex Marriage Bill and Religious Freedom, Cathoholic (Apr. 13, 2009, 8:57 AM), http:// 
www.thecathoholic.com/the_cathoholic/2009/04/mesex-marriage-bill-religious-freedom. 
html (quoting a Becket Fund study). The remaining two states, Hawaii and Wisconsin, have 
broad prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination with no exemption for religious 
organizations. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 (2010 & Supp. 2011); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31 
(West Supp. 2011). 
231 See Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Colliding Causes: Gay Rights and Religious Liberty, Deseret 
News (Feb. 12, 2012, 12:09 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/700224421/ 
Gay-Liberty.html; see also Hagerty, supra note 58. A suit arising from a photographer’s denial 
of service to a same-sex couple under New Mexico’s Human Rights Act is currently percolat-
ing through the New Mexico courts. Recently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected the 
photographer’s argument that the New Mexico State Constitution required a religious ex-
emption to the state’s Human Rights Act. Further, the court dismissed the photographer’s 
claim that the Human Rights Act compelled speech under the First Amendment. Elane Pho-
tography v. Willock, No. 30,203, at 11 (N.M. Ct. App. May 31, 2012), available at http:// 
www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/nmca/slips/CA30,203.pdf. The court reasoned: 
The [New Mexico Human Rights Act] regulates Elane Photography’s conduct 
in its commercial business, not its speech or right to express its own views 
about same-sex relationships. As a result, Elane Photography’s commercial 
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cilities to same-sex civil union ceremonies.232 Antidiscrimination stat-
utes have provided a vehicle for these challenges, raising the question 
of whether objections to same-sex marriage are like any other form of 
discrimination against lesbians and gays.233 
 Many laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and oth-
er prohibited classifications date to the 1960s and 1970s, long before 
same-sex marriage was widely considered.234 These laws largely address 
commercial services, like hailing taxis, ordering burgers, and leasing 
apartments, for which it is hard to imagine that a refusal to serve an-
other individual can reflect anything other than animus toward that 
individual.235 
 Refusals to assist a same-sex marriage are different in character, 
however—they can stem from something other than anti-gay animus.236 
                                                                                                                      
 
business conduct, taking photographs for hire, is not so inherently expressive 
as to warrant First Amendment protections. The conduct of taking wedding 
or ceremonial photographs, unaccompanied by outward expression of ap-
proval for same-sex ceremonies, would not express any message from Elane 
Photography. 
Id. 
Finally, the appellate court rejected the claim that the state’s RFRA could be used as a 
defense because the RFRA was intended to limit governmental intrusions into religious 
freedom and not suits between private parties. See id. 
232 Jill P. Capuzzo, Church Group Complains of Pressure over Civil Unions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
14, 2007, at B4; see Hagerty, supra note 58. 
233 E.g., Flynn, supra note 46, at 251–54. 
234 The Netherlands first recognized same-sex marriage in 2001, but same-sex mar-
riage was not accepted in any U.S. jurisdiction until 2004, when Massachusetts began issu-
ing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to 
Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1184, 1229 
n.191 (2004) (noting the genesis of same-sex marriage legislation in Europe); Carolyn 
Lochhead, Pivotal Day for Gay Marriage in U.S. Nears, S.F. Chron., May 2, 2004, at A1. 
235 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of 
a dwelling). 
236 This is not to say that every objection will be made in good faith. See supra notes 
110–207 and accompanying text (discussing tests for the sincerity of claims). Although 
some faith traditions object to homosexual sex, an objection to facilitating a same-sex mar-
riage on this ground alone would not be protected under the model provision in Appendix 
B, infra. The model provision, by its very terms, would protect refusals to “solemniz[e] or 
celebrat[e] [ ] any marriage” only when doing so would force one to “violate their sincerely 
held religious beliefs.” See infra app. B (emphasis added). All civil rights laws prohibit cov-
ered entities from discriminating on certain bases yet allow them to act on others. As a 
result, courts often must parse legitimate, permitted grounds from illegitimate ones, tak-
ing into account all surrounding circumstances. Cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, 664 F.3d 883, 898 
(11th Cir. 2011) (examining the possible legitimate and illegitimate reasons for an em-
ployer’s failure to promote an African American employee). 
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For many people, marriage is a religious institution and wedding cere-
monies are a religious sacrament.237 For them, assisting with marriage 
ceremonies has a religious significance that ordering burgers and hail-
ing taxis simply do not have. Many of these people have no objection 
generally to providing services to lesbians and gays, but they would ob-
ject to facilitating a marriage directly—just as some religious believers 
would object to facilitating an interfaith or second marriage.238 With-
out explicit protection in the antidiscrimination or same-sex marriage 
law, many will be faced with a cruel choice: your conscience or your 
livelihood. 
 The penalties for violating antidiscrimination laws are sobering. In 
Massachusetts, individuals violating the nondiscrimination statute can 
be fined up to $50,000.239 In Connecticut, business owners who violate 
the statute may be found guilty of a Class D misdemeanor, which can 
lead to thirty days in jail.240 In the District of Columbia, the penalties 
for violation of the Human Rights Act include liability for all of the typ-
ical money damages in civil cases, including damages for emotional dis-
tress and attorney’s fees.241 The defendant can also be forced to pay 
stiff civil penalties to the city: $10,000 or less for the first violation, 
$25,000 or less for a second offense in a five-year period, or $50,000 or 
less for a third offense in a seven-year period.242 These are harsh penal-
ties in today’s economy, especially the threat of private lawsuits. 
                                                                                                                      
Although exemptions seek to protect bona fide objections to facilitating a marriage, 
some may seek to take advantage of such exemptions for malign reasons. The fact that an 
exemption creates the possibility of misuse by some does not condone such misuse. More 
importantly, as Parts II and III of this Article explain, sincerity tests and information-forcing 
rules serve an important screening function and should discourage bad faith attempts to 
seek the cover of an exemption. See supra notes 110–161, 219 and accompanying text. 
237 See Charles Reid, Marriage: Its Relationship to Religion, Law, and the State, in Emerging 
Conflicts, supra note 30, at 157. 
238 See supra note 68 (discussing religious objections to interfaith marriage). 
239 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5(c) (2010). The law excludes social clubs, frater-
nal organizations, employers with less than six employees, and religious organizations if 
the challenged practice is in furtherance of religious doctrine or involves giving a prefer-
ence to members of the organization. Id. § 1. 
240See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-81d(b) (West Supp. 2011) (“It shall be a discrimi-
natory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal 
accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of such person’s sex-
ual orientation or civil union status . . . .”); H.B. 5145, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Conn. 2012) (specifying jail sentences effective October 1, 2012). A public accommoda-
tion is “any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the 
general public.” Id. § 46a-63. 
241 See D.C. Code § 2-1403.13(a) (LexisNexis 2012). 
242 See id. § 2-1403.13(a)(1)(E-1). 
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 Similarly, the parallel claim that the coverage mandate does not 
ask objectors to do anything also fails. Under the Obama administra-
tion’s accommodation to religiously affiliated employers, employees 
receive the coverage as an adjunct to the insurance coverage the reli-
gious employer finances, making it part and parcel of the employer-
provided coverage.243 Thus, the objector’s act of providing the man-
dated insurance facilitates an action the objector views as gravely im-
moral—the forestalling or ending of a life.244 The penalties for failing 
to provide the underlying coverage—coverage without which the “free” 
but objectionable coverage cannot be obtained—are staggering. If the 
University of Notre Dame dropped  its coverage for all employees ra-
ther than violate its religious convictions,245 under the regulations as 
they now stand and assuming no change in its number of employees, it 
would face an annual penalty of $32,830,000, although it may nonethe-
less come out ahead financially, as Part VI explains.246 
 Furthermore, if no one will truly be asked to do anything, then it 
costs nothing to provide a specific religious liberty protection. If, how-
ever, someone will or may be asked to assist with an act that violates 
deeply held religious beliefs, then it is incumbent upon legislators to 
clarify whether individuals can step quietly aside. 
V. Fifth Sticking Point: No One Should Have to Bear the Cost 
of Another’s Religious Objection 
 In the fight over the coverage mandate, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) pointedly maintained that “[r]eligious liberty does 
                                                                                                                      
243 See supra note 22–27 and accompanying text. 
244 See Garvey et al., supra note 24, at 1 (“It is no answer to respond that religious em-
ployers are not ‘paying’ for this aspect of the insurance coverage.”). 
245 Although some argue that institutions cannot have “beliefs,” institutions may be guid-
ed by institutional ethics that shape their internal character, culture, and mission. The Su-
preme Court addressed the free exercise rights of religious institutions in its 2012 decision in 
Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706, 712 (2012) 
(concluding that “the Free Exercise Clause . . . protects a religious group’s right to shape its 
own faith and mission through its appointment[]” of ministers, and noting that “[a]pplying 
the protection of the First Amendment to roles of religious leadership, worship, ritual, and 
expression focuses on the objective functions that are important for the autonomy of any 
religious group, regardless of its beliefs”). Some commentators argue that "[a] vibrant liberty 
of conscience requires morally distinct institutions, not just morally autonomous individuals," 
and therefore that the state should recognize that institutions also have conscience claims. See 
Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space Be-
tween Person and State (2010); Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good: An 
Introduction, 49 J. Catholic Legal Stud. 293, 296 (2010). 
246 See infra notes 343–355 and accompanying text (calculating penalties for failing to 
provide mandated health insurance under the ACA). 
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not mean the right to impose religious views on others. . . . Employers 
should not be able to impose their moral views about birth control on 
the women who work for them.”247 The same claim is made about 
same-sex marriage.248 
 For the most part, appropriately crafted exemptions need not ask 
same-sex couples to bear the cost of protecting others’ religious be-
liefs.249 The protections for individual objectors in government em-
ployment or commerce that I and others  have proposed seek to bal-
ance two competing concerns—marriage equality and religious 
liberty.250 
                                                                                                                      
 
247 See Steve Mistler, Groups Criticize Maine AG for Opposing Contraceptive Access, Me. Sun J. 
(Feb. 22, 2012, 12:12 PM), http://www.sunjournal.com/news/state/2012/02/22/groups- 
criticize-maine-ag-opposing-contraception-m/1158735 (quoting a representative of the ACLU 
of Maine); see also Written Statement of Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office, & 
Sarah Lipton-Lubet, Policy Counsel, ACLU, to U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Health, Committee on Energy & Commerce 1 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www. 
aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_statement_for_11-2-11_health_subcomm_hearing.pdf (“Religious 
liberty does not come with the right to impose one’s faith on others.”). 
248 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 319 n.3 (“[C]hurches should not get to push their beliefs 
onto their employees by denying benefits. There is no reason for the government to recog-
nize a right to bigotry in civil matters.” (quoting seller11, Comment to Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
A Marriage Equality Bill That Respects Religious Objectors, Wash. Post (Nov. 1, 2009), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102601653.html) 
[hereinafter Wilson, Marriage Equality Bill]). 
249 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text (discussing employee benefits). 
250 The proposed protections do not, however, cabin the exemption for religious or-
ganizations. Instead, religious organizations would be permitted to refuse to “(1) provide 
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related 
to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or (2) solemnize any marriage; or (3) 
treat as valid any marriage.” See infra app. B. In other words, religious organizations could 
choose not to provide benefits to spouses when recognizing any marriage that would force 
them to violate their religious beliefs. The argument for an unqualified exemption even as 
to benefits coverage—one of the thorniest and least intuitive issues facing legislators—is 
taken up in Part VI. See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text. The model provision 
would also permit religious organizations to refuse to rent their space for receptions cele-
brating marriages that are not recognized by their faith traditions. It is possible that this 
unqualified exemption would create hardship for same-sex couples if, for example, there 
were no other spaces available in the marketplace, although it seems very unlikely that 
same-sex couples would be unable to find another space. Where a religious organization 
occupies a monopoly position in the marketplace, however, this pivotal position would 
justify qualifying the right to object even for religious organizations. See Alta Charo, The 
Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 New Eng. J. Med. 2471, 2473 
(2005) (arguing that a health care provider’s claim of “unfettered right to personal auton-
omy while holding monopolistic control over a public good constitutes an abuse of the 
public trust,” and that health care providers who benefit from the monopolies created by 
state licensing systems have a corresponding collective obligation to provide services to all 
patients who seek them); Wilson, supra note 98, at 479–83 (arguing that any exemption for 
religiously affiliated adoption placement providers should be qualified if an absolute ex-
emption would erect a significant barrier to a same-sex couple’s ability to adopt). With 
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 A government official could refuse to solemnize a marriage only if 
another government official is promptly available and willing to do so 
without inconvenience or delay.251 Under this construction, in an un-
avoidable contest between religious liberty and marriage equality, reli-
gious liberty must yield. Thus, no state official may ever act as a choke-
point on the path to marriage. In the private commercial context, small 
business owners could say no because unlike government officials, they 
do not control access to the status of marriage. 
 The conditional nature of this protection is by deliberate design: 
an absolute exemption for government employees or officials— un-
qualified by hardship252—could erect a roadblock to marriage for 
                                                                                                                      
 
respect to health care providers’ collective obligation to serve all patients, Professor Alta 
Charo notes that the obligation: 
does not mean that all members of the profession are forced to violate their 
own consciences. It does, however, necessitate ensuring that a genuine system 
for counseling and referring patients is in place, so that every patient can act 
according to his or her own conscience just as readily as the professional can. 
Charo, supra, at 2473. Professor Charo acknowledges that although it may be difficult to 
strike such a balance, doing so “represent[s] the best effort to accommodate everyone and 
is the approach taken by virtually all the major medical, nursing, and pharmacy societies.” 
Id. This may occur with religiously affiliated hospitals that, for example, do not want to 
recognize the same-sex spouse of a patient for purposes of hospital visitation. As Part I 
documented, Catholic hospitals frequently do occupy a monopoly position in the market-
place, making these denials particularly burdensome, leading to significant and deserved 
public outcry. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text. This public backlash pre-
cipitated new federal regulations that address this “very tender and sensitive topic” for 
both sides. See Rogers, supra note 35 (quoting Mitt Romney). The regulations, which gov-
ern all Medicare- and Medicaid-participating hospitals, allow patients to decide for them-
selves who they want to visit during their hospital stay, including same-sex partners. See 42 
C.F.R. §§ 482.13(h), 485.635(f) (2012). The new regulations give the force of law to rec-
ommendations made by President Barack Obama in his April 15, 2010 Presidential Memo-
randum. See Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate 
Surrogate Decision Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511, 20,511–12 (Apr. 
15, 2010) (prohibiting hospitals from denying visitation privileges on the basis of race, 
color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability). 
251 See infra app. B. 
252 Several states provide illustrative hardship restrictions. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 
24, § 1790 (2011) (prohibiting the termination of a pregnancy unless the pregnancy: “(1) 
is likely to result in the death of the mother; (2) [t]here is substantial risk of . . . deformity 
or mental retardation; (3) [t]he pregnancy resulted from . . . [i]ncest, or . . . rape . . . ; 
[or] (4) [c]ontinuation of the pregnancy would involve substantial risk of permanent in-
jury to the . . . mother”); Md. Code. Ann., Health–Gen. § 20-214 (LexisNexis 2009) (pro-
viding that no person shall be required to perform an abortion or refer a patient to an-
other for an abortion, except when failure to refer the patient would reasonably be 
determined as “[t]he cause of death or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury 
to the patient” or if the failure was “contrary to the standards of medical care”); Mo. Ann. 
Stat. §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215 (West 2011) (mandating that public employees shall 
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same-sex couples at least some of the time.253 For example, an accom-
modation that absolutely exempts clerks from processing a marriage 
license application would hobble a couple’s access to marriage in a 
number of foreseeable circumstances. This might occur when a solitary 
clerk is available within a twenty-mile radius and he or she objects for 
religious reasons to facilitating a same-sex marriage.254 An absolute 
roadblock would also be erected when an otherwise willing clerk is un-
available due to illness or other reason, leaving no one else to assist the 
couple. Our proposed exemption forestalls such hardships to same-sex 
couples. 
 As with any rule that seeks to balance two separate interests, the 
proposed hardship exemption will involve some line drawing— specifi-
cally, what will count as “promptly,” or as “inconvenience” or “delay.” 
Such line drawing could be accomplished in the legislative process, 
which would permit states to make choices that reflect the facts on the 
ground in that state—for instance, how many clerks process the neces-
sary paperwork in any given office.255 Legislators would be wise to de-
                                                                                                                      
 
not perform abortions, except when “necessary to save the life of the mother”); S.C. Code 
Ann. §§ 44-41-40, 44-41-50 (2002) (mandating that “[n]o private or nongovernmental 
hospital or clinic shall be required to . . . permit their facilities to be utilized for the per-
formance of abortions . . . provided, that no hospital or clinic shall refuse an emergency 
admittance”). 
253 Many commentators are rightly concerned about conferring upon religious objec-
tors an absolute, unqualified exemption to facilitating same-sex marriages. For instance, 
Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle observe that: 
[T]he political community has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all peo-
ple have equal access to publicly available goods and services, whether pro-
vided by the state, commercial entities, or others. This interest primarily arises 
from concern about those who are excluded from such benefits. Exclusion may 
imperil health and safety, limit opportunities for personal development, deny 
political and social equality, or impose psychic distress. State policies protect-
ing against such exclusion also express the political community’s concerns 
about its own character and experience, because such exclusion may result in 
segregation and conflict. 
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 280–81 (emphasis added). Because my colleagues and 
I share this concern, the protections we propose would not give an absolute exemption for 
government employees or commercial providers. 
254 Such considerations are contextually sensitive and might vary considerably among 
specific state regulations. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 37:1-3 (West Supp. 2012) (“[A] marriage 
or civil union license shall be issued by the licensing officer in the municipality in which 
either party resides or, if neither party is a resident of the State, in the municipality in 
which the proposed marriage or civil union is to be performed.”). 
255 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 335–39 (presenting empirical evidence about the op-
eration of clerks’ offices in Massachusetts, including the number of clerks and same-sex 
marriage license applications, suggesting that same-sex marriage licenses constitute a min-
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cide to explicitly define such terms in any same-sex marriage legisla-
tion, as they routinely do in other statutes, rather than leaving it to the 
courts to construe those terms.256 That said, asking same-sex couples to 
wait any significant amount of time for a license that heterosexual cou-
ples would receive immediately would not be “prompt.” 
 The protection we propose will strike many religious objectors as 
cold comfort. In a head-to-head contest between religious liberty and 
marriage equality, religious liberty yields under this construction. Re-
stricting the ability to object to only those situations in which no hard-
ship for same-sex couples would result is principled: the state should 
not confer the right to marry with one hand and then take it back with 
the other by enacting broad, unqualified religious objections that could 
operate to bar same-sex couples from marrying.257 Although the pro-
posed protection does not help every objector in every instance, the 
exemption still has value. As I have argued elsewhere, a hardship ex-
emption will likely allow the vast majority of objectors to step aside.258 
 Some will ask why same-sex couples should ever have to experi-
ence any dislocation, however slight or remote. A common refrain is 
that religious objectors in government service should do all of their job 
or resign.259 This stance conflates the public receipt of a service offered 
by the state with the receipt of that service from each and every em-
ployee in the office who is available to do it. Same-sex couples clearly 
                                                                                                                      
iscule part of the workload for state clerk offices, and thus that staffing around religious 
objections would pose negligible costs). 
256 See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text (discussing promptness and the vir-
tues of making accommodations as invisible as possible so that same-sex couples “never 
stand in another line”). 
257 See Laycock, supra note 169, at 200 (“[A hardship qualification on religious objec-
tion] is inevitable in the governmental and commercial sectors. Religious dissenters can 
live their own values, but not if they occupy choke points that empower them to prevent 
same-sex couples from living their own values. If the dissenters want complete moral au-
tonomy on this issue, they must refrain from occupying such a choke point.”). 
258 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 335–39 (arguing that few cases of hardship to same-sex 
couples would actually arise). 
259 See Letter from James E. Gregory, supra note 226, at *2 (“[W]e fully expect the 
Town Board to direct Ms. Belforti to either perform her essential duties, including the 
issuance of marriage licenses to eligible applicants whether same sex or opposite sex, or to 
resign immediately.”). One D.C. Council member expressed the idea this way: 
If [an objector is a clerk] who chose[s] not to provide [a] service that [she 
has] accepted the job to provide but . . . still want[s] an entire salary as if 
[she] were providing 100% of the service, [then she is asking for] all of the 
benefits of the position [yet feeling] entitled to discriminate. 
Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:57:55 (statement of Council-
member David Catania). 
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have the right to receive marriage licenses and all other services from 
the state, but they do not necessarily have a claim to receive the service 
from a particular public servant. Indeed, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 imposes upon governmental employers a duty to accom-
modate an objecting employee if reasonably possible without undue 
hardship to the government, while also reasonably preserving the em-
ployee’s employment status.260 Given Title VII’s protections, it is simply 
insufficient to require that religious objectors “put up or shut up.” 
 More fundamentally, this stance vilifies people who could not have 
known when they took their jobs that they would be asked to facilitate a 
same-sex marriage. A New York clerk who resigned “just one day before 
gay marriage became legal” took her position as a clerk thirteen years 
before, in 1998—three years before the Netherlands first recognized 
                                                                                                                      
260 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 348–59; see also Am. Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster 
Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that employment status includes compen-
sation, conditions, terms, and privileges of employment). There are other problems with 
the “do-the-whole-job-or-get-out” approach. As a pair of cases involving claims for accom-
modation of employees in predictable administrative jobs illustrates, speculative predic-
tions regarding possible future disruptions are not to be considered; instead, employers 
are to be guided by the facts on the ground. See McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 
517, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979). 
In its 1979 decision in Haring v. Blumenthal, the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia noted: 
“[U]ndue hardship” must mean present undue hardship, as distinguished 
from anticipated or multiplied hardship. Were the law otherwise, any ac-
commodation, however slight, would rise to the level of an undue hardship 
because, if sufficiently magnified through predictions of the future behavior 
of the employee’s co-workers, even the most minute accommodation could be 
calculated to reach that level. 
471 F. Supp. at 1182. The best empirical evidence suggests, however, that allowing gov-
ernment employees to recuse themselves from facilitating same-sex marriages will cost the 
government and same-sex couples very little, if anything at all. See Wilson, supra note 46, at 
335–39. Moreover, although accommodations for certain government employees who 
protect the public (like police officers and firefighters) have raised special difficulties and 
received special scrutiny in a string of cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, at most these cases stand for the proposition that employees of “paramilitary” or-
ganizations responsible for public protection must check their consciences at the door. See 
id. at 349–58 (citing Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925–27 (7th Cir. 2003); Rod-
riguez v. City of Chi., 156 F.3d 771, 775–80 (7th Cir. 1998); Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
950 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1991)). Patently, religious accommodations for employees of 
marriage licensure offices and other government employees who may object to facilitating 
same-sex marriages pose far less difficulty than accommodations for public protectors 
because these employees perform routine, predictable, easily staffed-around tasks. See id. at 
349. Moreover, even in the public protector cases, which are the most hostile to the need 
for accommodations, public employers can and routinely do offer new assignments, trans-
fers, and low-level work-arounds short of a new assignment, which allow the religious ob-
jector to step aside from services that violate deeply held religious beliefs. See id. at 354. 
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same-sex marriage and six years before same-sex marriage was recog-
nized anywhere in the United States.261 
 Like the New York clerk, many state employees in the United 
States began working for the government long before same-sex mar-
riage was legally recognized anywhere. The Council of State Govern-
ments reports that many public sector employees have held their jobs 
for decades.262 Many state employees are eligible for retirement.263 
Generally, to be eligible for retirement, an employee must have worked 
for the state for a substantial length of time.264 Roughly one in every 
four or five employees working for state government in Iowa (17%), 
New Hampshire (22%), and Vermont (25%) qualified for retirement 
in 2002.265 There is no reason to think that clerks in state registrar of-
fices or other employees as a group are more likely to be newcomers to 
the job than their counterparts. 
 Moreover, dismissal or resignation will likely be very costly for the-
se employees. A job in the state licensure office pays well, and many 
long-time employees have built up retirement and other benefits that 
would be wiped out or significantly curtailed if they felt forced to exit 
rather than violate a religious conviction.266 
 Just as important as these very human costs to objectors is the fact 
that collisions will gradually become less and less prevalent. Resistance 
to recognition of same-sex marriage largely follows generational lines. 
In 2011, the UCLA Higher Education Research Institute annual na-
tional survey of college freshmen found that 71.3% of college freshmen 
supported same-sex marriage.267 In 2010, 53% of those surveyed be-
tween eighteen and twenty-nine supported same-sex marriage; 39% 
                                                                                                                      
261 See Graham, supra note 220; see also supra note 234 (discussing the origin of same-
sex marriage in the Netherlands and Massachusetts); see also Wilson, supra note 113, at 
328–31 (offering a more extensive discussion of this issue). 
262 See James B. Carroll & David A. Moss, Council of State Gov’ts, Trends Alert: 
State Employee Worker Shortage: The Impending Crisis 17 (2002), available at http:// 
www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/TA0210WorkShortage.pdf. 
263 See id. at 16 (providing data for some states that recognize same-sex marriage). 
Numbers for Massachusetts are not available. See id. 
264 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 330 n.66 (discussing length of service requirements for 
retirement). 
265 See Carroll & Moss, supra note 262, at 16. On average, state workers in Iowa had 
worked thirteen years by 2002, in New Hampshire nine years, and in Vermont eleven years—
all more than a decade before same-sex marriage was recognized by their states. See id. at 17. 
266 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 329–30. 
267 John H. Pryor et al., Higher Educ. Research Inst. at UCLA, The American 
Freshman: National Norms Fall 2011, at 6 (2011), available at http://heri.ucla.edu/ 
PDFs/pubs/TFS/Norms/Monographs/TheAmericanFreshman2011.pdf. 
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opposed it.268 Among older Americans fifty to sixty-four, 52% oppose it, 
with only 38% in support.269 This data suggests that conflicts over same-
sex marriage rights will recede over time.270 As Professor Douglas Lay-
cock has written, these conflicts will  “gradually fade away, and nearly all 
the rest [of those who oppose same-sex marriage] will go silent, suc-
cumbing to the live-and-let-live traditions of the American people.”271 
 In the commercial realm, our proposal gives more latitude to say 
“no” because the objector does not control access to the status of mar-
riage. The wedding photographer and cake decorator are classic ex-
amples of commercial actors associated with marriage. Even the protec-
tion for these commercial actors is not unqualified, however. An 
objector in the stream of commerce may object only if a “substantial 
hardship” would not result.272 This provision allows them to step aside 
only when other providers can do the job. Because same-sex marriage 
laws remain largely a “blue state” phenomenon, the number of refusals 
should be vanishingly small.273 As Professor Laycock has explained: 
Few same-sex couples . . . will have to go far to find merchants, 
professionals, counseling agencies, or any other desired ser-
vice providers who will cheerfully meet their needs and wants. 
                                                                                                                      
268 Gay Marriage Gains More Acceptance, Pew Research Ctr. for People & Press (Oct. 
6, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1755/poll-gay-marriage-gains-acceptance-gays-in-
the-military. Forty-six percent of individuals thirty to forty-nine approved of same-sex mar-
riage in 2010. See id. This group experienced the greatest shift in opinion favoring same-
sex marriage rights—up from only thirty-nine percent in 2008. See id. 
269 See id; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Politics of Accommodation: The American Ex-
perience with Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, in Religious Freedom and Equality: 
Emerging Conflicts in North America and Europe (Timothy S. Shah ed., forthcoming 
2013) (analyzing voter opinion in states that have yet to enact same-sex marriage statutes, 
as well as states that have enacted amendments banning same-sex marriage). 
270 In perhaps one sign that same-sex marriage is decreasingly controversial and polar-
izing, a national poll conducted two weeks after President Obama’s endorsement of same-
sex marriage revealed that the President’s stand had done little to affect public percep-
tions of him. See Julie Pace, Obama Team Trumpets New Polling on Gay Marriage, Huffington 
Post (May 23, 2012, 7:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120523/us-
obama-gay-marriage. Only seven percent of registered voters stated that President Obama’s 
open support for same-sex marriage raised concerns about supporting him, whereas sixty-
two percent stated that his position did not make a difference to them. See id. 
271 See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, supra note 48, at 
261. 
272 See infra app. B. 
273 See Fed. Election Comm’n, Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the 
U.S. President, U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives 17 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.pdf (reflecting the “blue 
state” presidential electoral results in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Vermont, and Washington). 
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And same-sex couples will generally be far happier working 
with a provider who contentedly desires to serve them than 
with one who believes them to be engaged in mortal sin, and 
grudgingly serves them only because of the coercive power of 
the law. Religious exemptions could also be drafted to ex-
clude the rare cases where these suppositions are not true, 
such as a same-sex couple in a rural area that has reasonably 
convenient access to only one provider of some secular ser-
vice. Such cases are no reason to withhold religious exemp-
tions in the more urban areas where most of the people—and 
most of the same-sex couples—actually live.274 
 Of course, same-sex couples may experience inconveniences or 
dislocations under any exemption, even an exemption qualified by 
hardship.275 So why allow any dislocation? First, a qualified exemption 
“lowers the stakes” in the debate about same-sex marriage, where pub-
                                                                                                                      
274 See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, supra note 48, at 
261 (predicting that without religious accommodations, the number of people opposing 
same-sex marriage will increase); see also Berg, supra note 46, at 229 (noting that marketing 
surveys indicate that more than seventy-four percent of same-sex couples live in large ur-
ban areas). 
275 One way to mitigate such dislocation is through information-forcing rules like those 
used with health care services. California law, for example, requires that any facility that does 
not offer abortion “on its premises shall post notice . . . in an area . . . that is open to patients 
and prospective admittees.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123420(c) (West 2012). This 
advance notice allows the patient to seek services knowing whether a provider is willing to 
provide such services. Information networks may also close knowledge gaps and ease disloca-
tion. These information networks have been used to promote patient access to emergency 
contraceptives and to allow the patient to get emergency contraceptives without great dislo-
cation, while allowing unwilling providers to live by their convictions. See Kyung M. Song, 
Women Complain After Pharmacies Refuse Prescriptions, Seattle Times, Aug. 1, 2006, at A5 (argu-
ing that “with better information, the patient would obtain the service without hardship or 
inconvenience”); Comments from Nathan J. Diament et al., Comments Submitted to the U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. with Regard to the Proposed Rescission of the “Conscience 
Regulation” Relating to Healthcare Workers and Certain Healthcare Services 4 (Apr. 7, 
2009), available at http://www.ouradio.org/images/uploads/HHS_Conscience_Regulation_ 
Comments.pdf (“[W]omen who have experienced difficulty in obtaining emergency contra-
ceptives have encountered ‘search costs’ that would be eliminated with better information. 
Thus, the patient in one complaint filed with the Washington State Board of Pharmacy ob-
tained [emergency contraceptives] less than an hour after the initial refusal took place.”). 
Advance notice of refusals will likely satisfy no one in the same-sex marriage context, 
despite the fact that it would avert needless inconveniences. We would no more tolerate 
signs saying, “This photography shop does not photograph same-sex ceremonies” than we 
would tolerate “Irish Need Not Apply” signs. The promise and hope of antidiscrimination 
laws is that they will erase differences or the importance of differences, not accentuate 
them. Thus, the information gain comes at an unacceptably high price—a loss of dignity—
which is explored in Part VII. See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text. 
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lic opinion continues to be deeply divided.276 It preserves as much reli-
gious freedom as possible in a liberal society without significantly en-
croaching on others—a goal we should generally strive for, especially 
when the costs to the public are cabined.277 A qualified exemption also 
provides “elbow room” for citizens with widely divergent views to live 
together in a pluralistic society. 
 As Professor Laycock notes, “[t]he larger problem for same-sex 
couples is the insult, the pointed reminder that some fellow citizens 
vehemently disapprove of what they are doing. But same-sex couples 
know that anyway, and the American commitment to freedom of 
speech ensures that they will be reminded of it from time to time.”278 
The fact that the government should not violate deeply held religious 
beliefs in order to protect others from insult does not mean that the 
government should not be concerned about whether same-sex couples 
are subjected to insult.279 
 Precisely to minimize any offense to same-sex couples, the process 
for accommodating religious objectors should make any objection as 
invisible as possible. As the next Part explains, this is achievable if the 
objector works in a large private-sector organization or government 
office.280 The couple asked by the Ledyard, New York town clerk to re-
turn at a later time to secure a marriage license from a deputy rightly 
                                                                                                                      
276 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse and Paul’s Admonition: How the Civil 
Rights Revolution Helps Us Understand Recent Clashes Between Religious Liberty and Gay Equality, 
in Andrew Koppelman & George W. Dent, Jr., Must Gay Rights Conflict with Reli-
gious Identity? (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author). Professor William Eskridge 
notes that: 
[J]udges are incompetent to resolve these issues where the nation is closely 
but intensely divided but they can and ought to lower the stakes of such pri-
mordial politics. Lowering the stakes means that judges should not prema-
turely constitutionalize fundamental issues where the nation is not settled; on 
the other hand, judges can sometimes ameliorate local conflicts that have es-
calated. 
Id.; see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage Law Lacks Religious Protection, Bangor Dai-
ly News (Oct. 16, 2009, 8:41 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2009/10/16/opinion/ 
samesex-marriage-law-lacks-religious-protection (arguing that religious liberty exemptions 
in same-sex marriage laws “go a long way to turning down the temperature in the heated 
debate over” same-sex marriage). 
277 Federal and state laws reflect this intuition. See supra note 14 (discussing the federal 
RFRA and look-a-like statutes in sixteen states). In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Su-
preme Court found that the federal RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states, 
hastening the enactment of state RFRAs. See 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1993). 
278 Laycock, supra note 169, at 198. 
279 I am indebted to Professor Laycock for this observation. 
280 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text. 
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felt “demean[ed],” as any of us would have.281 The felt disapprobation 
resulted not from having to make an appointment to secure the need-
ed license—all couples must now do this282—but from the clerk’s ar-
ticulated reasons for the change: “I don’t think it’d do the couple any 
service to have me as their person, because it . . . grieve[s] the Holy 
Spirit that resides in my heart, and I don’t know if I’d be able to cover 
that up for them. So, I want to remove myself from this process.”283 If 
New York law allows the delegation of one task to a deputy and the 
clerk followed the correct procedure for making this delegation, no 
one need ever have known the animating reason behind the change. 
 In the commercial context of a large organization, sensitivity and 
forethought sometimes will allow religious objections to recede from 
public view. In businesses owned by sole proprietors or with few em-
ployees, however, a member of the public who is turned away will always 
know it. Some will find this cost too high. 
 Here, the case for a qualified exemption rests, in part, on two pre-
dictive judgments. First, as discussed earlier, public attitudes are likely 
to harden against same-sex marriage in the absence of accommoda-
tions.284 Second, it seems likely that the market itself will police reli-
gious objectors. As noted above, in August 2011, a New Jersey bridal 
salon owner refused to assist a woman with her gown because she was a 
lesbian; the owner reportedly said that the customer “came from a nice 
Jewish family, and it was a shame that [she] was gay.”285 Although the 
                                                                                                                      
281 See Kingkade, supra note 223 (quoting Katie Carmichael as saying, “It’s demeaning, 
degrading and bottom line, it’s discrimination”). 
282 Some of the early reporting suggested that same-sex couples could not secure a li-
cense at all. See id. (indicating that “the publicly elected official responsible for issuing mar-
riage licenses[] refused to issue one herself and told the couple to make an appointment 
with a deputy town clerk. There’s just one problem: There is no deputy town clerk”). Town 
officials later confirmed that the clerk “informed the town board on Aug. 8 that she would 
not issue same-sex marriage licenses because of her fundamental Christian beliefs. . . . [She] 
‘agreed’ . . . to let her deputy clerk . . . issue all marriage licenses, including those to same-sex 
couples, in the future,” but “the bottom line for the town is that no one will be turned away 
and everyone will be treated the same.” See Scott Rapp, Same-Sex Couple Threatens Legal Action 
Against Cayuga County Town Whose Clerk Refused to Issue Marriage License, Post-Standard (Sy-
racuse) (Sept. 14, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/ 
same-sex_couple_threatens_lega.html (quoting Town Attorney Adam Van Buskirk). 
283 See Karla Dial, Friday Five: Rose Marie Belforti, CitizenLink (Aug. 19, 2011), http:// 
www.citizenlink.com/2011/08/19/friday-five-rose-marie-belforti. 
284 See Rauch, supra note 90, at 24–27; Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor 
John Baldacci, supra note 48, at 260. 
285 See Nina Terrero, N.J. Bridal Shop Refused to Sell Wedding Dress to Lesbian Bride: Owner 
Says: “That’s Illegal”, ABC News (Aug. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nj-bridal-shop- 
refused-sell-wedding-dress-lesbian/story?id=14342333. 
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owner denied the charges, the story went viral, and precipitated an on-
slaught of comments on the store’s Facebook profile condemning the 
alleged discrimination.286 
 This example illustrates that objectors will often pay a cost in the 
market for objecting. Presumably, the salon owner lost all the business 
of gay couples in her community—in itself a sufficient penalty, likely to 
limit refusals to those who feel quite strongly about it.287 And it appears 
that the salon owner also lost business from friends of those gay couples 
and others who heard about her stance. The possibility of social sanc-
tions is not confined only to commercial businesses, as the significant 
penalties faced by nurses who object to abortion in the workplace illus-
trate.288 
 In short, appropriately crafted exemptions should carefully bal-
ance marriage equality and religious liberty. Such exemptions should 
take into consideration whether an objection will create an actual 
roadblock to marriage and should therefore apply differently to actions 
taken by governmental officials and private businesspersons. 
VI. Sixth Sticking Point: We Cannot Deny Same-Sex Spouses and 
Women Insurance Coverage They Need 
 The benefits issue raises especially thorny questions in the same-sex 
marriage and health care contexts. Unlike facilitation, where a hardship 
exemption can affirm both values at stake—access and religious liberty, 
with one prevailing sometimes and the other prevailing at other times—
insurance coverage does not allow both interests to be affirmed simul-
taneously. Religious liberty will either prevail (with no benefits required) 
or it will not (with benefits required). Thus, it matters a great deal how 
policymakers choose to handle the benefits question. 
 The argument for a benefits exemption is not that exemptions will 
pose no hardship, but that failing to give an exemption often leads to 
greater hardships. Before the ACA, federal tax policy provided a sig-
nificant “carrot” to employers to induce them to provide health care 
                                                                                                                      
286 See Here Comes the Bride, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Here-Comes-
the-Bride/202112169814595 (last visited Sept. 17, 2012); Review of Here Comes the Bride, Yelp, 
http://www.yelp.com/biz/here-comes-the-bride-somers-point (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
287 See supra notes 112–133 and accompanying text (discussing sincerity and the prob-
lem of lukewarm objectors). 
288 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (discussing Danquah v. University of 
Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey and Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital). 
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coverage to employees, but it did not provide a “stick.”289 No federal 
law required employers to provide benefits to employees or their 
spouses— they simply could elect not to provide health care cover-
age.290 Although twenty-eight states mandate that any insurance sold in 
the state must offer contraceptive coverage,291 all but eight “allow cer-
tain employers and insurers to refuse” to include such coverage.292 
                                                                                                                      
289 Employers are motivated to provide such benefits because they are tax-preferenced. 
See Alliance for Health Reform, Tax Treatment of Health Insurance: A Primer  9–11 
(2008), http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/Transcript-1367.pdf. Although employ-
ers “can deduct the cost of health insurance,” as they would for any business expense, 
[t]he real subsidies for health insurance come[] from the fact that employees 
do not get taxed on the health benefits provide[d]. So, in other words, when 
an employer provides wages to an employee, those wages are taxed as income. 
When an employer provides health benefits to an employee, those benefits 
are not taxed as income. They’re essentially provided tax-free and, in effect, 
lower the taxes that an employee would otherwise pay. 
Id. at 9–10; see also Gamage, supra note 25, at *9–10 (“The primary sources of this tax ad-
vantage were the tax exclusions for employer-provided health insurance,” permitting em-
ployees to “exclude the value of those subsidies from taxable income” and payroll taxes, 
and to take advantage of “cafeteria plan[s],” if offered by their employer, allowing them to 
use pre-tax dollars “to pay for health insurance premiums.”). For the specific tax treat-
ment, see 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006) (excluding employer contributions to fund health 
care benefits from employees’ income); id. § 105(b) (excluding from employees’ income 
benefits paid by employer-sponsored health care plans to the extent that benefits are paid 
to reimburse the cost of medical care for employees, their spouses, and dependents); id. 
§ 162(a) (permitting employer deduction for ordinary business expenses); 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.162-10(a) (2012) (providing that amounts paid for health care benefit plans may be 
deducted under 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) if they are ordinary and necessary business expenses). 
After the ACA, small employers are incentivized to offer health care coverage to employees 
through tax credits. See Gamage, supra note 25, at *21 n.123. 
Professor Amy Monahan calculates that, for two employees in the twenty-five percent tax 
bracket, both of whom “desire the same insurance coverage, [say, for example,] an individual 
policy that costs $3,750,” the taxpayer who receives the policy through her employer “receives 
an effective subsidy of $1,412 to purchase her health insurance coverage solely because her 
employer makes such coverage available to her, and regardless of whether her employer 
makes any contribution toward such coverage.” Amy Monahan, The Complex Relationship Be-
tween Taxes and Health Insurance 3–4 (Minn. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 10-1 2010), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531322. 
290 Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health 
Insurance: Of Markets, Courts and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1037, 1042 
(1996) (“There is no statutory mandate requiring that employers must provide health 
insurance for their employees.”). 
291 See Insurance Coverage for Contraception Laws, Nat’l Conference of State Legisla-
tures (Feb. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurance-coverage-for-
contraception-state-laws.aspx (providing a state-by-state summary of mandated benefits); 
see also Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Insurance Coverage of Con-
traceptives *2 (2012) [hereinafter Guttmacher Report], available at http://www. 
guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf (listing states that require insurers that 
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 Far more crucially, however, such state mandates did not extend to 
private employer health plans unless the employer purchased insur-
ance coverage from an insurer.293 This occurred because employee 
benefit plans of private employers enjoy substantial insulation from 
state law as a result of the broad preemptive shield erected by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).294 Thus, employers 
that provided health care coverage to their employees could easily es-
                                                                                                                      
provide prescription drug coverage to include “the full range of FDA-approved contracep-
tive drugs and devices”). 
292 Guttmacher Report, supra note 291, at *2 (describing ‘a “‘limited’ refusal clause” in 
three states “that allows only churches and church associations to refuse to provide coverage, 
and does not permit hospitals or other entities to do so;” a “‘broader’ refusal clause” in seven 
states that “allows churches, associations of churches, religiously affiliated elementary and 
secondary schools, and, potentially, some religious charities and universities to refuse, but 
not hospitals;” an “‘expansive’ refusal clause” in nine states allowing “religious organizations, 
including at least some hospitals, to refuse to provide coverage,” which extends in two states 
to “secular organizations with moral or religious objections;” a right to refuse in one state, 
Nevada, rather than an exemption; and an exemption in two states for insurers as well as 
employers); see Timothy Jost, Newland v. Sebelius: The General Welfare, Religious Liberty, and 
Contraception Coverage Under the ACA, HealthAffairs Blog ( July 30, 2012), http:// 
healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/30/newland-v-sebelius-the-general-welfare-religious-liberty-
and-contraception-coverage-under-the-aca (“[T]wenty-one [states] have some form of reli-
gious exemption . . . .”). 
293 See Emp. Benefit Research Inst., ERISA and Health Plans 4–6 (1995), available 
at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/1195ib.pdf (“States can indirectly regulate health 
care plans that provide benefits through insurance contracts by establishing the terms of 
the contract. . . . But they cannot do the same with respect to self-funded plans. That is one 
of the factors that has caused a great rise in the number of self-funded plans.”); see also 
Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding that a Massachu-
setts statute requiring mandatory minimum health care benefits in any general insurance 
policy, even if sold to an employee health care plan, was not preempted by ERISA because 
it applies to insurance contracts purchased by the plan). 
294 ERISA broadly preempts state laws that “relate to” an employee benefit plan. See 29 
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). The “saving clause,” however, saves state laws that regulate insurance 
from preemption. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The “deeme[r] clause” provides an exception to 
the saving clause exception. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Under the deemer clause, self-funded plans 
are exempt from state laws that “regulat[e] insurance within the meaning of the saving 
clause.” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, ERISA preempts state laws regulating insurance with respect to self-funded plans, 
whereas insured plans are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. See id. 
As a result of this broad preemption, a persistent criticism of ERISA has been that 
Congress, by failing to regulate meaningfully employee health benefit plans at the federal 
level, created a federal “regulatory vacuum.” William J. Curran et al., Health Care 
Law and Ethics 1076 (5th ed. 1998). One notable exception is mental health parity. See 
Stacey A. Tovino, A Proposal for Comprehensive and Specific Essential Mental Health and Sub-
stance Use Disorder Benefits, 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 471, 488–89 (2012) (noting that because the 
essential mental health and substance use disorder benefit that is part of the ACA’s “essen-
tial health benefits” provision, § 1302, doesn’t apply to all health plan settings, even after 
health care reform is fully implemented, full mental health parity will not be achieved 
because mental health and substance use disorder benefits will not be fully covered). 
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cape state-mandated benefits by simply “self-funding” —or paying for 
health care costs out of their own funds, sometimes backed up by a 
stop-loss insurance policy.295 ERISA’s significant insulation from state 
law “is one of the factors that has caused a great rise in the number of 
self-funded plans,” in which eighty-two percent of employees in large 
companies now find themselves.296 
                                                                                                                      
295 See Emp. Benefit Research Inst. supra note 293, at 4–6. Employers that have self-
funded “may not themselves be regulated as insurance companies even if the self-funded 
or self-insured plan purchases stop-loss insurance to cover losses or benefits payments be-
yond a specified level.” Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 361, 363 (4th Cir. 
1997) (concluding that ERISA’s preemptive shield prevented Maryland from regulating 
self-funded private health benefit plans that used stop-loss coverage with a very low dollar 
threshold for payment by the insurer, because such regulations did not qualify as the regu-
lation of the business of insurance and thus fell outside the saving clause). Although the 
Supreme Court has never addressed the question, lower courts have held that the pur-
chase of stop-loss insurance does not cause self-funded plans to loss their status as self-
funded. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or ‘One Good Loophole 
Deserves Another,’ 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 113–15 (2005). 
296 See Emp. Benefit Research Inst. supra note 293 at 4–6. According to a 2012 survey, 
81% of covered workers in large firms (with two hundred or more workers) were in par-
tially or completely self-funded plans, whereas only 15% of covered workers in small firms 
(with three to one hundred and ninety-nine workers) were in similar plans. Kaiser Family 
Found. & Health Research Educ. Trust, Employer Health Benefits: 2012 Annual 
Survey 186 (2012), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8345.pdf; see also Michael J. Brien & 
Constantijn W.A. Panis, Self-Insured Health Benefit Plans 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/deloitte2011-1.pdf (estimating that 42.7% of plans that 
filed a Form 5500 had a self-insured component); U.S. Dep’t Labor, Emp. Benefits Se-
curity Admin., Group Health Plans Report 1 (2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ 
ACA-ARC2012.pdf (reporting that, as of 2009, for the “approximately 50,000 private sector 
employer-sponsored group health plans that filed a Form 5500” 42%, or 21,000 plans, “can 
be categorized as self-insured” or as mixed-insured). 
Drawing on state-mandated benefit laws, some commentators urge that “[t]he battle 
against legal contraception has been fought and lost before, not only in the 1960s, but also 
in the 1990s, when state legislatures and courts repeatedly rejected the argument that reli-
gious liberty provides a justification for undermining women’s equality and denying them 
contraceptive insurance.” 158 Cong. Rec. E1370 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2012) (statement of 
Representative Laura Richardson). These commentators cite such cases as Catholic Charities 
of Sacramento v. Superior Court, in which the California Supreme Court upheld California’s 
Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act against claims that it violated the establishment and 
free exercises clauses of the California and United States Constitutions. See 85 P.3d 67, 95 
(Cal. 2004). Unlike the employer in Bartlett, discussed above, the church-affiliated em-
ployer in Catholic Charities of Sacramento did not enjoy the benefit of ERISA preemption 
because it had not self-funded; this necessitated its ultimately failed attempt to secure an 
exemption on constitutional grounds. By emphasizing that “state legislatures . . . repeat-
edly rejected the argument that religious liberty provides a justification for . . . denying 
them contraceptive insurance,” these commentators overlook the fact that ERISA’s broad 
preemptive shield made it unnecessary for religious objectors to aggressively advocate for 
religious exemptions in the handful of states that provide no exemption to the state’s con-
traceptive mandate. 
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 As with the health care context, employers may also choose not to 
provide other insurance benefits, such as life insurance benefits, for an 
employee’s spouse.297 Thus, religious employers who believed they 
could not “recognize” same-sex spouses by providing insurance coverage 
could avoid the whole theological morass by refusing to provide benefit 
coverage to spouses of employees who are not already covered.298 
 This is precisely what happened several years ago after the District 
of Columbia recognized same-sex marriage. When the D.C. Council 
gave groups like Catholic Charities no other option—that is, no exemp-
tion—the religious organization took the nuclear option by eliminating 
coverage for the spouses of its 850 employees going forward rather 
than cover spouses in marriages that it could not recognize for religious 
reasons.299 When Catholic Charities chose this path, both sides lost out. 
Its employees could no longer add spouses to their health care cover-
                                                                                                                      
297 Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires 
employers to establish employee benefit plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of 
benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.”). Employers are moti-
vated to provide such benefits because they are tax-preferenced. See Alliance for Health 
Reform, supra note 289, at 2, 9–10. 
298 Some religious organizations may offer “employee plus one” coverage to side-step 
the collision between their religious doctrines and existing legal mandates when no ex-
emption is forthcoming. The American Civil Liberties Union has urged that Catholic or-
ganizations do not need a benefits exemption because they could copy the Archdiocese of 
San Francisco, which took the “employee plus one” path. See Letter from Reverend John 
W. Wimberly, Jr. et al. to the Honorable Vincent C. Gray regarding D.C. Bill 18-482, the 
Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, at 1 (Nov. 20, 
2009) (on file with author); see also Michelle Martin, Area Catholic Hospitals Prepare for Rami-
fications of Civil Unions Bill, Catholic New World (May 22, 2011), http://www.catholic 
newworld.com/cnwonline/2011/0522/2.aspx. “Employee plus one” coverage may itself 
represent a rollback of existing insurance coverage. See Beth Levin Crimmel, Agency for 
Healthcare Research & Quality, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance for Em-
ployees of State and Local Governments, by Census Division, (2010), available at 
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/st302/stat302.pdf. Whether all 
Catholic groups would accept this work-around is unclear. But, one can easily imagine that 
some religious employers would believe that this work-around is immoral. 
299 See William Wan, Same-Sex Marriage Leads Catholic Charities to Adjust Benefits, Wash. 
Post, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/01/ 
AR2010030103345.html. 
Starting Tuesday, Catholic Charities will not offer benefits to spouses of new 
employees or to spouses of current employees who are not already enrolled 
in the plan. . . . Staff members at the charity were not given advance notice of 
the new policy and will not be able to add a spouse now because the most re-
cent open enrollment period ended in November. Those who use their 
health benefits to cover spouses will be grandfathered into the new policy. 
Id. 
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age, paid primarily by the employer with tax-free dollars.300 As a result, 
the employees had to buy new coverage for their spouses on the indi-
vidual market, at higher prices and with after-tax dollars.301 Catholic 
Charities lost out as an employer, too. When an employer sheds or re-
duces benefits, it becomes harder for it to compete in the marketplace 
for employees.302 
 The ACA did not substantially alter the calculus for private employ-
ers. The nuclear option remains available to some religious objectors at 
no cost, as explained below. To others, it comes at a price, measured by 
the number of employees, although the cost of the penalties will almost 
certainly be much less than the cost of providing subsidized insurance to 
employees, as the objecting institution may have in the past.303 
 Under the ACA, employers providing health care coverage must 
comply with the interim final rules on the scope of coverage for pre-
ventative services.304 No plan can be sold—and no employer can self-
insure—unless it complies with coverage requirements.305 The Obama 
administration’s “accommodation” requires insurers, and not employ-
ers directly, to provide those services free of charge.306 This arrange-
ment simply does not work for self-insured employers because there are 
no insurers available to provide the mandated benefits for free, unless 
the government forces a plan’s third-party administrator to do this.307 
Further, since more than one-third of employers act as their own ad-
                                                                                                                      
300 See Alliance for Health Reform, supra note 289, at 9–10. 
301 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Is Employer-Based Health Insurance Worth Saving?, N.Y. Times 
(May 22, 2009, 6:05 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/is-employer-
based-health-insurance-worth-saving. 
302 See infra notes 318–319 and accompanying text (discussing the need for employers 
to offer a greater salary when they fail to provide benefits in order to compete in the mar-
ketplace for employees). 
303 See infra notes 313–317 and accompanying text. 
304 45 C.F.R. § 156.275 (2012) (mandating that qualified health plans comply with clin-
ical quality measures in various areas, including preventive care). See generally Group 
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011) 
(specifying the scope of required coverage for preventative care). 
305 See 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,622–23. 
306 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
307 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. A third-party administrator is an “en-
tity required to make or responsible for making payment on behalf of a group health plan 
. . . [or a b]usiness associate that performs claims administration and related business 
functions for a self-insured entity.” See Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Glossary, 
http://www.cms.gov/apps/glossary/default.asp?Letter=T&Language=English (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2012). Third-party administrators, however, assume no liability for claims made in 
the insurance pool. See id. 
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ministrators, there is not even a third-party administrator to provide the 
coverage.308 
 Putting aside whether this arrangement will even work, religious 
objectors, whether institutional or individual, remain stuck receiving 
coverage that violates their religious convictions. This leaves only one 
way out: the nuclear option. Under the ACA, some employers can in 
fact take this way out, although at significant—but perhaps not devastat-
ing—cost. 
 Consider an employer who falls outside the ACA’s penalty thresh-
old—that is, an employer with fewer than fifty employees or an em-
ployer with fifty or more employees, not one of whom receives a “pre-
mium credit” or government subsidy for his or her cost-sharing for 
coverage.309 If that employer objects to the new coverage mandate for 
religious reasons, it can simply trigger the nuclear option and abandon 
all health care coverage for its employees. Zaytuna College, which self-
identifies as a “Muslim institution of higher learning,” provides one ex-
ample.310 Zaytuna College reported twenty-five employees on its 2009 
Internal Revenue Service Form 990,311 meaning that it can simply drop 
all coverage and pay no penalty.312 
                                                                                                                      
 
308 Press Release, HighRoads, HighRoads Study Shows Employers Anticipate Rising Costs 
in Outsourced Health Benefits Administration (Nov. 26, 2010), available at http://www.busi 
-nesswire.com/news/home/20101116005643/en/HighRoads-Study-Shows-Employers-Antici- 
pate-Rising-Costs (noting that an employer’s incentive to self-administer its health plan may 
change because of the ACA). 
309 The ACA’s premium credit subsidizes an employee’s cost sharing when the em-
ployee’s household income is less than 400% of the federal poverty level and the employee is 
required to pay more than 9.5% of his or her household income for health care coverage. See 
ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Rec-
onciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 1029; I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i) 
(Supp. I 2011); Hinda Chaikind & Chris L. Peterson, Cong. Research Serv., Summary 
of Potential Employer Penalties Under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act 6 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/Documents/ 
Employer Penalties.pdf. 
310 See Our History, Zaytuna C., http://www.zaytunacollege.org/about/our_history 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2012). Zaytuna’s cofounder joined the leaders of other universities in 
opposing the coverage mandate. See Garvey et al., supra note 24 (listing signatories). 
311 See Zaytuna College, IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/330/ 
330720978/330720978_201007_990.pdf (indicating that Zaytuna College had twenty-five 
employees for the taxable year beginning August 1, 2009 and concluding July 31, 2010). 
312 Religiously affiliated colleges and universities may employ the nuclear option in 
other ways, too. The Franciscan University of Steubenville, Ohio recently announced that 
it would terminate its student health insurance plan rather than obey the new requirement 
that the plan cover birth control. See Franciscan University Drops Student Health Insurance Plan 
over Birth Control Mandate, Costs, MSNBC.com (May 15, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://usnews. 
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 For employers that do meet the penalty threshold (those with fifty 
or more employees, at least one of whom receives a “premium credit”), 
there would be substantial penalties for failing to provide coverage.313 
The annual fine for an employer with fifty employees would be $40,000. 
This penalty, although considerable, would be offset by savings the ob-
jecting institution realizes by eliminating coverage, as a consequence of 
which their employees will fall on the insurance exchanges. 
 A substantial literature has developed showing that private em-
ployers will frequently come out ahead financially by eliminating the 
subsidized health care coverage they previously provided to their em-
ployees.314 With the health care costs for American families now ex-
                                                                                                                      
msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/15/11720706-franciscan-university-drops-student-health-
insurance-plan-over-birth-control-mandate-costs. 
313 The formula for determining the annual penalty is: (total number of employees – 30) 
x ($2000). See ACA § 1513(a); I.R.C. § 4980H(a); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Research 
Found., ACA: Employer Mandate Penalties, CribSheet 11-1 (2011), available at http:// 
www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/research/cribsheets/employer-mandate-penalties-
nfib-cribsheet.pdf. If an employer offers a health plan that simply does not include the man-
dated coverage, a different penalty is assessed, up to $100 per day per employee. See, e.g., 
Cynthia Brougher, Cong. Research Serv., R42370, Preventive Health Services Regu-
lations: Religious Institutions’ Objections to Contraceptive Coverage 14, 16 (2012) 
(describing an excise tax under the Internal Revenue Service Code for noncompliant em-
ployment-based group health plans, as well as possible penalties under the Public Health 
Service Act for self-insured governmental plans, health insurance issuers providing group 
health coverage, and coverage in the individual market, and under ERISA for insured and 
self-insured group health plans and insurance issuers providing group health coverage). The 
fine for noncompliant plans and the annual penalty for failing to provide health care cover-
age appear to be alternative penalties. See, e.g., Jennifer Marshall & Dominique Ludvigson, 
Judge Issues Preliminary Injunction on Behalf of Business Owner in HHS Mandate Fight, Foundry 
( July 29, 2012, 8:17 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/07/29/judge-issues-preliminary-
injunction-on-behalf-of-business-owner-in-hhs-mandate-fight/ (describing the “alternative[s]” 
facing religious objectors and calculating penalties under each scenario). 
Employers that offer coverage that is deemed “unaffordable” also face penalties. This 
penalty equals one-twelfth of $3000 multiplied by the number of full-time employees that 
receive the exchange subsidies because the insurance offered to them by their employer was 
“unaffordable,” capped by “the amount that the employer would have been liable for had the 
[I.R.C. §] 4980H(a) penalty been triggered instead.” Gamage, supra note 25, at *22 (citing 
I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(1)). 
314 See Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4 (noting that some employers will be finan-
cially better off by paying the penalty and “dumping” their employees on the exchanges, 
rather than paying the employer’s portion of coverage costs); see also Kathryn L. Moore, 
The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 89 U. Neb. L. Rev. 885, 906–12 (2011) (analyzing empirical data from Massachusetts 
and San Francisco to predict whether certain employers will choose to pay the ACA’s pen-
alty rather than provide health care coverage); supra note 25 (citing scholarly opinion that 
the ACA creates perverse incentives that will lead some employers to drop certain employ-
ees on the insurance exchanges). 
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ceeding, by one estimate, $20,000 annually315—and with average em-
ployers picking up 82% of the coverage costs of single individuals and 
72% for families, on average316—it is easy to see why employers may be 
eager to drop subsidized coverage, even in the absence of a religious 
exemption. Not all employees will be disadvantaged by such a move, 
especially employees who are low- and moderate-income earners. These 
employees qualify for substantial premium tax credits if their employer 
fails to provide health care coverage entirely or offers “unaffordable” 
coverage.317 
 It is true that employers that provide fewer benefits generally have 
to pay greater salaries to compete for employees, all other things being 
equal.318 Indeed, “[e]conomists generally agree employee benefits are 
a dollar-for-dollar substitute for wages.”319 Nevertheless, an objecting 
institution that drops coverage would not have to increase pay for 
lower-income employees to compensate for the missing benefit because 
such employees will be made better-off financially by receiving pre-
mium tax credits. For higher-income employees, the institution likely 
would have to adjust pay.320 Ultimately, the cost of the nuclear option 
                                                                                                                      
315 See Milliman, 2012 Milliman Medical Index 1 (2012), available at http:// 
publications.milliman.com/periodicals/mmi/pdfs/milliman-medical-index-2012.pdf. A 2011 
study by the Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that the total average annual cost of health 
care coverage for a family was $15,078. See Julie Appleby, Costs of Employer Insurance Plans Surge 
in 2011, Kaiser Health News (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/ 
2011/september/27/employer-health-coverage-survey-shows-employer-spend-ing-spike.aspx. 
316 Employer Health Benefits: 2011 Summary of Findings, Kaiser Family Found. & Health 
Research Educ. Trust (Sept. 27, 2011), http://ehbs.kff.org/. 
317 See Gamage, supra note 25, at *17, *23 (estimating that, for a worker in a family of 
four whose household income is 100% of the federal poverty level ($24,000 a year), the 
value of premium tax credits received, together with the value of cost-sharing subsidies 
received, equals $18,433, more than dwarfing the tax value of any employer-provided 
health care coverage, and, in one break-even analysis, calculating the net-benefit to the 
employee at $16,309). Coverage is considered “affordable” when the employee’s contribu-
tion for employee-only coverage is less than 9.5% of the employee’s household income. 
I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II) (Supp. I 2011). 
318 See Thomas J. Atchison et al., Internet Based Benefits & Compensation Ad-
ministration (2012), available at http://www.eridlc.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=textbook. 
chpt20. 
319 Devon Herrick, Health Exchange Subsidies Will Reduce Employer Health Plans, Nat’l 
Center for Pol’y Analysis (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba758. 
320 Predicting the true cost of the nuclear option to an employer would require know-
ing how many full-time or part-time employees it has, the cost of existing coverage, the 
amount of the employer’s subsidy for that coverage, what the mix of low- and moderate-
income employees is to higher-income employees, and the household income of lower-
income employees (in order to determine the value of premium tax credits to them), 
among other factors. 
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may not be nearly as great as the calculated penalty suggests and cer-
tainly may not be prohibitive for smaller religious employers.321 
                                                                                                                     
 As the number of employees increases, however, so does the annual 
penalty. It does not take long for the financial penalty to become mas-
sive. For example, the Catholic cable television broadcaster that filed 
suit challenging the coverage mandate would pay more than $700,000 
annually.322 Colorado Christian University, which self-identifies as a 
nondenominational, evangelical university and employs 922 people, 
would face an annual penalty of $1,784,000 if it dropped coverage for its 
employees rather than violate its religious beliefs; this threat prompted 
the school to sue the Obama administration as well.323 But here again, 
the true cost of the nuclear option needs to be adjusted to account for 
the religious objector’s savings in eliminating coverage for all its em-
 
321 Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4. 
322 Eternal Word Television Network (ETWN) reported 384 employees on its 2010 
Form 990, filed with the Internal Revenue Service. See Eternal Word Television Network, 
IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2010), avail-
able at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/630/630801391/630801391_2 
01012_990.pdf. This yields a penalty of $708,000 [(384 - 30) x $2000]. See also Tyler King-
kade, Catholic Colleges File Lawsuit Against Feds over Birth Control Rule, Huffington Post 
(Feb. 22, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/22/catholic-colleges-
file-lawsuit-feds_n_1293814.html (reporting that EWTN filed suit to challenge the ACA). 
323 See What We Believe, Colo. Christian Univ., http://www.ccu.edu/welcome/webe- 
lieve.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2012); see also Colo. Christian Univ., IRS Form 990, Return of 
Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamo- 
data.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/840/840442429/840442429_201006_990.pdf (indicat-
ing 922 employees for the tax year beginning July 1, 2009 and concluding June 30, 2010). 
This yields a penalty of $1,784,000 [(922 - 30) x $2000]. See Kingkade, supra note 322 (re-
porting that Colorado Christian University has been joined in its legal challenge to the 
ACA by Ave Maria University, Belmont Abbey College, and Geneva College, all of which 
argue that even with the Obama administration’s accommodation for religious employers, 
the coverage mandate nonetheless conflicts with their belief that birth control is immoral). 
Ave Maria University reported 631 employees on its 2009 Form 990, which means it would 
pay a penalty of $1,202,000. See Ave Maria Univ., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization 
Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/ 
990_pdf_archive/030/030482006/030482006_201006_990.pdf. Belmont Abbey College 
would incur penalties of approximately $1,050,000 if it were to drop coverage for its 555 
employees. See Belmont Abbey Coll., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from 
Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_ 
archive/560/560547498/560547498_201005_990.pdf; FAQs: Becket Fund’s Lawsuits Against 
HHS, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, http://www.becketfund.org/faq (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2012). Geneva College reported 1439 employees on its 2009 Form 990, which 
would yield a penalty of $2,818,000 [(1439 - 30) x $2000]. See Geneva Coll., IRS Form 990, 
Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http:// 
dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/250/250965376/250965376_201005_990.pdf. 
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ployees, offset by the additional wages that it must offer to remain com-
petitive in the marketplace.324 
 For much larger employers, the annual costs of the nuclear option 
would seem at first blush to be almost unsustainable. For Catholic Char-
ities of the Archdiocese of Washington, which employs over 1000 peo-
ple, penalties would crest $2 million annually;325 the University of 
Notre Dame,326 with its 16,445 employees, would face an annual pen-
alty of $32,830,000.327 As before, however, these gargantuan penalties 
                                                                                                                      
 
324 Supra notes 318–321 and accompanying text. 
325 See Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Wash., IRS Form 990, Return of Or-
ganization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata. 
fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/530/530196524/530196524_201006_990.pdf (indicating 1118 
employees for the tax year beginning July 1, 2009 and concluding June 30, 2010). This 
yields a penalty of $2,176,000 [(1118 – 30) x $2000]. 
326 On May 21, 2012, the University of Notre Dame brought suit against the federal gov-
ernment over the coverage mandate. See Complaint at 1–4, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 
No. 3:2012-cv-00253 (N.D. Ind. May 21, 2012), available at http://opac.nd.edu/assets/69013/ 
hhs_complaint.pdf. As Notre Dame president Father John Jenkins, C.S.C., explained: 
 Let me say very clearly what this lawsuit is not about: it is not about pre-
venting women from having access to contraception, nor even about prevent-
ing the Government from providing such services. Many of our faculty, staff 
and students—both Catholic and non-Catholic—have made conscientious 
decisions to use contraceptives. As we assert the right to follow our con-
science, we respect their right to follow theirs. And we believe that, if the 
Government wishes to provide such services, means are available that do not 
compel religious organizations to serve as its agents. We do not seek to im-
pose our religious beliefs on others; we simply ask that the Government not 
impose its values on the University when those values conflict with our reli-
gious teachings. . . . 
 This filing is about the freedom of a religious organization to live its mis-
sion, and its significance goes well beyond any debate about contraceptives. 
For if we concede that the Government can decide which religious organiza-
tions are sufficiently religious to be awarded the freedom to follow the prin-
ciples that define their mission, then we have begun to walk down a path that 
ultimately leads to the undermining of those institutions. For if one Presiden-
tial Administration can override our religious purpose and use religious or-
ganizations to advance policies that undercut our values, then surely another 
Administration will do the same for another very different set of policies, 
each time invoking some concept of popular will or the public good, with the 
result these religious organizations become mere tools for the exercise of 
government power, morally subservient to the state, and not free from its in-
fringements. If that happens, it will be the end of genuinely religious organi-
zations in all but name. 
Press Release, Office of the President, Univ. of Notre Dame, A Message from Father Jen-
kins on the HHS Lawsuit (May 21, 2012), available at http://president.nd.edu/communi- 
cations/a-message-from-father-jenkins-on-the-hhs-lawsuit (emphasis added). 
327 The University of Notre Dame reported 16,445 employees on its last Form 990, 
filed with the Internal Revenue Service. See Univ. of Notre Dame, IRS Form 990, Return of 
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would be offset by the savings to the religious objector in no longer 
subsidizing health care coverage for its employees, although the objec-
tors would need to provide some additional wages to higher-income 
employees to remain competitive as an employer.328 
                                                                                                                     
 It would not be surprising if some employees of religious groups 
shared the group’s religious objections to the mandated coverage, nor 
would it be surprising for ordinary individuals employed elsewhere to 
have religious objections.329 Yet, the impact on individuals has been 
largely lost in the debate over mandated coverage. Under the ACA’s 
individual mandate, an individual must show coverage through an em-
ployer or public insurance, or privately purchase coverage,330 unless 
exempt from the duty to do so as the result of low income or the lack of 
an affordable plan in the market.331 Failing to do so prompts a mone-
tary penalty like those paid by employers, which varies with the individ-
ual’s income.332 
 
Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata. 
fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/350/350868188/350868188_201006_990.pdf. This yields 
a penalty of $32,830,000 [(16,445 – 30) x ($2000)]. Other universities have also objected 
to the coverage mandate. For example, Liberty University, which reported 5457 employees 
on its 2009 Form 990, would pay a penalty of $10,854,000. See Liberty Univ., IRS Form 990, 
Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http:// 
dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/540/540946734/540946734_201006_990 .pdf; 
Reaction to Obama’s Birth Control Compromise, Guardian (London) (Feb. 10, 2012), http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10087882 (reporting the views of Liberty Univer-
sity’s vice president and dean of the law school). 
328 See supra notes 318–321 and accompanying text. 
329 Some may ask how the coverage mandate is different from a general duty to pay 
taxes, which fund wars and other services to which an individual might object on secular 
or sectarian grounds. The coverage mandate has a disproportionate and direct impact on 
individuals who believe that by participating in an insurance pool, they are facilitating the 
use by others of drugs that cut off potential life, both before fertilization and after. Many 
faith groups are not opposed to taxes because government decisions are intervening acts 
and the result of those acts are too removed from the believer for the believer to have any 
moral culpability. Here, the objector, charged with responsibility for his or her own moral 
act of facilitating the end of a potential life, must decide whether to comply with the law or 
violate a religious tenet. 
330 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(f), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
331 The individual mandate applies only if an individual is able to secure health care 
coverage that costs less than eight percent of the individual’s household income, after 
applying premium tax credits or employer contributions, if any. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1) 
(Supp. IV 2011). Moreover, “workers with household incomes below 133 percent of the 
federal poverty line will generally qualify for Medicaid.” Gamage, supra note 25, at *2, n.8. 
332 If an employer exercises the nuclear option, some lower-income employees may come 
out ahead because they will receive subsidies to purchase coverage from an insurance ex-
change. See supra notes 314–317 and accompanying text (estimating that low- and moderate-
income workers may benefit financially by securing health care coverage through ex-
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 So what recourse does the individual who objects to mandated 
coverage have? First, although the ACA contains an individual religious 
exemption, it is extremely narrow.333 ACA’s exemption parrots the reli-
gious exemption in the Social Security Act for the Amish, who are ex-
empted from paying social security taxes.334 Although the Amish and 
substantially similar religious groups335 will qualify for ACA’s religious 
exemptions, most individual objectors will fall outside the exemption’s 
narrow bounds.336 A second option for the individual objector is to join 
a health care sharing ministry, shielding the individual from a tax pen-
alty.337 These sharing ministries, however, offer very limited benefits. 
Few ministries exist, and because any qualifying sharing ministries must 
have been in existence on December 31, 1999, the market cannot 
grow.338 Further, even though members of sharing ministries pool their 
resources, participation in a ministry does not provide the security of a 
real insurance product: ministries do not guarantee payment or retain 
financial reserves.339 Regulators presumably could increase the protec-
                                                                                                                      
 
changes). An employee who objects to mandated coverage on religious grounds, however, 
wants no coverage if it includes the objectionable service, not cheaper coverage. 
333 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A). 
334 Samuel T. Grover, Note, Religious Exemptions to the PPACA’s Health Insurance Mandate, 
37 Am. J.L. & Med 624, 629 (2011). 
335 See Jost, supra note 2, at 42 n.119 (identifying the religious groups likely to qualify). 
336 To qualify for the individual religious exemption, an individual must meet five cri-
teria. The first three establish basic elements: (1) he or she must belong to a religious sect 
and subscribe to its tenets; (2) the individual must waive Social Security benefits; and (3) 
the sect must establish these tenets. The remaining requirements are much more limiting: 
(4) the sect must have a substantial history of providing for and taking care of its depend-
ent members; and (5) the sect has been in existence since December 31, 1950. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A(d)(2)(A) (exempting from the individual mandate any “member of a recognized 
religious sect or division thereof which is described in section 1402(g)(1), and . . . an ad-
herent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division as described in such sec-
tion”); see id. § 1402 (g). 
337 26 U.S.C. § 5000a(d)(2)(B)(2) (Supp. IV 2011) (exempting from the individual 
mandate members of health care sharing ministries). 
338 See id.; Jost, supra note 2, at 43 (estimating that 100,000 people are members of such 
health care sharing ministries, which are generally restricted to Christians who abstain from 
alcohol, drugs, smoking, or extramarital sex); Michelle Andrews, Some Church Groups Form 
Sharing Ministries to Cover Members’ Medical Costs, Kaiser Health News (Apr. 25, 2011), http:// 
www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/Insuring-Your-Health/Michelle-Andrews-on-Health-Care- 
Religious-Cooperatives.aspx (estimating that “the total number of people who are sharing 
their medical costs [is] roughly 120,000”). 
339 Andrews, supra note 338 (“If there's a shortfall one month . . . every household 
seeking help gets a prorated portion of its needs covered, and the ministry asks members 
for voluntary contributions to make up the difference. If the shortfall continues, members 
vote on raising the share amount.”). Fact sheets for the ministries explain that they do not 
operate as an insurance product. See, e.g., Alliance Health Care Sharing Ministries, 
http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012) (“HCSMs [health 
1502 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1417 
tion that sharing ministries provide to members, but it remains to be 
seen whether this will occur.340 
 The ACA’s individual mandate does contain a hardship exemp-
tion, but it provides very little detail about what would qualify for such 
an exemption.341 No regulations have been issued as to the scope and 
availability of any hardship waiver. Thus, it remains to be seen whether 
religious objectors can avail themselves of this way out. 
 The individual employee-objector’s third option is to drop his or 
her health care coverage and “go naked.” The costs for “going naked” 
include not just the monetary penalties, which may be stiff, but also the 
financial risks associated with having no health care coverage at all.342 
 The individual mandate applies if an individual or family’s income 
exceeds the federal threshold for taxation.343 For 2011, the threshold 
                                                                                                                      
 
care sharing ministries] are not insurance companies. HCSMs do not assume any risk or 
guarantee the payment of any medical bill. Eighteen states as of May, 2012 have explicitly 
recognized this and specifically exempt HCSMs from their insurance codes.”). “By con-
trast, insurance companies face considerable regulation as to solvency, reserves, and other 
matters [like actuarial estimates] precisely because the companies agree by contract to 
guarantee payment for covered services.” See Andrews, supra note 336. Although these 
ministries may provide important assistance with payment of smaller claims, in the case of 
catastrophic claims, participation in a sharing ministry may not be materially better than 
“going naked.” 
340 The Obama administration has not yet released regulations fleshing out the scope 
of the individual religious exemption. One prominent supporter of ACA, Professor Timo-
thy Jost, has noted that “these questions are unavoidable in a society that attempts to on 
the one hand adopt generally applicable laws addressing controversial subjects, and on the 
other hand maintain a high regard for religious liberty.” Jost, supra note 292. He suggests 
that a promising way forward for “reconciling” the “religious freedom of employers with 
the right of employees to access vital health services” would be to mimic federal legislation 
“excusing employer contributions to Social Security where both the employer and em-
ployee had religious objections, but not otherwise.” Id. 
341 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1411, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
342 See No Insurance Creates Serious Health Risks, ACP Internist, available at http://www. 
acpinternist.org/archives/2000/01/atpress.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2012) (noting stud-
ies that indicate that “the uninsured may be three times more likely than the insured to 
experience adverse [health] outcomes . . . partly because uninsured individuals are less 
likely to have a regular source of care or to have visited a physician recently . . . [and] are 
also less likely to use preventive services”). 
343 Any individual or family that does not meet the taxation threshold will be exempt 
from the individual mandate. See Kaiser Family Found., Focus on Health Reform: 
Summary of New Health Reform Law 1 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
healthreform/upload/8061.pdf. There are seven other groups exempted from the indi-
vidual mandate: incarcerated individuals, undocumented immigrants, individuals for 
whom the required contribution exceeds eight percent of an individual’s income, indi-
viduals with a coverage gap less than three months in duration, individuals with a hardship 
exemption, Native Americans, and individuals with a religious exemption. See id. The indi-
vidual religious exemption is very narrowly tailored and is generally used only by the 
Amish and some Mennonites. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2009); Maura 
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was $9500 for individuals and $19,000 for families.344 If an individual or 
family refuses to comply with the individual mandate, the monetary 
penalty, starting in 2016,345 will be the greater amount of either: (1) a 
flat fee ranging from $695 per year346 up to three times that amount 
(maximum $2085),347 or (2) two and a half percent of income.348 Four 
examples clarify how the penalty would play out in different circum-
stances:349 
1) A family of four earning the median U.S. household in-
come of $49,445350 would pay a fee of $2025 for “going na-
ked,” because their flat fee amount is greater than the per-
centage fee.351 
                                                                                                                      
Reynolds, Health Bills Allow Some a Religious Exemption, Cong. Q. Pol. & MSNBC.com (Aug. 
3, 2009, 9:46 AM), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32267628/. 
344 See I.R.S. Publ’n 501, at 3 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p501.pdf. 
345 The penalties begin to take effect in 2014, but do not reach their full amounts until 
2016. See Kaiser Family Found., supra note 343, at 1. 
346 The $695 will be adjusted for inflation yearly after 2016. See Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of R.I., Federal Healthcare Reform: Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act Individual Mandate & Subsidy 2 (2010), available at https://www.bcbsri. 
com/BCBSRIWeb/pdf/Individual_Mandate_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
347 The $695 is calculated for each spouse, plus $695 for each dependent over the age 
of eighteen, with dependents under the age of eighteen resulting in a fractional amount of 
$695. See id. The limit on the flat fee is $2085 per family, no matter the number of depend-
ents. See id. Thus, for example, a family of five with three children over the age of eighteen 
still will pay only the $2085 flat fee. See id. 
348 The 2.5% of income is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount 
(for example, $19,000 for families in 2011) from the total amount of income reported. See 
id. A family earning $100,000 a year in 2011 would subtract $19,000, for a total of $81,000. 
The 2.5% would then be calculated against the $81,000, equaling $2025, the amount the 
family would have to pay as the penalty under the percentage. In other words: (Gross In-
come - Tax Threshold Amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; (100,000 - 
$19,000) x 0.025 = $2025. 
349 All of the following examples are made using the 2011 tax threshold and the 2016 
penalty schedule. See supra notes 343–348 and accompanying text. 
350 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Cov-
erage in the United States: 2010 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11-157.html. 
351 This family’s penalty will be the greater of their percentage penalty or flat fee. The 
percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from the 
total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold 
amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($49,455 - $19,000) x 0.025 
= $761.38. The flat fee has a maximum of $2025, which will apply to a family of four. Be-
cause $2025 is greater than $761.38, this family will pay $2025—the flat fee amount. 
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2) A family of four earning $150,000 would pay $3275 for “go-
ing naked,” because their percentage fee is greater than the 
flat fee.352 
3) An individual earning $50,000 would be subject to a pen-
alty of approximately $1010, because the percentage fee is 
greater than the flat fee.353 
4) An individual earning $26,364, the 2011 median annual 
wage,354 would be subject to a penalty of $695, because the 
flat fee is greater than the percentage fee.355 
 Of course, objectors who drop coverage and pay the fine will not 
be able to purchase an unobjectionable insurance product in the mar-
ket once the ACA’s extensive regulation of the insurance exchanges 
begins.356 
 Whether they be individuals or groups, religious objectors to the 
coverage mandate can solve the collision between their religious con-
victions and the demands of the law only by taking extreme measures, 
sometimes at great personal costs to themselves. A benefits exemption 
would give religious objectors a less extreme way out, which permits 
them to comply both with the law and with their religious tenets. Thus, 
                                                                                                                      
352 This family’s penalty will be the greater of their percentage penalty or flat fee. The 
percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from the 
total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold 
amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($150,000 - $19,000) x 0.025 
= $3275. The flat fee has a maximum of $2025 which will apply to a family of four. Because 
$3275 is greater than $2025, this family will pay $3275, the percentage fee amount. 
353 This individual’s penalty will be the greater of the percentage penalty or flat fee. 
The percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from 
the total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold 
amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($50,000 - $9500) x 0.025 = 
$1012.50. As noted earlier, the individual’s tax threshold is lower than that for a family. 
The flat fee has a maximum of $2025, which will not be used here since we are concerned 
with an individual. Instead, the flat fee amount is $695. Because $1012.50 is greater than 
$695, the individual will pay $1012.50, the percentage fee amount. 
354 See Jillian Berman, U.S. Median Annual Wage Falls to $26,364 as Pessimism Reaches 10-Year 
High [Correction], Huffington Post ( Jan. 23, 2012, 8:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2011/10/20/us-incomes-falling-as-optimism-reaches-10-year-low_n_1022118.html. 
355 This individual’s penalty will be the greater of the percentage penalty or flat fee. 
The percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from 
the total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold 
amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($26,364 - $9500) x 0.025 = 
$421.60. As above, the individual’s tax threshold is lower than that for a family. The flat fee 
has a maximum of $2025, which will not be used here since we are concerned with an 
individual. Instead, the flat fee amount is $695. Because $695 is greater than $421.60, the 
individual will pay $695, the flat fee amount. 
356 See supra notes 343–348 and accompanying text. 
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the question for policymakers becomes not whether to avoid harm, but 
rather which harm to avoid as they seek to balance two competing 
goods—access to a full range of health care services and religious lib-
erty. Rather than forcing religious employers and individuals into tak-
ing extreme measures, policymakers may well choose to give them a 
less extreme option. The Obama administration has a ready vehicle for 
providing this way-out—the hardship waiver.357 
VII. Seventh Sticking Point: Exemptions Will  
Undermine Dignity 
 Many contend that religious liberty exemptions encourage or fa-
cilitate discrimination and bigotry and thus will undermine the dignity 
of same-sex couples.358 As a threshold matter, the possibility of digni-
tary harm will not take policymakers very far because there are two im-
positions of indignity here—the possible affront to lesbian and gay 
couples who are turned aside, and the affront to religious believers who 
are told that their beliefs are not to be tolerated, at least not in the pub-
lic sphere. As Judy Brown, president of the American Life League, 
note
s of the 
dignity that obedience to God’s moral law provides.359 
              
d: 
The Rev. John A. Leies, . . . president emeritus of St. Mary’s 
University, . . . reminds us that Vatican II declared, “In the 
depths of their conscience, men and women detect a law 
which they do not impose on themselves but which holds them 
to obedience, a law written by God; to obey it is the very dig-
nity of men and women. According to it they will be judged.” 
This is what Obama’s mandate violates. He will strip u
                                                                                                        
quot-
ing 
 
357 See supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing the hardship waiver). 
358 See Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:57:55 (statement of 
Councilmember David Catania describing religious exemptions as a “get out of jail free” card 
authorizing discrimination); see also Wilson, supra note 46, at 319 n.3 (“Tolerate intolerance? 
Not a chance. Bigotry is bigotry, even if they’re pretending God told them to do so.” (
anarcho-liberal-tarian, Comment to Wilson, Marriage Equality Bill, supra note 246)). 
359 Press Release, Judy Brown, President of the Am. Life League, HHS Mandate Strips 
Catholic Freedom and Human Dignity (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.all.org/ 
article/index/id/MTAwMTk. The controversy over the New York town clerk’s “creative 
solution” to her religious objection to same-sex marriage illustrates the competing claims 
of intolerance and harm. One of the women seeking the marriage license in New York told 
the New York Times that “[g]ay people have fought so long and hard to get these civil rights 
. . . . To have her basically telling us to get in the back of the line is just not acceptable.” See 
Kaplan, supra note 221. The clerk countered in the Wall Street Journal, stating that “people 
are opposed to accommodating [my] faith.” Gay Marriage, Religion Issues in NY Clerk Race, 
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Legislators face dueling dignitary harms, and thus dignitary considera-
tions cannot by themselves resolve the question of whether to have ex-
emptions. They can, however, help us structure exemptions—at least 
some of the time. 
 In a perfect world, no one would ever know that a religious objec-
tor stepped aside. How would this work? Consider a government mar-
riage license office with four clerks: Faith, Hope, Charity, and Efficiency. 
Only Faith objects to assisting with same-sex marriage license applica-
tions. If all four clerks randomly greet individuals and couples who pre-
sent, disaster looms. Faith could easily pop up to assist a young man, 
Steve, only to find him later joined with his same-sex partner. If Faith 
refuses to assist the couple, surely they will notice and be offended. 
 Contrast this with a Division of Motor Vehicles-style intake scheme 
in which one clerk does the intake and farms out work to the others. In 
this scheme, Efficiency might serve in the intake role, or she, Hope, 
and Charity might switch off, leaving Faith to spend her day processing 
paperwork without greeting the public. When Steve arrives, Efficiency 
quickly and efficiently directs him and his partner to a willing provider. 
Faith does not receive a pass; she still has the duty to serve other cou-
ples. 
 But note what does not happen in this system: same-sex couples 
are not asked to step into another line. They are not asked to wait 
longer. And they never even know that they have been queued to a 
non-objecting clerk. Obviously, any dignitary harm evaporates if the 
exemption is invisible. 
 How an office chooses to staff around an objector would be within 
its sound discretion, absent some other provision of state law,360 since 
the best arrangement may change with the specific circumstances fac-
ing the office—such as the number of willing providers, the number of 
religious objectors, the volume of requests for marriage applications in 
relation to other work, and so forth. 
 Some voice a nagging “suspicion that, for some of these people— 
not all, but some—what’s cast as a ‘principled religious objection’ boils 
down to simple gut feeling.”361 The possibility of unfair surprise is a se-
rious one and warrants attention. Willy-nilly refusals can be avoided by 
                                                                                                                      
Wall. St. J. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://sec.online.wsj.com/article/APdc4e266cbfe34cfc97b0 
8b5a3e786654.html?mod=WSJ_NY_LEFTAPHeadlines. This trope is gaining a lot of trac-
tion. See Goodstein, supra note 100. 
360 See supra note 227 (discussing a New York law allowing the delegation of tasks to 
other personnel). 
361 See Corvino, supra note 165. 
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making objectors state their objections in advance and in writing—a 
common device used to implement health care conscience clauses and 
conscientious objection to military service.362 Checking in with em-
ployees about possible objections is crucial in order to enable employ-
ers to staff around those who object and avoid unfair surprise to both 
e p
harm t: 
(1) Same-sex couples should never have to stand in another 
(2
ointment or mail-in 
(3  an objector should be invisi-
(4 ent of a religious 
. The clerk’s public explanations created a lot of needless ran-
or.3
                                                                                                                     
th ublic and the employer. 
 Four concrete commitments would limit the possibility of dignitary 
 to same-sex couples and should guide the staffing arrangemen
line; 
) Same-sex couples should receive the service in the same 
manner that any other couple receives it (so that if hetero-
sexual couples receive a service by app
request, same-sex couples would, too); 
) Any scheme to staff around
ble to same-sex couples; and 
) If an employee gave no advance statem
objection, no refusal should be allowed. 
 The controversy in New York over the town clerk’s delegation of 
marriage license applications to an assistant is again instructive. If New 
York laws indeed permitted such a delegation,363 there was no compel-
ling reason for the clerk to articulate the reason behind this staffing 
change
c 64 
 Obviously, these commitments make sense for a government office 
or for a large bureaucratic organization in the private sector. They 
would not, however, shield same-sex couples from the insult of being 
denied services from small “Mom and Pop” businesses in the wedding 
industry. Nonetheless, as noted above, same-sex couples have consider-
able recourse in the marketplace for such refusals.365 In short, we 
should strive to make accommodations as cost-free as possible when we 
 
362 Legislators can, and should, authorize employers to ask about potential objections 
or demand that potential objectors state their objections ex ante in writing. See Wilson, 
supra note 30, at 299–327 (excerpting selected state statutes permitting an objection only if 
the invoker shows proof or states his or her reasons in writing). 
363 See supra note 227. 
364 See, e.g., Dial, supra note 283. 
365 See supra notes 118, 285–286 and accompanying text (discussing the backlash 
against a New Jersey bridal shop that refused to serve a lesbian customer). 
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can do so, but the fact that w ve that end in each and eve-
 ca
religious liberty accommodations qual-
ied by
ow thoughtful an exemption or a claim for ex-
emptions may be, realistically to obtain religious liberty protection re-
quires that proponents understand how exemptions look to decision-
makers on the ground. 
e cannot achie
ry se does not negate the good that we can do. 
Conclusion 
 This Article considers a burning issue in society today—whether, 
and under what circumstances, religious groups and individuals should 
be exempted from the dictates of civil law. A number of the “sticking 
points” to providing religious liberty exemptions to same-sex marriage 
laws collected in this Article bear an uncanny resemblance to those rag-
ing in the debate over the Obama administration’s sterilization and 
contraceptive coverage mandate. Among these real-world points of re-
sistance to providing religious accommodations are legitimate, trou-
bling concerns in a pluralistic, democratic society: why should legisla-
tors accommodate anyone’s beliefs; how can we distinguish between 
legitimate religious beliefs and animus or mere silliness; how attenu-
ated can one’s participation in an objectionable activity be and still war-
rant protection, among other issues. As this Article demonstrates, ac-
cess and religious liberty need not be mutually exclusive social goods if 
policymakers embrace nuanced 
if  hardship to the public. Indeed, qualified exemptions can trans-
form a zero-sum proposition into one in which both access and reli-
gious freedom can be affirmed. 
 Ultimately, religious objectors must make convincing claims for 
legislative accommodations because they are not shielded from gener-
ally applicable, neutral laws as a matter of federal constitutional right. 
In the end, no matter h
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Appendix A: Core Religious Liberty Protections in Same-Sex 
Marriage Legislation 
All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly exempt 
clergy from requirements to solemnize or celebrate marriages inconsis-
tent with their religious faith. 
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a (West Supp. 2011); D.C. Code 
§ 46-406(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 457:37 (Supp. 2011); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 11(1)(1-a) 
(McKinney Supp. 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5144(b) 
(Supp. 2011); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(2)(4) (West 
2005); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly allow a 
religiously-affiliated group to refuse to provide services, accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or 
celebration of a marriage. 
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) 
(McKinney Supp. 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(l) 
(Supp. 2011); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(2)(5); H.B. 
438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly protect 
covered religious objectors from private suit.  
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1); 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(l); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 26.04.010(2)(6); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
Six jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, New York, and Washington) expressly protect religious ob-
jectors, including religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations, from 
being penalized by the government for such refusals through, for ex-
ample, the loss of governments grants.  
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-
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b(1); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010(2)(4); H.B. 438, 2012 
Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
Three jurisdictions (the District of Columbia, Maryland, and New 
Hampshire) expressly protect religious organizations from promoting 
same-sex marriage in violation of the religious society’s beliefs through 
religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats.  
See D.C. Code § 46-406(e); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) 
(exempting “the promotion of marriage through religious 
counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing desig-
nated for married individuals”); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th 
Sess. (Md. 2012) (provided so long as the program receives 
no government funding). New York may provide this protec-
tion as well. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(2) (“[N]othing in 
this article shall limit or diminish the right . . . of any religious 
. . . organization . . . from taking such action as is calculated by 
such organization to promote the religious principles for 
which it is established or maintained.”). 
Two jurisdictions (New Hampshire and New York) expressly protect 
religious organizations from promoting marriage through . . . housing 
designated for married individuals.  
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 
§ 10-b(2) (“[N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the 
right . . . of any religious . . . organization . . . to limit em-
ployment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or 
admission to or give preference to persons of the same relig-
ion or denomination.”). 
Three states (Maryland, New Hampshire, and Vermont) expressly allow 
religiously-affiliated fraternal organizations, such as the Knights of Co-
lumbus, to limit insurance coverage to spouses in traditional marriages.  
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(IV); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 4501(b) (Supp. 2011); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 
2012). 
Two states (Connecticut and Maryland) expressly allow a religiously-
affiliated adoption or foster care agency to place children only with 
heterosexual married couples so long as they don’t receive any gov-
ernment funding.  
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-135b; H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th 
Sess. (Md. 2012). 
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Three states (Maryland, New Hampshire and New York) expressly ex-
empt individual employees who are managed, directed, or supervised 
by or in conjunction with a covered entity from celebrating same-sex 
marriages if doing so would violate their religious beliefs.  
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 
§ 10-b(1); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012). 
Two states (Maryland and New York) include non-severability clauses in 
their legislation.  
See 2011 N.Y. Laws 752; H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 
2012). 
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Appendix B: Proposed Same-Sex Marriage Legislation 
The Marriage Conscience Protection Act that I and others have pro-
posed366 would read: 
 
Section ___ 
 
(a) Religious organizations protected. 
No religious or denominational organization, no organization operated 
for charitable or educational purposes which is supervised or con-
trolled by or in connection with a religious organization, and no indi-
vidual employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in 
the scope of that employment, shall be required to 
(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization 
or celebration of any marriage; or 
(2) solemnize any marriage; or 
(3) treat as valid any marriage 
if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such 
organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious be-
liefs. 
 
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected. 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole pro-
prietor, or small business shall be required to 
(A) provide goods or services that assist or promote the sol-
emnization or celebration of any marriage, or provide coun-
seling or other services that directly facilitate the perpetuation 
of any marriage; or 
(B) provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or 
(C) provide housing to any married couple 
if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause such 
individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such small businesses, to 
violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. 
(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if 
                                                                                                                      
366 This proposal has previously appeared in Wilson, supra note 46, at 367–68. 
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(A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar 
good or services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere 
without substantial hardship; or 
(B) in the case of an individual who is a government em-
ployee or official, if another government employee or official 
is not promptly available and willing to provide the requested 
government service without inconvenience or delay; provided 
that no judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall 
be required to solemnize any marriage if to do so would vio-
late the judicial officer’s sincerely held religious beliefs. 
(3) A “small business” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a le-
gal entity other than a natural person  
(A) that provides services which are primarily performed by 
an owner of the business; or 
(B) that has five or fewer employees; or 
(C)  in the case of a legal entity that offers housing for rent, 
that owns five or fewer units of housing. 
(c) No civil cause of action or other penalties. 
No refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges protected by this section shall  
(1) result in a civil claim or cause of action challenging such 
refusal; or 
(2) result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions 
to penalize or withhold benefits from any protected entity or 
individual, under any laws of this State or its subdivisions, in-
cluding but not limited to laws regarding employment dis-
crimination, housing, public accommodations, educational 
institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-
exempt status. 
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